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PREFACE 
During the past year a great many people, with wi�ely varying.
degrees of knowledgeability, have written about the problems and 
controversies arising during and subsequent to the establishment
of the Federation of Malaysia. Although the better informed of 
these writers have all acknowledged the importance of Singapore's 
internal politics in �nderstanding the process of federation, none
has, to my knowledge, undertaken the thorough and searching 
analysis of this problem that it merits. Yet clearly the central 
and most decisive factor in understanding the background and 
process of Malaysia's formation, not to mention the new Federation's 
emerging internal problems, are the internal politics of Singapore.
Covering the period 1959 through May 1964, this study by Mr. Milton 
Osborne is, I believe, the-most thorough and substantial analysis 
of this subject yet to have appeared. It should be helpful to all 
those wishing to understand the motivations behind the establish­
ment of the new Federation and the centrifugal forces working within 
it -- forces which in the long run are likely to be of greater
importance than its more immediate external problems. 
Milton Os:t>orne received his B.A. degree, from the University of 
Sydney in 1958 with First Class Honours and the University Medal in 
History. He- then entered the·Aust�alian Department of External 
Affairs, remaining there until 1962. During this time he apent over 
two years as a member of the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh in 
Cambodia. From 1962-63 he was.!f'a temporary lecturer in History-at the 
University of Sydney, and spent three months of this period on re­
search in Singapore and Saigon. He was fortunate to be in Singapore 
at. times when events of marked importance to Malaysia we.re taking
place, in December 1962 during the time of the B�nei rebellion and 
February of 1963 when large scale.!f'detention of opposition ·elements!f'· 
was carried out •. In Sep_t:ember of 1963 Mr. Osbome, as a doc�oral 
candidate in Southeast ·Asian History, entered Cornell where a pre-._
limina-ry draft of tpis study was written for a Malaysia seminar held 
during the fall term of 1963. The Cornell Southeast Asia Program is 
pleased to give this study the wider dissemination which we believe
it deserves. 
Ithaca, New York G. M�T. Kahin 
June 10; 1964 Director·
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INTRODUCTJON -- THE SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF Tl{E SURVEY 
In 1959 the People's Action Party came to power in Singapore with 
the aim of merger with Malaya as a major plank in its party platform!f'o
Five years later, in 1964, with merger achieved,within Malaysia, the 
same party attempted to extend its power beyond Singapore and to achieve
parliamentary representation in the Fe<Jeral Parliament from Malaya, as
well as from Singapore. Despite its.!f'lack of success in this attempt, 
the People's Action Party's decision to contest the Mal_ayan elections 
in April 1964 appears to have been an important turning point in Malaysian 
politics. It represented the first attempt by an opposition party to 
achieve pan-Malaysian representation at the Federal level. This survey 
seeks to describe and analyze the events between �he assumption of power 
by the People's Action Party in Singapore in 1959 and that party's 
decision to contest the Malayan elections .in 19640 In order to place 
these events in perspective there is also a brief consideration of events 
in Singapore from the Second World War until 1959. Singapore's extemal 
relations during the period under consi�eration, includin$ those with 
Malaya, have been 1mp.,rtant�. But in· great measure these relations have 
depended on the development of -.internal politics. Indeed, the dec-ision · 
to contest the Malayan elections reflected the strong position which the 
People's Action Party had achieved in Singapore after its victory in the 
Singapore elections of September 1963. In essence these internal poli­
tics have consisted of a battle for survival fought by the People's 
Action Party against a challenge from the Barisan Socialis, a party 
which emerged from within the People's Action Party and which pre-empted 
many of the tactics of its parent. 
Two most important limitations faced my study of Singapore politics. 
The first is a matter of technique. The second, and probably the more 
important, is a matter of methodology and interpretation. The technical 
matter involves the use of source material. To be fully equipped for a 
survey of Singapore politics would require a knowledge of English, 
Chinese, Malay and Tamil, as well as the obvious desideratum of a grea�er
personal knowledge of the area. I have had to approach this survey with 
English as my one useful linguistic aid. But in fact, in the context of 
inmediately available material, reliance on English sources becomes less 
of a handicap than might be imagined. English continues to be an impor­
tant vehicle for politics in Malaysia and the principal newspaper 
reporting is in English. 
On the second limitation, it se�ms necessary to outline the diffi­
culties involved in interpreting· the true nature of the policies of the
Barisan Socialis and the political affi�iations of its leaders. These·· 
are matters of great importance to the discussion: of politics in 
Singapore which are difficult to resolvl·� ,, Singapore does not enjoy a
fully free press. The powers of the Government are such that it can
limit ·critical c0t01oe1'\t. The chief newspaper operating within the state 
has recognized the bounds within which it can operate and keeps to 
V 
them. 
* 
The result is an unsympathetic presentation of the Barisan 
Socialis' point of view and a restriction on the amount of printed 
critical ·coo,oen.t concerning the Government. In attempting to ana­
lyze such a situation one risks depending on conclusions which 
stress "success" as opposed to "failure'' and of neglecting 'the 
content of the opposition party's policies. Again, Lee Kuan Yew's 
success in internal politics has been achieved at the expense of 
freedoms which are accepted, at., least as goals, in Western 
democracies. Both in the ca�e of the People's Action Party and the 
Barisan Socialis, I have attempted to set their actions and policies 
against the background of Singapore's political development. Where 
value judgments obtrude, I have done my best to identify them as 
such. In suggesting that the Barisan Socialis' policies were of 
such a nature as to benefit the aims of the Coillillunists in Singapore 
and Malaya, I am relying on the technique of comparison and exten­
sion of what are generally ass,ned to be the aims of Conmw.,ists in 
the area, when reviewed by knowledgeable observers. It is not suf­
ficient to note that the Barisan Socialis' policies were impracticable 
within the limits set by the Federation of Malaya's attitudes. In 
addition to the negative aspects,there was the positive consideration 
of the damage which would have been done to relations between Singa­
pore and Malaya through adherence to the Barisan policies. Here, of 
course, a judgment of both value and practicability is made which 
probably cannot be avoided. This is that a viable future for Singa­
pore lies in merger with Malaya and not in isolation or in opposition 
to the Federation of Malaysia. It is difficult to escape this con­
clusion, or the additional judgment: that the terms which Lee Kuan Yew 
obtained for merger represented the maximum advantage which could be 
obtained by Singapore. 
Milton Eo Osborne 
Ithaca, New York 
May 15, 1964 
* This point has been made in annual surveys of government inter-
ference in the press throughout the world conducted by the 
Associated Press. In its latest survey, reported in the New York 
T:lmes. of 5 ,Tamary 1964, it remadced: ''Malaysia has no censorship 
of outgoing news. Newspapers face a govermuent shutdown if they 
defy govt:.r,ooent policy." 
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I. THE·BACKGROUND 
Two facts are central to any pis�ussion of Singapore: -one is. the 
island's prox.imity -to the Malayan_.inainland; the other is the overwhelm­
ingly Chinese nature of its popul�tion.l The first fact combined with 
Singapore's limited natural resources, not, least of water,s· make it 
impossible to think of the island having any tru,e vialj,ility. independent
of Malaya, whatever precedents may be quoted, as _they·were by 'David 
Marshall in 1-956, for independent states of l�ss than one million 
people. The nature, of Singapore's racial composition is of the greatest 
importance for the polit;ical orientation of its politics, the develop­
ment of its educational ·policies, ·and for its -position· vis-a-vis a 
conservative Malayan GC!ntel"nment dominated by Malays and firmly committed 
to a policy of Malay paramountcy, despite concessions to the.sChinese 
position in Malaya. Practically and economically merger has seemed de- · · 
sirable and logical, with inimediate advantages offering in such fields 
as a unified public servic•e and in a joint approach _to economic problems.
Politically, for �he greater part of the postwar period merger has 
seemed impossible. The divergent economic developmentsof Singapore has 
been a complicating facto�. Ma.laya as a p,;fma,:y producing country de­
pends on export· duties and protective-tariffs. Singapore from itss. 
foundation has been a free port relying heavily _for fi.nance, although 
less and less exclusively since the Second World War, ort entrepot trade. 
This divergent development did in .s·• ·fact offer advantages in merger 
through complementarity but it posed the problems, as much political as 
economic, of how to blend the two territo�ies' economies with as little 
disadvantage· as possible to eachso 
There has been merger at the physical level between Singapore and 
Malaya for many years through t�e Johore Causeway, and this has been re­
inforced by the increasing reliance placed on water supplied from Johoreso 
Indeed, the ec·onomic linkage of Johore and Singapore was clearly estab­
lished in the nineteenth century. In discussion since -1946 political 
r�«!�t Monthly Digest of Statistics,
1962). Tables 2 .1 and 2 .3. · 
lo The following population figures are taken from the Singapore
Gove_s .. Vol. 1, No ., 12 (Singapore, 
Total population - mid 1962 - 1,732,800
Population by race - mid 1962 - Chinese 1,302,500, Malays 243s9 400,
Indians 143,700, Other 43,000so 
The approximate breakd�n of_ the Chinese population into linguistic 
• 'I . 
groups as of 1958 was Hokkien 432,000, Cantonese 236,000, Teochew 
234�000, Hakka 60,000, Hainanese 79,000, Foochow 14,000s., These . 
figures were provided by the Singapore Chief Secretary on 3 December 
1958·- Singapore Legislative Asse1!11>ly Debates:· p££icial Report 
(henceforth Leg. ,,A�,s. Debates), 3 D�cember 1958, Cols. 1024-1025 o 
. . . . . 
2 
merger has been pronouu�d an ohjective of the-majority of parties in 
Singapom. As an issue, however, it has only ceee into real prominence
with the 11a1mation of British govn•n•e�tal control in Singapore aad in 
conjunction with the awing from reatricted political activity, and a
restricted franchise, to the participation of the mass of the popalation
in politics and the nergence of partie·s relying on mass serpport. 
This survey will be chiefly concerned with events from Singapore's 
attai-- ient of seai-independence in 1959 until the achie,,..n,ent of Malaysia
in September 1963, with greatest attention given to the period 1961 to 
1963. So.e attention will be g�ven at the end of the fhatve1, however, to 
the events following September 1963, in particular to the decision by the
principal Singapore political party to play an active role in Malayan 
politics. Bat to obtain a proper perspective the point of departere must 
be the end of the Second World War. Singapere was not included in either 
the Malayan Vnion or the Malayan Federation set up by tlte British 
GO'fttomeat after the war. The prl-.cipal reason for thia decision was 
the fact of Singapore's heavily Chinen- population which was seen as 
likely to create racial difficulti .. if cabined with the Chineae popu­
lation on the aainland. As a pos_itive aapec:t of the same issue there 
was the develcrp ent of Malay natioaali•, which had for the first t:fme 
rationalized its concern for the reaulta of Chinese economic domination 
into political action. Other cen.tribllting reasons wre the differing 
economic develop-at of Singapore, with neither Singapore nor Malaya
ready at that stage to discuss an econemic modus vivendi which might
overco e the problems of union; an4 the strategic consicleratiom of the 
British Gover;;; ent which wished to maintain a strong Far Eastern base. 
In this f:lnal nspect British concern was st11ngthened by the Malayan 
Emergency and the outbreak of the ICorean War. 
Tbe moat characteristic feat.-re of Singapore politics in the period 
11+ ediately after the Seeoncl World War was tbe failure of the population
to participate in politics, even giving consideration to the limitations 
of the franchise. Two threads xun thl'ngh this situation. First, the·
Japanese occ:upation had alienated the traditional leaders of the Chinese 
co-w11uoity -- the towkays or prospe'."'Olls bdsinesa en -- fi:• participation
in politica.3 At the rame t1me, there waa resistance fJ."Olll the politic­
ally aware Chinese to the limit�tins placed upon them, and resento.ent
of those l:lmitatiODS was translated into beycott of the electoral re­
gisters as wll as in the low percentage of votes cast. It bas been 
estfmated that in the first two elections held in Singapore in 1948 and 
1951 a quarter of a million persona were eligible to vote. In 1948 some 
twenty-two thousand persons registered to vote and sixty-three percent 
of these exercised their right, while in 1951 some forty-eight thousand 
2. L.!f'A. Mills, Malaya - A Political and Economic Appraisal, (Minneapolis,
1958), P• 117. 
3. v. Purcell, The Chinese in Modern Malaya, (Singapore, 1960), p. 39. 
3 
. \ . ' . 
registered and fifty-one percent of the registered voters voted.
4 
Along
with this xeluctance to participate in �lections, h•ever, there was by
the early fifties increasing activity by left-wing organizers who cam­
paigned against· colonialism and present·ed independen� from Britain as 
·their aim. 'l'hetr· poiicies• found ready appeal among the youJiger Chinese,
particuJarly those· at·tendi�g: the Chit\es� -��dle schoo1s, many of whom · . · ·
school children would ·
ready vitally aware of the changing role being played by China in world 
affairs. Calls to action phrased in anti-colonial terms or in terms
which stressecf Chinese chauvinism. had . great appeal. No real sense of 
were older than their status as!f' suggest and al­
. .
Malayan nationalism developed because of the China-oriented outlook of 
those to whom this agitation was directed. But Singapore's economic
problems and its position as a British garrison-town insured that there ·!f'
would be continued •sitation for greater power for the island's inhabit­
ants. The· Br-itish re·aponse to the situation was to app·oint the Rendel 
COUl4laaion, and its Report, issued in 1954, brought the first significant 
step tGWaris popular participation in politic·s. lnte�stingly, the
Report, while noting· that the q:uesti on of Singapore's merger with- Malaya
lay ou�side its terins: of ref�ren�,- referred· to_!f'the desirabilit!. of5 _merger in the future •. - : . . . , .. , . •. . . . . · . · · · . ·· · 
Changes following the Renclel Deport, while not bringing·manhood 
suffrage, su.fficiently enlarged the- electora.te· to, encourage. the parti­
cipation of· the. radical, left. .:..wing politicians; · and· in the:· 19 55 elections
the People's Action Party (P.A.P.), dominated from its foundation in 1954 
by �• Kuan Yen, the present. _Pri�,._Minister of Singapore, won representa­
tion in. the Singapore Legislative As· Of. the · ,.. _ sembly with three seats. 6· ·. ,,_. ....... - .
parties contesting tbe�elections the P.A.P. was clearly the furthest to
the left of the political spectrum. �lth�gh, seeking to appeal�to a 
multi-racial audience the P.A.P., as must be the case with any-mass 
party in.Singapore, depends principally on its abil�ty to muster the
Chinese vote. Its most active leaders have come from. among those Chinese 
who have been educated in the English-language schools·and who have been 
dissatisfied with the policies offered b,y more conservative Chinese 
groups auQh as the Malayan Chinese Asso_ciation (M.c.A.). . T� participa­
tion of a limited number of capable Indians in the leadership has been 
important .also, while the need to give some representation to Malays has 
not been neglected. This latter aim has been so successfully pursued
that in the September 1963 elections the United Malays National Organiza­
tion (U.M.N.Oo) candidates in Singapore were unable to gain one seat
against the P.A.P.7 From the outset the P.A.P. has proclaimed -its aim of 
union with Malaya. It is a measure- the changed situation in!f'Singapore­of· -
Malayan relations that thi,� party, which. was seen by many in the' Federation 
as unre�emed.ly associated with eow,m,uniam and Chinese c;hauvinism, has 
successfully concluded merger with the F�deration of Malaya.
, . 
' .
4. L.!f'A. Mills, op. cit., p. 119. 
5. Report of the Con§titutional Coo•uiaeion, Singapore, :(Singapore, 1954),·· · · see PP• 137-142. · 
6. L� A •. M;lls, !P• cit., p. 123.. .. ., .
7. For an analya·ts ·of' t·be e·ducational background of the P .• A.P. leaders, 
see Appendix A. 
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Politics 1n· Singapore from 19S5 to 111111-independence in 1959 are
frequently _described in terms of a!f'. one-way swing of the political 
pendulum from right to left. This is cotte�t as a generalization but 
it requizea qualiftcation. First, radical positio�a taken in election 
campaigns wre not always earried tbmugb in practice. Second, in
describing Singapore politics wight mast be given to the setting in 
which thay · take place, which is one of hiP- ,memployment. extremely un­
satisfactory conditions of social wlfare,!f'8 and a fmtrating dependence 
on the British presence for much of the eoq,toywent in Singapore, made 
doubly fruatrating by such statements as that of-Lellllox·Boyd, the
British Colonial ·-Secretary, that ''people who depend· on· selling goods 9
should get OD with the job and Wul!ty leas over constitutional niceties." 
Dari� this period, with the exception of David Marshall's theatrically
unproductive demand ·for complete independence in 1956, there was
general acceptance of the aim of obtaining Singapore's independence 
through merger with Malaya, althypb the terms envisaged by different
political groups varied greatly. The Federation leaders during this
period 1e,1t1i.ned firmly opposed;.· to 116rgeJ: as a practical proposition.
The tone in which these Federation views we� expressed might vary but 
the inferen� was always the 11an-8. · Thus, although at the time of the 
£ormdation of the P.A.P. in 1954, Tengku Abdul Rahman suggested that if 
the P .A.P. • s stand on merger had wider currency attaining that aim 
might not be so difficuli as oba.;:zvers :imagined, this was no more than
a political pleasantry. In 1956 the Tengku, in a rnann�r provoking 
Singapore criticism, indicated!f'.!f'that tbe Federation might consider aci1pt­
ing Singapore as a subordinate unit within the Federation of Malaya.
Then early in 19S7 the Tensk!s stated that be did not think there was 
"any possibility of me_rger."13 The strongest view noted here seems, in
fact, to have been the basic Federation position. The Malay leaders of 
the Federation Gover■woe11t were acutely aware of the dangers of Chinese 
chauvinism and racialism -- there were riots on a racial basis in Penang
in early 19S7 -- and conscious too of the capacity, revealed during the 
Emergency, of ·a limited number of insurgents to disrupt Orderly govern­'
ment. The Singapore middle school riots and trade union protests in the 
second half of 19S6 mast have convinced them that there was no point in 
adding to their own troubles by embracing more in Singapore. 
Two £irrtber developments which took place before 1959 should be
noted for their bearing on later policies and events. The first of thes� 
was the detention in 1956 of the part of the P.A.P. Trade Union leadership 
8. A scholarly account of these problems is presented in Barrington Kaye,
Upper Nanki.n St�t, (Singapore, 1960).•
9. Tfmes (London), 20 August 195S0 
10. The co11oon aim was emphasized in the discussion before Lim Yew Hock 
went to London in 1957 with an all-party delegation.
11. Quoted in Lee ICuan'ICew; Battle.for Merger (Singapore, n.d.), p. 23. 
12. Straits T:f••, 24 J'amaary 19S6. 
13. Ibid., 18 January 19S7. 
- -
••• ••• • •• 
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which stood well to the left, including Lim Chin Siong, Devan Nair, s.
Woodhull, Chia Ek Tiam and James Puthucheary. 
,. 
Lee Kuan Yew has now 
I .stated that these men were acting as pro-Coumunists, an allegation lent 
truth by James Puthucheary's political testament which he wrote in the 
form of·a letter to Lee Kuan Yew while still under detention in
September 1957. In this letter, which is extremely revealing for its 
docwue4tation of the problems facing an inte11ectual living under 
colonial conditions and bitterly resentful of them, Puthucheary wrote: 
When I broke with my /Co11ounist7 political friends in 1951, 
the full implications were not clear to me, and so to a large 
extent hung in mid-air as it were. Though I had rejected some
of what were considered basic tenets, and was critical of Com­
munist reg1me�tation I was unable to reject their Weltenschauung. 
How much of my activities of the five intervening years is ex­
plained by this being and non-being I don!t know•••• 
My return from Communism was not in a straight line. One is
always drawn by the desire to fight colonialism and the urge to 
join up with those who are fighting hardest i,s irresistable • • • •  
But as I was not completely a social demQcrat.!f'when I was 
outside, the problem of choice never presented itself with any 
force. The best way to describe my political position at that 
time, would be probably to say that I was more a social democrat
than a Goomunist or was it the other way round?l4 
The lack of documentation concerning the attitudes of the other detainees 
makes judg,oeut difficult here. In choosing to detain the trade unionists, 
the Cb.iflf Minister at the time, Lim Yew Hock, was acting primarily in
association with the British authorities to restore order in the face of
riots and strikes. Lim Chin Siong as the most militant trade union 
leader became a prime target for detention. Possibly no more can be
said with certainty than that those ar1ested were closely associated 
with the events which had led to serious public disorder and that their 
statements.!f'in addressing rallies were certainly
.!f'
those of the extreme 
left.!f'15 Lim Chin Siong has continued to deny that he was or is a 
CCimlDUUist.16 The P.A.P., as it was bound te do, protested against the 
detentions and made the release of the detainees one of the main planks 
of its party platform in the 1959 elections. The detainees, as part of 
the process of release, signed a stat�9t in which they criticized the 
actions of the Malayan Coomunist Party. 
14. Quoted in Lee Kuan Yew, op. cit., p. 132. 
15. Accounts of the riots and strikes are contained in Straits Times for
September and October 1956. For an example of Lim Chin Siong's
speeches see Straits �imes 29 September 1956. 
16. Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XXXIV, No. 5, 2 November 1961, PP•
264-265 quoting Lim Chin Siong in an interview with Alex Josey. 
17. Lee Kuan Yew, op. cit., P• 32. 
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The other event to be iioted was_ the internal revolt which took place 
within the P .A.P. as a challenge to I.ee.' s leadership in 1957. In 
August 19S7 Lee and five-others refused to take office in the P. A.P. 
because they had lost control of the central e•cutive to more extreme 
members of the party. Their position aa leaders was saved by the deten­
tion of five ,.. ..,bers of the new earutive. Thia challenge., although 
dismissed at the time largely in tema of "adventurism", must have given
Lee Kuan Yew considerable pause as .to the future poaaib.ility of maintain­.
ing the P .A.P. 's position as a· party which was "non-C"'-iboc,nist" but not 
"anti-Coo11n1nf.st". Bat be apparently felt that it was necessary to main­
tain his party's prospects for power by basing it on as wide a composition
asn· p�s_sible. 
Although in opposition in the Legislative Assembly fran 1955 to 1959,
the P.A.P. made its voice beard through the ability of its parliamentary
representatives and through its capacity to organize well-attended mass 
meetings. Its policy on merger, which·nLee Kuan Yew presented whenever 
opportunity offered, was stated in the party's fourth anniversary cele­
bration issue of its journal Petir. Since- this policy_-statement ·refers 
to the P.A.P. •a assesanaent-of the Pederation·Gove:rumeut'a attitude - as 
well as to the P.A.P.'s plans, it warrants quotation in detail: 
The present Alliance Gowx,11•,e"'t Lin Malayif is anti-merger _n •••• 
The Alliance leaders have put out different reasons.at different 
times bat wen- can fllmoarise them into two: Singapom has about one 
million Chinese (about 701. of Singapore's population or 18% of the 
Federation population). The inclusion of this one million will 
upset the racial balance of power in the Federation. 
�cond, Singapore has too many 'leftists' who are supported by
the one million Chinese in Singapore. The Alliance leaders are not 
very clear in their distinction between Co•■nunists and socialists. 
They believe all leftists may be Cc:. eu11i�ts of varying degrees. 
We 11111st allay these fears and ereute the condition for merger.
This ia our 1 ediate task. To achieve freedom is no longer just 
a simple qaeation of fighting the British. We must also resolve 
the tw fears which make the Malay majority in the Federation not 
want the Chinese majority in Singapore.n18 
As a strong illustration of his party's readiness to co-operate, Lee 
Kuan Yew took the potentially difficult position of supporting the 
operation of the Internal Security Council to control security in Singa­
pore, since with merger as the P.A.P.'a aim he argued that it was logical
to recQp1ae that ultimate responsibility for security would rest in the 
·hands of the Feclerat"i.on.n19 
18. Extracted from an article in the- Foartl't Anniversary issue of Petir 
.(1958) and quoted in The Socialist Solution, (Singapore, n.d.), p. 18. 
19. Speaking in the Singapoze Legislative Assembly on 8 October 1958, Lee 
Kuan Yew said "If we are prepared to accept the Federation and join it 
as a member state it means we are prepared to al low the Government 
(continued) 
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It wal with the backgroun<J. which has been briefly described, that 
the maneuvering for merger took place following the P.A.P.'s election 
victory in 1959,. and after Tengku Abdul �mnan's Malayan proposal made 
in May 1961. The details of that pe�iod form the basis of the later 
sections of this e�say. · Why such importance was attached to the issue
of mergdr by the competing political intere�ts both in Singapore and 
outside was apparent in outline in the events.!f'between 1946 and 1959. In 
a very real sense these wer� years.when an attempt was made by both the 
British, and later the emerging Malayan Government, to remove Singapore
from the area of imme4iate concern by fostering its semi-independent
development, presumably with the hope that a pragmatic approach to 
Singapore's problems oould meet wMtever difficulties occurred. That
this could be no more than a stopgap approach was inherent in Singapore's
racial composition and in the character of its politics. In order to 
recognize the reasons for the passion aroused by the struggle for merger, 
it is sufficient to consider the alternatives to merger. Under any 
estimation the most likely alternative, in the context of Singapore's 
situation in 1958, would have included some of the following character­
istics. Chinese chauvinism seemed likely to be increasingly difficult
to control. Separated from Malaya and resen�ful of it the Singapore 
Chinese, and in particular the younger.!f'elemer;it of the- population, could 
have had many rea•ons for frustration, both thrQUgh the impact of 
economic problems and thmugh the pre,ence· -� so ··long as Brit!sh bases 
remained -- of Western, "imperialis�•• forces. The economic problemsof a 
state with a rapidly increasing population, and the prospects of a de­
�lining entrepot trade, had little scope for improveme�t under conditions 
of independent development. Above all, the political prospects for 
Singapore, even with allowance made for.!f'the differences between policy 
and practice, appeared to show only those auguries which would favor the
political left, and the extreme left in particular. Merger offered a
viable alternative to the highly unattractive possibilities associated 
with a fully independent Singapore. As will be suggested later, the 
likely disruptive results of an independent Singapore and_tbe advantage 
which this would have given to the extreme left appears, in part, an
explanation for the bitter opposition from left-wing representatives to 
merger -and Malaysia. In short, with merger there could be a future for
Singapore. . Without merger there could, at best, only � uncertainty. 
representing the eleven states in the Federation to have a decisive
voice in the affairs of Singapore." Leg. Ass •. Debates, 8 October
1958, col. 804. · 
The lnt�rna,l Security Coancil was the principal British safeguard 
embodied in the 1958 Singapore Constitution. Under that Constitution 
the Internal Security Council was composed of two Singapore represen­
tatives, two British representatives and one Malayan representative 
·of ministerial rank. Thie compositiQn ensured that in the case of a 
British-Singapore d�adlock on internal security matters, the Malayan 
·member would have the casting vote. 
II. THE CITY STATE PROM 1959 
Adult suffrage, sustained criticism of Britain and promises of 
wide social improvements, plus the accoo1ootlation of extx-enae left-wing
politicians within the P.A.P. broaght it a sweeping victory in the 1959
Singapore elections. It won forty-three of the fifty-one seats in the
Legislative Assembly. In its 1!ampaign the P.A.P. developed the argu­
ment, which it had consistently advocated since its foundation, of sup­
port for Singapore's independence through merger with the Federation of 
Malaya.1 As elements in this arg.1oent the P.A.P. argued for tae con­
scious developmea>.t of a Malayan spirit within Singapore F such devices 
as stressing Malay as the national language of the state-· and developing, 
artificially if .necessary, ''Malayan Culture": 
Yes we are trying to develop a Malayan culture, if you like,
by pressure �oking. We are convinced that the longer it takes 
to develop a Malayan culture, the greater the danger of racial 
conflict, for, a Malayan culture is the only effective defence 
against racial conflict.3 
While Westem newspaper reporting chose to emphasize the anti-colonial 
nature of much of the P.A.P.'s election campaign and to ridicule the 
party's concern with "!f'yellow culture", there was another aspect to the 
campaign which received less publicity. In one of his speeches during 
the campaign, Lee Kuan Yew made it clear that in his analysis the ulti·­
ma.te contest in Singapore was between the P.A.P. and the Malayan
c�o-1°,nist Party, with the P.A.P. · for "a democratic, non-cOIIIDlWlist,
socialist Malaya and the Mal�an Cno11nu1ist Party for a Soviet Republic 
of Malaya."� 
Once in power, the P.A.P .. supported its stand on merger vocally 
with propaganda on its aims of· building a truly Malayan spirit within 
Singapore, and practically by seeking to make itself more acceptable
as a possible future partner in merger by cooperating with the Malayan 
and British Gover1w1ents in the preservation of security in Singapore. 
It also sought to make arrangements with the Federation which might 
ease Singapore's actual and potential economic problems. Singapore has 
always depended economically on its. function as an entrepot for the
region, particularly in tropic�l produce from such areas as Indonesia 
and the Indo-Chinese states. With the advent of independence for thes.e 
countries, a search for economic independence developed which was suf . ;.
ficiently effective to diniinish the .extent to which Singapore could 
1. An Pxao,ple is a speech by s. Rajaratnam -- now Minister for Culture 
-- on 19 April 1959 quoted in The Tasks Ahead (Singapore, n.d.). Pt. 1, 
P• 17. _..... . ... .. .2. Speech by Yong Nyuk Lin on 12 April 1959 in The T.asks Ahead, Pt.1, p.12.
3. S� Rajaratnam in speech on �5 July 1960 in Ma��lF Cul�ure in the ·- - ,, 
Making (Singapore, n.d.), Po 5. 
4. Quoted in Lee Kuan Yew,!f'. op. cit., p. 39. See also Straits Times, 30
May 1959. 
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rely on entrepot trade alone.!f'
5 At the same time SingapoTe!f'i s population 
was growing rapidly, with one of the highest birth rates in· the world 
and one of the lowest death: rates. It was estimated in 1960 that the 
population would reach two million by 1967 and double that number by 1982. 
A sudden increase in births at the end of the Second Wortd·!f'war had made 
Singapore's population an extremely young one, �ith nearly fifty percent 
under- fifteen years of age.6 In economic terms, the P.A.P. had sug­
gested that these were!f'.further reasons for aiming _!f'at political merger 
with Malaya but that they could be met immediately by some type _!f'of coumon 
market arrangement. In the election campaign the future
.
Singapore
Finance Minister, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, had spoken in terms of a couuoon
market which would permit Singapore to exp�rt goods into the Federation 
without paying duties, while proliding as a quid pro guo to the Federation 
joint control of Singapore port. Understandably, these proposals did 
not bring a response from the Federation once the P.A.P. took office, · 
although a series of t�lks were begun; Singapore, despite its higher per 
capita income has lower labor costs, and an arrangement such as suggested 
by Dr •. Goh Keng Swee would .permit .Singap.ore to import raw materials· at ·a
substantially lower cost than those availabie to Feder�tion manufacturers; 
then to. ma;nufacture gQods with c}leaper._!f'. labor ; �nd .finally to._sell these 
across - the Causeway in unfair competition with tbe!f'�lay� producers�!f'.
Federation reservations about Singapore's �ture were shared to some ex­
tent by businessmen operating in Singapore, and in, 1959 and 1960 capital, 
responding more. to �he tone of the governcnet>.t than to actual discrimina­
tory measures against business, moved to Kuala Lumpur.!f'8 At the same
t1me the Federation began to develop its own international port at Port 
Swettenham!f',' while some major providers of capital reacted as Shell did 
by establishing facilities in the Federation which!f'tended to duplicate.
those in Singapore. There was discussion of the possibility of moving
the rubber futures market from Singapore to Malaya. Economically
Singapore in 1960 presented a great many problems. 
Despite the P.A.P.'s attachment to Malayan culture, it retained its 
1rnage as a Chinese party in rederation eyes, and distrust of this and 
s. Report on the Economic Aspects of Malaysia by a Mission of the Inter­
national Bank for Reconstruction and Devel�nt under the Chairmanship 
of Mr. Jacques Ruef£. (henceforth Ruef£ Report) .(Kua,la Lumpur, 1963) p. 6. 
6. Singap�re Annual Report .;. 1960, (Singapore) P• 9 .  -
7. Speech ..
.
by Goh Keng Swee on 22 March 1959 ·in The Tasks Ahead, Pt. 1, p. 21. 
8. Ruef£ Report, p.· 2. In referring to· tpe "tone
u of the Singapore Govern­
ment I have in mind its loud demmciations· of ''yellow culture", threats 
to appropriate the land used. by the Royal Singapore Coif Club!f'.and such 
incidents as the cultural cause,celebre of November 1960 -- the Enright 
af�air. Professor Enright, Pro_fessor of English at. the University of · · · 
·Singapore • .;. then university of Malaya in Singapore -- in his in­
augural lecture suggested that to attempt·!f'to ·!f'c:reate a Malayan culture, 
was to try and achieve artificially what cc,ald only!f'.come with titne and 
nomal development and that Singapore was risking the creation of!f'.
"sarong"' culture. The philosophical aspects of the· case were subc;rdi­
nated to the demands for Enright's retraction and at one stage it 
seemed that he might have to resign. 
10 
-- gave 
its Socialist policies -- no more radical , as one observer has noted, 
.than the po
tional 
licies of the Atlee Labour Govei:,UDcnt in the United Kingdom9 . 
little hope of merger before the projectedo·oSingapore constitu­
talks due to be held in 1963 , when it was widely accepted that 
if Singapore had not been absorbed into the Federation it wuid seek 
complete independence. The tone and content of Tengku Abdul Ra.Jnnano' s 
coo•oients on merger varied with each pronouncement but the message was 
the same -- Singapore was too ·prone to control by C0111buniats and too· 
Chinese-oriented to ffl ac�c,.woodated within the already delicately 
balanced Federation. 
The broad basis of the P.A.P. membership which had contributed to 
its election success in 1959 proved its weakness in the ensuing eighteen 
months, with a series of defections which complicated the merger and 
Malaysia issue but possibly proved decisive in bringing the Tengku to 
accept the necessity of merger. Daring 1959 and 1960 the Singapore 
Go�ronient found the realities of: political and e�onomic life a severe 
restraint on the achievement of the goals it had set in housing and 
social welfare programs, and there was a resultant decline in its popu­
larity. The first real challenge came from Ong Eng Guan, one of the 
P.A.P. ' s  own ministers. Ong, who had completed his education in 
Australia, had been elected as P.A.P. Mayor of Singapore in 1957 and 
attracted attention by discarding the City Council's mace and pictures
of Queen Elizabeth as "vestiges of colonialism". As the rnembe-r for 
Hong Lim electorate he was returned in the 1959 elections with the 
largest majority of any candidate contesting the elections and was 
given the portfolio of National Development. In J\D\e 1960 Ong Eng Guan 
launched an attack against the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew and ·his sup­
porters within the P.A.P. Why he chose to act at this time must be a 
matter for speculation, but it s�ems likely that he was dissatisfied 
with his ministerial post which brought him less int� the public eye 
·than had been the case while he was ·Mayor of the city, and he probably
misjudged the very great support which he had in his own electorate 
for an indication of wider support throughout Singapore. His challenge
took the form of sixteen resolutions introduced l>Y him at a special 
P.A.P. party conference on 18oand 19 J'une 1960. ll The resolutions sug­
gested that the P:.A.P. should retum to its "revolutionary party
manifesto of 1954" and reaffirm its strong stand in the anti-colonial 
struggle. The resolutions criticized the Gover,uoe,,t ' s  acceptance of 
the existing Constitution and , by implicatioa, the fact that it bad not 
moved more quickly in its negotiations with the Federation. The reso­
lutions suggested that the P.A.P. Government was not giving sufficient 
attention to Singapore ' s  poor -- Ong had always stressed his own 
interest -- and called for an intensification of the fight against 
''yellow culture". But , most important , Ong criticized the way in which 
.. 
9. E. Sadka, "Singapore and the Federation: Problems of Merger, "  in 
Asian Survey, Vol. 1 ,  No. 11, January 1962. 
10. Straits Tfmee,o31 January 1961. 
11. The full text of the sixteen resolutions is published in Straits 
Times, 21 J'une 1960. 
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the P.A.P. policy was decided, calling for a wider participation of party 
members in the determination of policy., This was the c:.entral issue, _ 
2and it was acknowledged as such in the· r.a,�ctions of the P.A.P. leaders.!f'1 
If Ong expected to receive wide support; he was disappotnted. With his 
expu\sion from the P.A.P. in July_1960 be �ook .only two- other �ssemblymen 
with him to form the United People 's Party (tJ!P, -P�), le.aving ·the Govem­
ment 's strength in the Assembly still at fo�ty in · a· fifty�one member
house. Interestingly, the P.A.P. 1D81Jl°htlrs who were later to defect to
form the Barisan Socialis did not give any indication of their future 
actions during this period. s. T •. Bani,_ la�er �!f'- key figure in the
Barisan and an important trade union lea.de�·, criticized Ong and uhis · 
stooges" for creating discontent.!f'and called on the party to rally to its 
existing leadershipol3 
Ong's expulsion set the scene· for a . series ot, l> _itter exchanges be­
tween h:lm and the leaders of the P�A.P., which were climaxed in October 
1960 by Ong's allegation of nepotism against the Prime Minister and the
Minister for Law and Labour, K. M. •�• Ong resigned in December 1960 
to force a by◄lection, while the Gcwermnent, in an attempt to clear its 
ministers' names and to.!f'discredit Ong� ii;,.•t:Ltuted- a CQomiss:i.on to inquire 
into his charges_. . The Commiss�on was pr.esided·
. 
ov.er- . by Mr. J.uiat_:f:� Chua 
of the . Singapore Supreme Cou� and held its sittings in'January!f'1961.
Lee Kuan Yew appe�red on·!f'his own behalf and d�nstrated.the forensic
skill which ha4 made him one of. SingaP9xe!f'1 s. iea�ing advocates. '!;be.
Cou■nission found the charges made by Ong to·be "groundless and reckless" 
and dismissed them.!f'14 This had lit.tle, if any, effect on the electors!f'·!f'.
of Hong Lim when the by-election was held at the end of April 1961� The
by-election was fought with_ an ·intensity and over a longer period than!f'· 
had previously been e,q,erienced in Singapore. 15 Ong Eng Guan attacked 
the Gwernment as a stooge of the British and the United States and · 
16criticized the P.A.P. for not achieving its promises on social welfare. 
The P .A.P. pre·ssed the findings of the Chua Conmlssion and its policy 
on merger. · The Singapore Prime Minister remarked at one rally, in 
retrospect prophetically, that ''We_ are not playing to a Singapore audi­
ence but we have to play to:. a Pan-Malayan audience� ••17 What the audience 
saw was the crushing defeat - of. . the P.A. P. candidate . and Ong's triumphal 
retum With two and half times more votes than any other candidate 
po _lled. There can be. no doubt that the decisive factor in the contest 
12. s. :Rajaratnam reported in Straits Times, 21June 1960 • . . .
13. _s. T. Bani reported in Straits 'limes, 21June 1960. 
14. Times (London), 27!f',February 1961 reports on the findings of the 
Conmiaeion and an ·account of the tabling of the Chu.a Report appeai:s ·!f'
in Straits TirnefS, 2 March 1961. 
15. Dipst of Malay, Chinese and Tamil Press!f'_!f'(Singapore) No. 17/61 quotes
editorial by Sin Chew J:Lt Poh!f'·of 29.!f'April.!f'1961 on p •. 4 and an editor­
ial by Nanyang Siang Pau also on page 4, c01..ne11ting on the intense 
activity in the election. 
16. There are lengthy reports of the campaign in the Straits Times for 
March and April 1961. 
17. Straits Times, 31 March 1961-. 
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was Ong's g:reut personal popularity, but for observers concerned with a 
possible drift to the left in Singapom politics, it s•emed that the 
P.A.P. leadership was losing control or at least facing a real challenge 
from the left. Once again it ta iatenating to docaent' the support 
siven to tba P.A.P. by the future larisan leaders. Speaking!f'- in support 
of t�e P.A.P. can�idate in Pebruary 1�61 , Lim Chin Sionf called for 
UDity of the left and attacked topponenta of the P.A.P.1 Significantly,
while calling for left-wing un�ty Lisa Chin Siong did not ea.11 for inde­
pendence through merger. In his first major speech. after Hong Lim, Lee 
Kuan Yew criticized the line of arg«woent embodied in Lim Chin Siong' s 
speeches through the campaign. It was not enough, Lee argued, to call
for left-wing unity. He pointed 011t that the P.A.P. had a clear Pryfram
and a position on major issues encl its members mast stand by these. 
Throaghaut the period before Tengku Abdul Rahman'• Malaysia proposal, 
the P.A.P. Gowro•ne"lt in Singapore endeavored t.o make progress towards 
merger in discussions with the Pederation Goverome'lt. Visits of· 'Singapore 
ministers ,to ICaa'l.a I-11ap11r were fref(Uent, and Lee Kuan Yew had sufficiently
improved his relationship with the T�ngku to become an acceptable golfing
partner. But there was no sign that merger could be negotiated and even 
discussions for some form. of economic merger developed very slowly. 
18. Ibid., 25 Pebruary 1961. 
19. Ibid., 2 May 1961. 
� 
III• THE MA.IAYSIA PROPOSAL 
The period from the beginning of .,all-u
.
aryn. 1961. ��11 Tengku Abdul . .
Rahman's sugge. stion ot some form of p�lit:i.'cal union ·b�tween Malaya,
Singapore and the Borneo territo;ries .on · 27 May 1961 is critical to the 
discus·sion of Malaysia. Whatever Britain's part.was in engineering the ·
project, recognition must be given .to the success which Lee Kuan Yew had. 
in "selling" himself and his Govermnent as acceptable partners in the . ' 
Malaysia scheme and a� acceptable negotiators on ·the details of the scheme. 
During January and February 1961, there were-visits by important figures
from then·United Kingdom to Malaya and Singapore and informal meetings of 
Federation and Singapore ministers. The British Minister for Coum�nwealth 
Relations, Duncan Sandye, spent .nthree days in the area from 13 January
1961. During this visit he had discussions with Tengku Abdul Rahman and 
Lee Kuan Yew, and he met the High Conanlssione rs of the·: various Commonwealth 
countries represented in Malay·a. There was the inevitable golf match 
during the visit. The announced .reason for Sandys' visit was to discuss 
the Laos ct:isis.n1 In retrospect there seems every reason to believe that 
the problem of Singapore's relation.a with Mal..aya was .n�lso o.nn_the agenda. 
Sandye had been. prec,ded· a few day�< ���lie:f - by·-the Min�Jter for War John.
Profumo, who was· inspecting British militaey bas�s in the Far East, and 
followed in mid-Februaiy by the Cbi'e-f of · the British Defence Staff,
Admiral of the Fleet : Lord ·nMountbatten _wtip.: visit«fnboth Stngapore and · · · . · ·Malaya.3 · · · · ' 
If, as later events suggest, these visits by British officials and 
meeti�gs such as that between the Tengku and Lee Kuan Yew on 29 January 
1961� were important for dis�ussions on Singapore's future, they brought 
no tnnnediate result in the form of an encouraging 
. 
statement
: 
from the
. .
Federation Prime Minister. Addressing a group of German news correspon-
dents on 30 January 1961 the Tengku spoke of the necessity to put the 
Federation ''house in order" before merger could take place. He stressed 
that he was not opposed to the Chinese in Singapore but to the China­
oriented Chinese there. In summary he spoke of merger as having "to wait 
some time. nS The most interesting P .A .. P. couauent on future merge·r pos­
sibilities at this stage came from Dr. Toh Chin Chye, the party chairman . 
At the P.A.P. new year �ally on 1 January 1961, Toh spoke of the need for 
Singapore to strengthen its ties with the Federation and the Borneo 
territories. 6 It is difficult to assess whether this particular state­
ment had moren·nthan passing significance. The idea of somen·nform of 
association between the territories in the Malayan - area. :which were, or 
had been, under British control was not new and certainly_nnot an idea 
1. Straits Times, 11 January 1961 for the program of Sandysn' visit and·
Straits T1.ffi!s, 17._nJa�uary 1�61 :f�r �_po,;t of San�ys'. meeting with the . .Tengku and Lee Kuan Yew. 
2. Ibid., 11 and 12 January 1961. 
3. Ibid., 14 February 19610 
4.  Ibid., 30 January 1961. 
s. Ibid., · 31 .�anuary 1961. 
6. Ibid., 2 January 1961. 
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conceived by the P.A.P. Toh's statement seems more li1ce•ly to have been 
an attempt to giw a new twist to the old P.A.P. call for merger of 
Singapore with Malaya at a ·!f'time when Singapore's pol:l.ticians·!f'were being
noticeably unsuccessful in their negotiations with the· Federation. It 
appears that Lee Kuan Yew's statement (which he claflns to have made in
conversation with the "Ple11" on 11 May 1961,) that he: did not foresee. 
early -merger but perhaps some form of coo,oon.. market, was a more sign if i­
cant indication of P.A.P. thinking aod can probably be taken at face 
value.7 ' Moreover, as late as 4 May 1961 the Tengku stated that Singapore 
could not be accoamodated within �he Peder3tion until the •people of 
Singapore were loyal to Malaya as a whole. 
If we ass,, ... that the concept of Malaysia had been fc,tmulated some 
t':fme before the Tengku's statement of 27 May 1961 and that the visits of 
senior British representatives in early 1961 indicated increased British 
concern and even · · be said of the advocacy of the proposal, what can
Tengku's sudden change of position? Here the role of Singapore appears 
vital. Lee Kuan Yew has spoken f:rankly on the role which he states he
and his m:lniste-ra played in · bringing the Tengku to acceptance of merger. 
.The nub of Lee's argu,Dewit when discua·sing merger with!f'· �he Pederation 
P,.ime Minister was that any alternative was too daoge·roas. to be enter­
tained. . Thia ara,••"t was advanced, Lee bas stated, across the poker
table, over a -.al and on the go·lf coarse: 
Slowly the unpleasant facts were placed before the Pecleration 
Gove.co ent. 
, ' . .I .  
Wbat!f'·!f'had been publicly kuow was that Malaya was vital to 
Singapore. !ut what we did not emphasise, lest w offend our
friends across jhe Causeway, was that Singapore was vital to
their survival. 
Tengku Abdul Rahman has confitme.d that this dialogue took place in a 
7. Lee Kuan Yew, op • .  cit., p. 47. The ''Pleii" -- short for Plenipotentiary 
-- was the name given by Lee to a young Chinese who, Lee states, 
visited him as the representative of the Malayan Coa+odnist Party at 
various t1■es from March 1958 with the aim of gaining a united P.A.P .­
Malayan Conaunist Party front. The meetings are described in : :Battle
for.Merger�:!f'. Lee has now reveale• the "Plen I s" name as Fang Chuang Pi 
-- see Straits T1mee, 16 October 1963. The Barisan Socialis leader Lim 
Chin Siorig has expressed doubts as to the meetings having ever taken
place.
8. Digest of Malay, Chinese and Tamil Press, No. 19/61, p. 9 CfUOting from 
Nanyang Si•R
g Pau of 8 May 1961. *'Talking again on the question of 
merger at Pe mass rally in Alor Gajah, Malacca the other day, Tengku 
Abdul Rabman ....reiterated his usual stand that merger is possible only
when the people of Singapore are completely loyal to Malaya • • •  other­
wise there is no need to make a retp1est for merger." See also Straits
�1mes, 5 May 1961. 
9. Lee JCuan Yew speaking in the Legislative Assembly -- Leg. Ass. Debates, 
30 July 1963, Col. 301. 
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lOstatement made in the Malayan House of Representative;s on 16 October 1961.
But even more important than the positi'1'e actions of the Sing.pore minis­
ters mast have been the striking illustta�ion which the Ho,ig Lim by­
t
election gave of the validity of Let'·• wan,�ngs. As baa. already been 
indicated, Ong's  defeat of the P.A*P• C41Jdidate!f'-w4s decisive, and Ong 's 
ebulllent per8ol)ality, his 4enunc�at:to.n of t:he Unit�dn-�ingd� and general_
demeanor must have made him the epitomy of the Singapot.:e politician most 
deplored by t·he Federation leadership. lf. this analysis is correct, the
Hong Lim by-election must have played ·a key part in convincing the. Federa�
tion J.>t1me Minister that some positive move had to!f'be made. It would not 
have been out _of character for Lee to ha'1e pressed his point on this basis, 
following Ong's victory. 
Acceptance of Singapore as a pos$,{'.ble partne,: in Malaysia and of the 
1P�.P. leaderehip as negotiators, opened the lines fe·r a series of poli­
tical batt-les in which the fundaJDe1\ta1 t,sues were whether Singapore wa:s .
to 1118rge with Mala,a!f'on the compromise ba,is which alone was acceptable to
�he larger partner in merger, and concurrently whether Singapore would be 
controlled by- a p$rty which e•ld negotta�� with Ma�aya bo.tll 1;,efore and .after meJ"ger. . Desp_it_e the-ir f.mpo.t'tan�. •�•h�l �\ficat;l.cms. these 
issues·were essentiially internal in nature•. The most important outside 
issue was determination of the exact t',ois 11nclei' which s ·in:gapore would 
merge , as part of Malaysia, with �-laya,_,. 1-n tlai:s,d -f;sc,i,.ssi·on tlie economic 
issues involved became extreme·ly important . In the Qegotiations with the 
Federation Singapore had, and developed, certaiu advantages both in the 
skill of its negotiators and in their re'Cognitioa of tb• blow to Malayan 
prestige should Singapore be •xclu4e.d. As an additional complication, the
months 1nmediate ly after the Tengku's. announcemen.t were marked by the· .
emerpnce of!f'_the Barisan Sociali1 as an extr�· left-wing patty in oppo­
sition to the P.A.P. When he casually dropped his acceptance of a 
Malaysia concept before the Foreign Cc,xr:espondents Association on 27 May 
1_961 Tengku Abdul Rahman could scarcely have envisa$ed the difficulties
which lay ahead•. 
10. Straits Ttxues, 17 Octol>er 1961. 
IV. THE J,JNR� 0'6 INTEllRAL CONFLICT - 1. The Emergence of the Barisan 
Socialis 
By April 1961 Siqapore politics had reached the point where, whatever 
the hopes of conservative politicians, chan�s of victory in future 
elections depended on mass support and policies at least as radical as
those advocated by the P.A .P. Criticismr. of Britain, of colonialism and 
an attitude of at least hypersensitivity to any impingeme"1t. by Malayan 
politicians into Singapore's presexves were the min1mnrn positions which 
brought renlts. An additional conaideration for politicians in Singapore 
was the need to avoid any suggestion of interfering too strenuously with 
the special position of the Chinese education system in Singapore which 
is given more favored t·reatment than that received by the "Chinese-stream" 
education system in the Pede�ation. In the same way, trade unions in 
Singapore, altholagb kept under close supervision by the Gove.<oiraeut, bad 
obtained a stronger position thmugb a developed arbitration system than 
those operatl ng in the Federation. Preservation of Singapore's trade 
union privileges was essential for the maintenance of mass supp0rt. Con­
cern for the Chinese position xuna as a constant thtm,e_ through Singapore 
politics. It is. a temptation which leads politicians .to resort to ·
chauvinistic appea�s which stress racia· 1 issues. Through the size of the 
Malay coi,eeeun1ty in Singapore, eoo11nu,al Malay parties have a restricted
following, while the Malayan Chinese Association suffers through its 
links with a Pecleration party in an electorate much more radical than 
that of the Pec:lerationo At the time of the Tengku's aDDoun.:ement of the 
Malaysia proposal the Singapore People's Alliance was tarred with the
brush of business interests, while those splinter groups or individuals 
such as David.!f'Harshall 's Workers' Party or Ong E ng Gaan'a U.P.P., partly·
through personality defects and partly through a lack of organization, 
were boand to play a minor role in the ensuing developments.1 The
:Important opposition to Malaysia, in Singapore terms, cam'! from the new 
party of. t� extreme left, the Baris.an Socialis (Socialist Pront) • 
.
The Bariaan Socialis has be.come · so closely associated with opposition 
to merger of Singapore with Malaya, that it is important to recognize
that the split cleveloped within the P.A.P. before the· announoernent of 
even the general terms under which Malaysia was to be established. The 
Tengku's announcemeW'lt was flde on 27 &y 1961, but Singapore reaction to 
it r.ame relatively slowly. Indeed, in bis addreaJ on Singapore's 
National Day, 2 June. 1961, Lee Kuan Yew, while welcoming the proposal� 
did not really develop the issue of merger in any detait.3 On the same 
day the first signs of a real split in the P.A.P. became evident-- in a 
'. 
1. See Appendix B for a chart of the party strengths in the Singapore
Parliament for the period 1955 to 1963. At least for the present, 
parties other than the P.A.P. ancl the Barisan Socialis have been 
eclipsed and this paper will deal almost exclusively with these two 
pan,ies.
2. It is apparent from Singap0re Press COiititie:n.t. at the t1me ,  that Malaysia 
was not seen by many obstsrvers as likely to eventuate other than as a
long term proposition. 
3. Straits Tfmeq, 3 June 1961 . 
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stateme�t issued by Lim Chin Siong and five other le�ding members of the 
trade union movement. L�e Kuan Yew has stated subsequ.ently, that·nhe was 
never convinced of Lim Chin. Siong' s loyalty· ' to the P �4.P. , and that by 
1960 be was convinC.ed that others of th� forqi�r detainees had gone over 
to the Communist side . 4 He. ar�ed, h�ver, th�t nothing could be �one 
until the interq.al opposition within tp.e P.A.P .  mad, -an overt move. 
Those associated with Lim were, Fong S�e -Suan; ·· Dominic :Puthucheary, s. 
T. Bani, s. Woodhull and Jamit Singh� These men, who had provided much 
of the tra�e �nion backi�g for. tµe P �A�J? .-·, indicat�d in t�ir statement 
that they, would Sl:lPPOrt the P.A•.:P •.:lP: th:�:,
,fo�µCOUling_ All,son by-election 
on condition that the P.A.P. agreed to seek the abglition ofn_nthe Internal 
Security Council in the 1963 constitutional talks. The first significant 
statement of the P.A.P. '"s attitude to merger came in. an address by Dr. 
Toh Chin �hye on 9 June, in.nwhich �n-�mph4si�ed th�t the P.A.P. would 
continue to seek independence through merger� Speaking. at the same time 
Lee Kuan Yew noted that Singapore mu't retain control over education and 
labor in any arrangement for merger. These statements did not men�ion 
security, but the P.A.P. position on this had consistently been made 
clear byn.its. vi�w ;th4�. merge�:' wit.;h_·.�al,�:r� p,:reeuppq$�� cgnt:rol <;>f security 
by the ��tr�l. _a�tb,9r�t�e�.f, :  Ft:� . t��s_:, pqtn� on:.�,t�1- ,j'1st afte.r the.
.
Anson by-electionn· held' on' l5 3uly .1961, there were a: series of exchanges 
between the six trade µnion leaders, usu,ally with Lim Chin Siong as their 
spokesman, 4nd the.·.loyAl' l�ad�rship
.n. of ;the P "'A�l:'. The. issue of Malaysia 
·in these exchanges initially. took.nsecond place t·_o· delDan.ds .by the dissident 
trade .unionists for the release of all political detainees, greater free­
dom for the press and an end to the refusal of citizenship rights to 
those suspected of C01mnunist affiliations.9 The issue of merger became 
more important in early July, with Lim Chin Siong open1 criticizing the 
Tengku for the way in which he had introduced the idea. 1O The internal 
aspect of the dispute finally came - to a head on 11 July when a senior 
member of the P.A.P. leadership indicated that the party was prepared to 
break with the dissidents.n11 Two days later eight of the P.A.P. assembly­
men announced the�r support of Limn.Chin Siong, and on the same day Lee 
Kuan Yew called for the resignation o·f three of thy trade union leaders 
who held positions as P.A.P. political secretaries. 2 
4. Lee Kuan Yew, op. cit., chapters IV and VI. 
5.  Ibid. , p. 44. 
6. Straits Times, 3 June 1961. Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan andns. 
Woodhull, following their release from detention in 19 59., had been 
employed within the P.A.P. ministries as political secretaries and 
throughout the developing split they continued .to hold these posi­
tions. 
7. Both speeches are reported in Straits Times, 10 June 1961. 
8. See footnote 19, _npage 6 of this papf�• 
- . .9. Straits Times, 13 June 1961. 
. 
: · . 
10. Ibid., 3 July 1961. 
11. Devan Nair addressing a political forum 11 July 1961 reported Straits 
Times, 12 July 1961. 
12. Ibid., 14 July 19
.
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The P.A.P. thus faced a crisis on the day before the Anson·by­
election. In their campaign for the Anson seat the P.A.P. had stressed 
their reco� and their aim of merger through Malaysia. The other 
leading contender for the seat, David Marshall the fe>rmer Singapore 
Chief Minister., call�d for inn:nediate independence and criticized the 
proposed merger which t� Tengku·!f'had advanced. By throwing their sup­
port behind · ·!f' the dissidentMarshall in the final stage of the campaign
trade union group brought about his election and the defeat of the P.A.P. 
candidate.!f'13 The break between the P.A.P. and the six trade union 
leaders and their supporting assemblymen was clearly establi�hed in the
week following the Anson by-election. ne Trade Union Congress split 
with Lim Ching Siong and his followers, while the defecting Assembly 
members who had expressed approval of Lim• s views were later joined by 
five others to reduce Lee Kuan Yew's majority over all opposition 
parties in the Assembly to a margin of two seats. IS The Barisan
Socialis was formed on 26 July 1961 although it did not receive regis­
tration as a party until 13 August. 
The formation of the new party and the steps leading to its forma-
t ion reflected, according to the P.A. P ., the ope rat ions · of. the1i3
lay.an _Comnunist Party for which the Barisan is a front organiz_at-ion. This 
explanat-ic;>n is far too simplistic, quite apart from the caution with 
which statem�ts coming from a rival political party must be treated.
It seems likely that at least some -of the defections were the· result of 
personal antipathies. Lee Kuan Yew:!f'had run his party in such a way that
strict obedience to his decisions was expected and failure to give this 
could result in bitter personal attack. Others who defected could have 
been prompted by fear that, under control from the Federation, security 
within Singapore would become more stringent. As Lee Knan Yew has him­
self coo•nented, the distinction betwen Socialists .and Conmunists has 
not alwaya been clear to Alliance leaders in the Federation.17 Yet,
with all these qualifications, it is difficult not to accord some vali­
dity to the allegations made by the P.Ao P• that the leadership of the 
Barisan had embarked on a policy moat likely to advance C0t1•ow,ist aims 
through bringing a situation in which merger with Malaya would be im­
possible and, as an aggravant, the British presence would have to remain 
to ensure that order was kept. A further issue which must remain partly 
in the area of speculation is the question of why the split between the 
P.A.P. and the subsequent members of the Barisan Socialia did not develop 
more rapidly, once the trade unionists had made their open challenge on 2
June 1961. For the P.A.Po, the answer is probably that Lee Kuan Yew was 
prepared to try and ride out the storm with the hope that an open party
disagrPernent would not be translated into a loss of the P.A.P. 's parlia­
mentary majority. The delay between the emergence· of their public 
13. Marshall defeated his P .A.P. opponent by a majority of 546 votes. 
14. Straits Times, 18 July 1961. 
15. See Leg. Ass. Debates, 20 and 21 July for the account of the parlia­
mentary defections. 
16. Lee Kuan Yew develops this arguo,ent at length in Battle for Merger.
17. See page 6 of this paper for Lee's coouoe11t. 
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criticism, and the final formation of the _Barisan Socialis as a party� 
may be explained for the Bar,isan on the basis that they!f'
.
wishe_d to. sei�e
power within the Assembly • .- Success in �his maneuver would have given!f'·.
them control of the .Government vithout the uncertai�ties of fight-ing an 
election which they might not win. If this is a valid explanation it
is supported by Lee Kuan Yew's disclosure of wl1,at he has called the .
"British Plot". This refers to a number of visits made by future leaders
of the Barisan to the British Cemmlssioner in Singapore, Lord Selkirk •!f'.
Lee claims that the Singapore Government was not informed about ·these . 
visits but learned of them itself. According to Lee, their purpose was 
to discuss with Selkirk the ,likely British reaction to .a parliamentary
coup in which the extreme left of the P.A.Po  gained control of the 
island's Parliame�t. The British authorities, again according to Lee,
did not discourage their visitors, since they envisaged that such a
development would bring the C01c1ouni.sts into the open. from where they
could be purged effectively; and rssibly such a development could 
strengthen the British position.!f'1 =!f'Meolbers of the Barisan have dis­
missed the account by Lee of their visits but they have not denied that
the meetings took place.!f'19 The British authorities, as might be ex-
pected, have made no coo,oient on Lee's account. The various reaS01S'
which led to the formation of the new party show it to have grown. _' out 
of more than the announcement by Tengb Abdul Ralunan of t:he accept -
ability of Malaysia. Nevertheless, as the split widened between the 
P.A.P. and its dissidents, it was the issue of Malaysia which more and 
more dominated the arguments advanced by both sides. 
The fonnet:ion of the Barisan established a clear!f'·poiitical threat 
to the P.A.P., with the new party from the start ready to use the .siame!f'··
techniques which had brought the P.A.P. to power in 19 59 --- appeals to!f'_
anti-colonial feeling, crit�cism of Britain and the attempt to dominate 
trade union support in Singapore. ;With the- announcement of tentative
plans concerning the nature of merger between Singapore and Malaya, 
the contest between the P.A.P. and!f': the :Baria.an!f' entered a mom adyanced · 
stage. In their communique of 24 August 19 61, the Teng� and Lee 
announced that agreement had been reached in principle for · Singapore· 9 s
attainment of independence through merger with Malaya as part of 
Malaysia. It was agreed that external affairs, defense and security 
would be the concern of the Central Gor e:r1Dllent, while Singapore woula 
· ·retain autonomy in education and labor.!f'20 In accepting these terms. Lee
Kuan Yew
.!f'
had recognized one of the essential conces�icms which Singapore 
had to make to ensure merger. This waa!f'·that control of the security of ·
Singapore had to be placed in the hands of the Federation. When the
full terms for merger -- with the exception of:!f'the financial arrange­
ments -- were made public, following the. joint working party meetings
of Malayan and Singapore officials, tbe·!f'other essential concession was 
18. lieg. Ass•. Debates, 20July 19 61, Cols. 1666 to 1669 and Chapter VII
of Battle for Merger. The account given here is an extremely con!f'-­
densed version of Lee's descripticrm of eventso 
19 �  See a letter by 3ames Puthucbeary to the Straits rimes of 21 A�gust
1961. 
20. Straits T::lmee, 25 August 19 61. 
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revealed as Singapore's acceptance of a more limited nwnber of seats than 
its pop11l1,tion warranted in re·tum for its autonomy in eclacation arid labor 
matters.!f'21 With the August , _announcement the Barisaa Socialis developed
its earlier criticiam of Ma1aysia il\�O a more concrete fc,.cq1. , It argued 
that what the P.A.P. Govero-neut had accepted was •phoney merger0 and �that 
what shoald be sought instead was "true merger". Such a t1trae merger"
could be obtained, not under an ar,.-angen_rent whereby Singapore retained 
some autono.ny and the Federation some controi, but by a complete merger 
of Singapore with the Federation on the same basis as Malacca or Penang 
s allowed. The flaw argaanent, which 
-- the ii° non-Malay states tucorpor�ted into the 1948 Federation of 
Malaya. · This arg,1• 11t has a certain :fDDediate appeal for a Si-ngapore 
audience. In proposing it the Barisan omitted, however, either to con­
sider or develop one of the major implications involved in its proposal,
and the P.A.P. was never to let its opponent forget this. It is perhaps 
necessary to mention that the issues of argument and counter!f'"'.'argument 
have bec011.e blurzed and distorted, since both sides have not ·!f'hesitated 
to color or misrepreeent the opponent 's point of viewo In terms of 
Chinese chauvinism,, the Barisan arp .. ent had the attraction that the 
Chinese of Singapore could be united with their racial counterparts on
the Malayan mainland .to form a much more dominant r.Olllil\1l11ty than the 
present circ•••Stance· - irtby· the the
P.A.P. conatantly e,q,loited, was that even if Malaya wen to agree to 
such a merger as tile Bariaan proposed, it was beyond belief that the 
Malayan authorities would agree to waiving the citizen,hip regulations 
which would drastically cut the rn1::her of Singapore citizens with voting 
rights.23 One instance of the Barisan's failure to present a convincing 
rebuttal of this P.A.P. criticism was in a forum on merger held on 21 
September 1961 and it was then placed in the difficult position of 
having to advance the argument subsequently that the Federation authori­
ties should arnen.d the Mala)'an Constitution to permit all Singf!ore
citizens to become Federation citizens Jo11ediately on merger. 
Thia was the arg1;me-1t advanced by the leader of the Barisan in the 
Singapon Legislative Assembly,·Dr.!f'
2�
e Siew Choh,!f'; when he spoke against 
the Goverurnen.t on 20 November 1961. Be argued that there should be no 
21. The agreed preliminary terms for merger were printed as Sin&poreC.,■oeod Paper 33 of 1961 and published in boo�let_ form by t Singa­
pore Gover,aoent as The Merger Plan. Singapore was to have fifteen
members in the Federal Parl�ament and its citizens were to he
accorded Federal nationality but not citizenship. These matters are 
discussed in greater detail later in this papero Cc-1-■,eml 33 was
published en 16 November 1961. 
22. Straits Times, 30 August 1961. 
23.· Citizenship was granted on a much more liberal basis under the 1958 
Singapore Constitution tban bad been provided for non-Malays under 
the Federation Constitution. 
:i
24. Straits T1me�, 22 September 1961. 
25. The Barisan Socialis moved an amendwen.t to the g_over1noeut ' s  motion
supporting Malaysia on the terqis agreed to in S1n
!;
pore CNM ..and Paper
33. . The texts of the mot ion and the amendinellt we :-
(continued) 
· 
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difficulty·afor the Malayan Government to amend the Federation's 
·Constitution: 
• • •  Our standa·. is that every· Singapore ci·tizen shoulda- autoa­
matically become a Federal citizen on merger�a· That i·s,  on merger, 
all 624,000 Singapore • citizens , irrespective of whether they were·a. · 
born in Singapore, India, China !i Timbuctoo , automatically will 
become 624,808 Federal citizens. 
·Under this ''true" foxm of merger the Barisana. clafrned that they wouldabe 
ready to !'cept the operations ofa.the Federal Gove:rornent in control ofa· 
security. Additionally, the Barisan argued, such an arrangement a·s 
they proposed would ensure the adeciuat'- representation of fihe statea.ain
2the Federal Par11ame�t which the P.A.P. had not obtained. The most 
·striking feature of the Barisana' s ·argu1ne,it was that there was no pos-
sibility ofa· the Federation Government ' s  accepting the suggestion that · 
·they grant all Singapore citizens Federal citizen·ship and the vot:ing 
rights which went with ito While the -Federation was prepared, as it 
subsequently showed, ·to negotiate on financial matters, it shcrwed it­
self to be inflexible on matters of citizenship (so far as voting rights 
were concerned)a, and security.a· To. suggest, as Dr. Lee Siew Choh did, 
that there was no difficulty involved· in amending the Federataion Consti­
tution ia only correct as 4 . astatentent of constitutional possibility, and 
it was not in these terms that he ; presenteda·athe arg\11Denta. As a practical ., . . ·a
proposition it had no value. The issue of citizenship was capable, · 
however, of raising C0111DU1U,t.l feelings in Singapore on the basis that 
failure by the P.A.P. Government to make demands similar to those prea­·
sented by the Barisan reflected a retreat before the .policies of a 
Mslay-dominated Federation Gover,unent. The practical possibilities ofa. ..·· the Bariaan argu1oent aside, ' it permitted the new party to claim to be the ,
champion of Singapore 's  citizens -- the Chinese in particular. In 
assessing the Barisan' s  position 'further, it is necessary te contrast the 
views it expressed on internal security in the Assembly debate in ,Nove�­
·ber and December 1961 with the call for the abolition of the Internal 
Secu�ity Council which bad hen one of the principal issues leading to 
Moved by the Minister for Labour, Inche Ahmida·a'bin Ibrahim -- "That, 
whereas it hasa.aalways been the avowed objective of all nationalists . 
of Malaya to achieve the re-unification of Singapore with the Federaa­
tion of Malaya and to remove the artificial division created by t� 
British by their ·•divide and rule·• policy, this House affirms and 
declares that the .. •first object ot all true patriots of Malaya is to 
·achieve the rea-uni,fica:tion of· these territoriesa· in a merger of Siµga.:
· pore with the Federation of Malaya. '1 · 
Moved by the leader of tne Barisan1 Social!,s in thea· Assembly , Dr. 
Lee Siew Choh -- •'To leave· out from 'a' • • •  /that . ·is the wo:r:d occu:r:­.
�ing ·ninth from the end of the minister 's  motio!_f: � .: �� - and. insert . 
'agenuine merger with the .Pederation of, l{alaya wi;h Singapore as th,e 
twelfth state and with all its citizens. ,to aut01114tical.ly _a'become 
Federal citizens on Merger Day' '1 � extracted froma. Leg. Ass. Debates, 
20 November 1961, footnote to Cols. 281 and 282. 
26. Leg. Ass.,l>ebates, 20a1:fovember, Cols. 327 anda.a328. 
27. Iliid.a, Col. 315. 
·28. Ibid. , 21 November 1961 , Col. 385. . .  
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the defection of Lim Chin Siong and his followers from the P.A.P. More­
over, in one of ·the less-widely publicized statements made by a leading
member of the Barisan in early 1962, s. Woodhull, speaking at the 
Malaysian Socialist Conference held·- �n Kuala I,u1qpur in January , denied 
the position expressed by Dr. Lee Siew Cboh in the Sin&apore Aasem\lt ·
and called for "true merger" for Singapore coabined Lmy underlinin1,/ 
with Singapore eolitrol over internal security.29 The •ame speaker
raised the con+uwa 1. ia'aue the Jlext IIIOllth when he stated that the P.A. P. 
''waa mom la■ en on appeaaing the CME•n•nal prejudice of the Federation . 30Gove,,unent than of advancing the interests of the people of Singapore.n" 
Tbeae last two incidents anticipate then·nnext section of this paper 
which deals with events up to the Sept-ember 1962 Referendum in Singapore. 
December 1961 not only ended the calendar year but marked a division of 
some importance in the political developments in Singapore. Those who 
had been discontented with the political viewpoint of the P.A.P. and had 
defected from it failed to gain power in the Assembly. The Barisan 
could not defeat the P.A.P. on the floor of the Assembly since the other 
parties holding seats -· ·notably the Singapore Pe�le 'sn:Alliance and · 
U.M.N.o. -- would not unite with tbe Barisan. In spite of clemands frGDl 
the �rism tlaaf-'. it: should resign, the P.A.P. made it clear that so long 
as it held a parliamentary majority it would hold power and pursue merger
through Malaysia. The P.A.P. utilized all JJ.eans at its �OM11Hc1'lld, including · 
_Radio S:fngapon, to maintain its position.31 Refusing to resign, the PoA.P. 
iadicamcl' ·· �- that it was prepared to submit the issue of merger to referenN::­
dum and it was this question which dominated the ��litical life of the :i
i 
state for tbe first eight months of the new year. 
29. Straits T1mes, 27 January 1962. 
30. Ibid. , 14 February. 1962. 
31. Between 13 September 1961 and 9 October 1961 Lee Kuan Yew made a series 
of twelve radio talks on merger and the alleged pro-Coo11runist connec­
tions of the Barisan. These have been published as The Battle for 
Merger. For further co11-uent see Bibliography. 
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.
Offer made by Goh Keng Swee in a foxmn on 21 September 1961. Sttaits 
T1mea, 22 September 1961. 
IV• ·tHE LINES OF INTERNAL CONFLicr - 2. The Singapore Referendum 
Much of the political action relating to Malaysia in the eight 
months precedipg the Singapore Referendum -- held on 1 September 1962 
-- took place outside the Malays_ia area. There wei-e discussions between 
Tengku Abdul Rahman and the British authorities arid!f'_!f'visits by Lee Kuan 
Yew to·England and also to several "uncommltted" countries to promote 
the Malaysia concept. The Singapore Referendum itself was brought into 
the international sphere with: appeal �gain_�t it$,· terms lodged before 
the United Nations Committee on Co.lonialism by opponents of the P.A.P. 
point of view. During the period before the Ref�rendum it became. clear
that the P.A.P. was prepared to go to the limits of its parliame�tary
power to maintain its position, while the Barisan' s statements beeame 
more and more intense .with little effort to disguise the appeal to com­
munal affiliations. 
The essential feature of the P.A.P.'s Referendum proposal was that
the alternativesto be _!f'placed before. the voter� we�e not between accept­
ance or �jecticm of the policy of.!f'�rge.r as negotiat-d �Y the P.A.P.,
but rather a choice- between various fol:'DlS!f': of merger. When the .Singapore· 
Legislative Assembly debated the issue in March 1962, Lee Kuan Yew took
the attitude that ·since. all parties represe.nted. in_ the. Assembly were in
favor of merger, the issue to!f'� placed .. l)efore. the voters should be a
choice between ,the terms negotiated by the· P,.A.· P. Government or those 
called for by the Barisan.!f'1 ; , The· P.A. P. 's interpretation of the Barisan • s 
.position was that it sought :nierger of Singapore, with Malaya on the same·
basis as Penang and Malacca, and hence accepted that the restrictions of 
the Federation Constitution regarding citizenship should be applied!f'_
against a large proportion of the Singapore population� Just as con­
troversial was the P.A.P.'s proposal that blank votes cast during ti,
Referendum should be counted as votes in favor of the P.A.P. policy. 
It should be noted that despite the political heat engendered by the 
Refere.ndum debate and discussion outside the Assembly!f'-, .!f'the Singapore
Constitution made no provision· for decicling such a matter by Referendum 
nor could such a decision be regarded!f'·as binding on the other!f'.principal ­
partner in merger, ·Malaya• . Following the initial debate on. tbe!f',Referendum 
Bi,11 in the Assembly, it was referred _to. a select committee and!f'· was not
4ebated again in the Assembly until June 196.2. In the ,initial debate in 
the Assembly, Dr. Lee Siew Choh for the Barisan defined his party's call 
for a clear-cut ·chc,ice in t� �ferendum betweep.. acc,pt:in§. or rejecting 
the terms set down in_ Singapore CODDand!f'iPaper, 33 of 1961. _!f'
. . 
The Federation Prime Minister made ·one · uotable intervention· into the 
Referendum discussion .in Mar,ch 1962 which may have been important for ·. '. 
1. Leg. Ass. Debates, 16 March 1�62, Col.- 293. 
2. Ibid. , · Col. , 29·9 . 
3. Ibid.by, 15 March 1962, Cols .. 77-78. The general terms of Co,notat\d 33 
are noted on P• of this paper. 
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the result later in the year. In a visit to Singapore to address.!f'the
Singapore Branch of U1tM0No O• he said with obvious reference to the 
Barisan Socialis: 
• • •  if the extremists and opposition parties want to create 
trouble and cause bloodshed after merger then it is better 
that we do not have merger.4 
In the event of difficulties with Singapore, the Tengku indicated the 
Federation .would not hesitate to close the Causeway. Since acceptance 
of the P.A.P.!f''s proposals would not, in the Federation's view, create
difficulties , the implications_ of the speech were clear. The speech · 
brought an angxy reaction from the· Barisan which claimed!f'.!f'it illustrated 
the unacceptable nat!re of the c�stitutional proposals for merger pre­
sented by the P.A.P. Less than one month later the Tengku reiterated 
his threat of closure of the Causeway in a speech to the Penang Branch 
of U.M.N.O,, and this time he accompanied his threat with an explicit
denunciation of the Barisano It was, he said : 
• • • not a true socialist party. It is more co,1at1unist in 
outlook and whatever support it has t>gen getting comes 
entirely from coo11n1nist sympathisers. 
It may be debated whether the Tengku's statement was more likely
to bring acquiescence or resentment of the merger proposal, ·!f'given the
sensitivity present in Singapore to auggestions of interference from 
Malaya. Bis intetvention certainly intens�fied the activity of the 
Barisan Socialis , and there were ferences made by leaders of further re·
this party appealing to communal attitu�s. In a stateme�t of 29 April 
1962, s. Woodhull warned against ace4Jptance of the Malaysia proposal as
likely to nourish coo■ .. una.1 feelings. The same techni"IU6 of appealing 
to cor..o••nal loyalties by criticizing the Federation Government for har­
boring them was used by Lim Chin Siong in his May Day address to the 
Singapore Association of Trade Unions -- the rival body to the Trade 
Union Council set up by Lim and bis supporters following their break 
with the original body in July 1961. Lim conde,nned the proposal for 
merger th� Malaysia and criticized the arrogance of the Federation
Gove:roo>ent!f'o The forceful tone of the Barisan 11s public stateme11ts was 
continued in May 1962 with a threat to Britain of possible "brutal con­
frontation" if lee ltuan Yew succeeded in "selling out our interests."9 
In its counter arguments the PoA oP o had two main thernes o It con­
tinued to argue that the Barisan Socialis was a front for Commudist
activity and it stressed the advantages of its own program. In pursu­
ing the first of these two arguments Lee Kuan Yew suggested that, far 
4. Straits Times, 26 March 1962. 
S. Ibid.by, 27 : -March 19620 
6. Ibido ,  16 April 1962. 
7o Ibid. , 30 April 1962. 
So Ibid. , 2 .May 19620 
9. Ibid. , 18 May 1962 quoting from Plebian -- the Barisan Socialis 
j011rnal -- of 17 May 1962. 
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from being really concerned about the citizenship issue, the Barisan's 
true concern was for the security arrangements which would follow merger 
and which might limit the activities of its members.IO As an interest­
ing subsidiary allegation, the P.A.P.  asserted that the Barisan was in 
contact with the Indonesian Corrmunist Party and, since the P.A.P. claimed
that the Barisan expected the P.K.I. to gain power in Indpnesia, this . 
indicated that the
.!f'
Barisan prefe:cred merger with Indonesia!f'·to merger with 
the Federation.!f'11 The· fact that the P .K. I• .,had announced its opposition 
to Malaysia was used ·generally by the P.A.P!f'� to discredit the Barisan. 
In its po
.
sitive arguments the· P .A.P •!f'. stressed that merger on the terms 
which it had accepted was both a practical aim and a desirable one too. 
In arranging for Singapore to retain control over education and labor, 
Lee argued, the P.�.P. had retained control over matters which, if they 
had passed und!r Federal control, could have given rise to communal .difficulties.l 
During June and July 1962 the final terms of the Referendum were 
decided in the Legislative Assembly� Early in the latter month the 
P. A. P  • '•s parliament,ary ma.jqrity was 1;ec;luced to an absolute minimum with 
the defection of··P.A.P.: assemblywoman Ml:'s. Hoe. Pu�y Ch.ooo In a statement 
explaining her.!f'decision, she complail\ed that she. was not kept informed 
of party policy and that the final issue prompting her action was the 
decision to proceed· with. Clause 29 of the Referendum Bi.11 which permitted
the Singapore·!f'(;oveJ:'lUD8nt .to!f'·c;ount blank vptes. cast in the Referendum as
votes in favor of its proposa1. 13 Mrs. Hoe did not immediately join the 
Barisan, although she did so later. Without further defections and with
the support of the · Singapore Alliance members in the Assembly, the P oA .P. 
had no difficulty in passing a Bill authorizing the Referendum.!f'14 In
its final form the Referendum offered three alternatives to the voters_
.15 
The first of these altematives was merger on the terms ¢oncluded · by the 
Singapore Goveriw.ent with the Federation of Malaya, as announced in 
November 1961. The second alternative offered merger with Malaya on the 
basis of the position occupied by the st-ates of Malacca and Penang, in 
keeping with· what tlie : :P1.A:�' P.� � claf:med was the Barisan" s proposal. . The 
third alternative, included at the suggestion of the former Chief Minister 
Lim Yew Hock, offered merger on terms no less favorable than those ob­
tained by the , Borneo territories. At this stage there was no firm indi­
cation of just what these terms would be.!f'16 
10. Ibid. , 20 : April 1962. 
11. Ibid., 23 May 1962. The P.A.P. claimed and the Barisan denied that 
·. Lim Chi� Siong had told the editor of Bintang Titnor that the .Barisan
would prefer merg�r· with Indonesia to merger with Malaya.
·12. Ibid., ·!f' ·1 June 1962 and 3June 1962� 
13. lb.id. , 4 July 1962. The defecti�n took place on 3July 1962. The
reference to Clause 29 of·. the Referendum Bill was reported in Straits 
�fmes, 5 July- 1962. 
14. · Leg. Ass. Debates, 6July· 1962, Col. 1022. 
15. Ibid., 10 July 1962, notes and·!f'text Cols. 184-186.
16. The essentials of the Refei-endum proposals offered to voters were: 
� - (Symbol - Singapore Flag) Merger with res,rve powers, notable.
autonomy over labor and education; automatic conversion of Singapore 
(continued) 
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.. . - - - ..., 
With the passage of the Referendum proposals the Barisan Socialis 
and four of the Singapo... spl�nter parties -- the Wor�ra' Pa�y, the 
Liberal Socialists, the Party Rakyat and the United Democratic!f''Party 
-- foxmed a Council of Joint Action to take the Referenclwn issue before 
the United Nations COiiiDlttee on Colonialiam.!f'17 Both in terms of party 
membership and political effectiveness ·there is no doubt that the 
Barisan alone was important in this action, although the participation 
of the splinter groups lent the!f'�appearance of "socia1ist unity".!f'· Even 
this appearance of unity was disturbed in the scramble for the right to 
represent the Council of Joint Action before the United Natfgns COiii4it-
tee with David Marshall playing a familiarly divisive role. In its
me,norandwa to the Comittee the Joint Action Council argued that the 
proposed constitutional changes which would merge Singapore with Malaya 
had .been devised by the British Goverrunent to �•sure its continued righ't 
to bases in Singapore, and to protect its privileged economic position. 
The Cowcil criticized the terms of!f't� forthcoming Referendum on famil­
iar lines and the citizenship provisions of the November 1961 agreement
between the Malayan and Singapore Governments. It suggested that the 
terms of this agreement placed Singapore in a more or less "trusteeship" 
position under the Federation of Malaya. Finally, the petitioners 
sought to "advise the nations of the World • • • of the perfidy which is 
sought to be perpetrated on the subject peoples of Singapore through a 
dishonest referendwn.!f'1119 A supplemeutary meo,o"'andum £rom the petitioners 
sent on 13 July 1962 stressed again the lack of choice ofiared to the electorate when it came to.!f'participate in the Referendum. · The P o A.P.
Gov�;r.went '• reaction to the activities of the Council for Joint Action 
was to demand the same right to speak before the United Nations COiiiilit­
tee, if auch a right was granted to its opponents, and also to send a 
detailed rebuttal of the arguoie11ts contained in the Joint Council's 
memorandum. The rebuttal, also, waa along familiar lines. The Singapore
Gove:roment denied the charges of British involvement in the determination 
of the terms for Singapore 's merger with Malaya and argued that the terms 
citizenship into Malaysian citizenship� fifteen seats in the 
central parliame�t; retention of nmlti-lingualism. 
B - (Symbol - Penang Flag) Merger as a state within the Federation; 
application of the present Federation labour and education poli­
cies; only persons born in · Singapore and some citizens by descent 
will automatically become Federation of Malaysia citizens; parlia­
mentary representation in proportion to the number of citizens 
eligible under stricter Federation citizenship laws; only English •
and Malay to be used in the State legislature. 
C - (Symbol - Flag with badges of Sarawak and North Bon,o) Merger on 
tems no less favorable than the Borneo territories. For discus­
sion of this point see po 27 of this paper. 
17. The Cowoittee 's full title is: The United Nations Special Committee 
on the Situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration!f'· 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and J?eoples. 
18. Straits Time�, 18 July 1962 and 19 July 1962. 
19. United Nations Docume�t A/AC. 109/Pet. 16 of ' 12 July 1962. 
20. United Nations Document A/AC.!f'109/Pet. 16 Add. 1 - of 18 July 1962. 
' 
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negotiated for citizenship were better than any others which could be 
obtained. Playing on the fact that the Barisan had been unable to defeat 
the P.A.P. in the Singapore Assembly, the rebuttal p0inted out that the 
Singapore Govemment was a freely elected on�, carrying .out its mandate 
from the electors.21 After an initial decision by the C�mculttee on 
Colonialism not to take note of a petition from the .Council of Joint 
Action,22 repres�t;1t.ativ�s o� t� .. Council • led 1,>y Dr • .  Lee Siew Gll,oh and · .
s. Woodhull of the· Barisan Socialis appeared before it on 26 July!f', i962.23 
Lee Kuan Yew!f'!!!. route for London appeared on the same day and defended 
the proposed procedures for the Referendum.!f'24 The Conunittee did not
take any action o� the protest. 
On 14 August 1962, shortly after his return from London, Lee Kuan
Yew announced that the date of the proposed Referendum would be 1 
September 1962. On the same day he announced an amendment to the Singa­
pore-Malaya merger· agreement to provide f9r Singapoi-e citizens to receive 
Federal c
2
tizenship with merger, instead of nationality· as previously 
provided. 5 Under this new proposal Singapore citizens were to receive 
Federal citizenship and enjoy the privileges which that entailed, but 
they w�lcJ ,ot;1iy l)e ab.le to . . :vo��. in_.!f'si�gapore•: the!f'. change l,7$$ . basi�ally:one of sema,n.ti,�S a;nd was · f�i;?=�Y. OQyi�sly .a . fµrther pr,9p�gat>4a �apon in · 
the campaign by the P.A.P. to win the �ferend\Dll,.!f's:tri.ce the nationality 
previously offered conferred the same J;>enefits ·!f'with the ex.ception of the 
title of "citizen". While it is difficult to estiJDate the effect of such
an annQ\Ulce�n� separately : from the Qt!.1,er asp.ects. of
. 
t�e .P o,A.P. Referen­
dum campaign, it can probably be included among the items which helped!f'.
the P.A.P. to gain the result it desired. Other aspects of the campaign 
which should be noted for their likely effect on.!f'the result include the 
use of Radio Singapore to further the P.A.P. point of view,!f'2 and the 
general tone of P.A.P. propaganda that failure to accept Alternative A 
could only lead to merger under less desirable conditions than those 
already negotiated with the Federation. The Barisan!f'Soc•ialis charac­
2terized the announcement on citizenship as a "bluff'' 7 and called for 
21. United Nations Documents A/ACo 109/Pet. 18 of 18 July 1962 and A/AC.
�09/Pet. 18 Add. 1 of 26 July 1962. 
22. Straits Times, 20July 1962. 
23. Ibido, 27 July 1962. 
24. Ibid.
25. Straits Times, 15 August 1962. The distinctions involved here 
between "nationality" and "citizenship" are p·ossibly not so un­
familiar. . to Singapore citizens as might be the case in a country 
where citizenship is synonymous with nationality. Before 1958, for 
instance, citizens of Singap()re held passports as citizens of the 
United Kingdom and
.
Colonies and possessed British nationality. 
26. Leg. Ass. Debates, 14 June 1963, Col. 1216.  The Minister for 
Culture speaking gene.�a�ly Qn the control exe��ised by the Government 
over radio and· television said: ''We are proud that we have used 
radio and television for the purpose for which the people elected 
us and will continue to use it until such time as the cause of
deniocrsicy has been safeguarded.
27. Strair.s· Times;. : 17 ·August 1962. 
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its supporters to cast blank votes as ·an indication of disapproval. 
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Despite·· the provisions of the Referendum Bill which permitted the 
Goverowent to count blank votes as it pleased -- ott the basis tbat.fail­
e•e·(._.-._; east a proper ballot indicated that the elector was ready to
permit the Government to act in bis behalf -- Ltm Cb.in Siong's call 
could have been a severe embarrassaae-At for the P.A.P. if it bad suc­
ceeded in bringing anything approaching a majority of voters in 
opposition to the P.A.P. 
In an electorate of approximately 624,000 persons, 561,000 cast 
ballots in the Referendum. Seventy-one percent of the ballots (397,!f'-
623) Wltre for Alternative A, the terms negotiated by the P.A.P.!f'_ There 
were 144,077 blank ballots representing twenty-five percent of!f't� 
total, while the remaining alternatives received less than two percent
each of the ballots.!f'29 Lee thus won his victory, and the pnss reports 
of his unaeaa,. emotional reaction to the news indicate how concerned be 
was to do this. Cns=ne-it on the result by political obse1vers was re­
served, both through the natun of the, choice open· to the voters and 
through tbe difficulty in assessing just what tbe blank votes meant. 
In ntroape<!t, it seems that possibly more weight should be given to
the result as reflecting the effectiveness of the P.A.P. propaganda
machine than was allowed at the t:fme of tbe Referendum. One interesting
claim by the P.A.P. concerning the results, which is relevant to the 
voting pattern in the Sep�ember 1963 elections, was that the heaviest 
tally of bhnJc vote•· , from the "rar�l" areas outside the urban 
centers such as Jurong. Probably t� best juclgaoe\1.t which can be made
is that the majorit-y of people in Singapore pref�t 1ed that
. 
merger should 
come in the form offered in Alternatift A, but that then was a firm 
bloc of votei-a who, -either from a ca•e•:!to•11t to the Barie.an or through 
other dia1atiafa.otion With the merger pn,posals, cast blok votes. The 
campaign before the &efezendum and it• result were further illustrations 
of the extent tTo which politics in Siogapore had polarized around the 
·P.A.P. and the Barisan Socialis. 
28� Straits Times, 20 August 1962 re,-rtll Lj_m Chin Sioy a1 ·followa1 
"We an ·deterwo:lned not to be provoked Lto violence/ am have decided 
to call upn the people of Singapon to cast blank votea, thoqh we 
are fally aware that blank votea an to be counted aa Coveruneot 
votea. ,
29. The nnlta aa noted in the Straits Tfmea, 3 September 1�62 wens 
Blectpe 624,000; Voted 56l,559; Alt·ernative A 397,623t ' Alternative ! 9•4 J Altaniative C 7 ,9111 Blit01b 144,077, Unce1ttain 2,3701 !!,-· 
jected 153. .:.. 
30. Strait■ T1••• 14 Jaly 1963. See Appendix C which lists those elec­
torates which are generally claaNd as "rural" and discusses the 
aignf.fican� of the classification. 
IV. THE LINES OF INTERNAL CONFLICT - 3. Malaysia and the Singapore 
Elections 
The P.A.P.'s success in the Referendum provided another clear stage
in the development of merger and Malaysia as an isSue in Singapore 
politics. With no apparent possibility of upsetting the merger program 
through such means as a Referendum, the Barisan began to concentrate on 
gaining power in the Singapore Assembly, and directed its public efforts 
to this end with the anticipation that elections had to be held no later 
than April 1964. The Barisan's effectiveness was to be considerably 
hampered when, in February 1963, much of its leadership was detained by 
the Internal Security Council, partly as a result of an alleged connec­
tion between the Barisan and the forces-behind the Brunei Rebellion. 
Just as the failure to unseat the P.A.P. in the Legislative Assembly in 
December 1961 h�d brought something of a pause in overt political
activity, so
.n
there was a brief respite after the Referendum. The Barisan 's  
public assessment of the result was that the P.A.P.  proposal had been 
accepted becau-,e of the Govex1unent 's "intimidation tactics" .n1 In his ·
report to the Barisan Socialis Conference during October 1962, Lim Chin.
Siong pledged the Barisan to ·marshal the "left-wing - and anti-colonial 
forces" to gain control of the Assembly by constitutional means. The 
main enemy of these forces , according to Lim, would be the "British­
Al-liance" axis.n2 At the same conference the Barisan stressed its friendn­
ship for "the great Indonesian people" in a gesture which possibly pro­
vided part of tlte incentive for then.later actions of the Internal Security 
Council. 3 While the interest of the P.A.P. Govetument in the Borneo 
territories was chiefly to insure that their problems did not delay the 
formation of Malaysia, the Barisan called for the right of self-determi­
nation for the territories: 
· 
As regards the Borneo territories we have time and again said 
that it is the people in these territories concerned who should 
decide their own future. 
But neither the British nor the Malayan Government has 
bothered to accord the people of Borneo the right of self­
determination. Instead· ·nwe havena hgax -- a conmission to ascer-.tain the views of the people there. . .· 
The Barisan again criticized the Federation Pritne l(inister when it opposed 
his stance on the Sino-Indian b!rder dispute and called instead for 
Malayan neutrality on the issue. 
1. Straits Times, 3 September 1962. 
2. Ibid., 16 October 1962• .  
3. Ibid. 
4. Letter to the editor from Lim Chin Siong, Straits Times, 23 October 
1962. 
5. Straits Times, 12 November 1962. 
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In view of its earlieor statements on Borneo, the Barisan could have 
been expected to express strong support for the Brunei rebellion when it 
came in Decernher 1962. But on the evidence of press reports it was reo­
makably silent as , indeed , was the P.A.P. which apparently refrained from 
major coo,oeT\t on the events during December.6 Both the P.A.P. and the 
Barisan refe1xed to the matter in their new year 's  messages at the begin­
ning of 1963. The P.A.P. indicated its approval of the operations to 
suppress the rebels, and Lee Kuan Yew contrasted the actions of the Brunei 
rebels
7
coming from a Malay state with the results of the Singapore Refer­
endum. In their new year's  messages the Barisan leaders continued to 
denounce the way in which Malaysia was being formed and the means used to 
achieve it. Lim Chin Siong predicted that developments in Malaya were 
leading to "the establishment of a Fascist and military dictatorship in 
the country" and referred to the Brunei revolt as a sign of "the 'people 's  
will to freedom.o"8 Dr. Lee Siew Choh suggested that the Brunei struggle 
would continue until the "people have regained their freedom."9 
Although it was considered possible in Singapore that some action 
might be taken against the Barisan leaders in view of their public 
statements and because of the past readiness of authorities in Singapore 
to detain those who openly supported violence , most observers were sur­
prised at the size of the detention operation which was carried out on 2 
February 1963 in both Singapore and Malaya when one hundred and eleven 
persons were detained. Subsequently a small additional number of persons 
was detained. The detentions were carried out at the decision of the 
Intemal Security Councilo Two aspects of the detentiono.odeserve partic­
ular attention. The first is the question of the extent to which the 
Singapore Govex,unent was a willing partner in the operations; the second , 
6 . The lack of cooooent from the Barisan contrasted strongly with the 
sta�eme�ts from parties on the left in Malaya, particularly the 
Socialist Front. 
· The writer was in Singapore at the time of the Brunei revolt and 
witnessed one interesting example of a failure to excite antio-British 
feeling as a result of the developments in Brunei. The executive of 
the Students ' Union at the University of Singapore -- considered by · 
various persons to whom I spoke to include supporters of the Barisan 
-- called for a protest march to the British ColWlissioner 's  Residence 
and adopted a resolution condemning British action in suppressing ,the 
Brunei revolt by forceo An announcement to this effect was posted
around the university campus on the moming of 12 December 1961 .  
Within three hours 500 students signed a petition rejecting the call 
for a protest march and the executive 's resolution. The march was 
abandoned .oand the motion rescinded. The interest in this incident 
comes not from the numbers involved -- although given the .size of the 
university and the fact that this occurred on a normal lecture day the 
numbers protesting were significant -- but as an illustration of the 
extent to which the P.A.P. policy and the Malaysia concept have appeal 
to the English-:-educated section of the communityo The incident. was 
reported in Straits Times, 13 December 1962. 
7.  Ibid.o, 1 January 1963. 
8. Ibid. 
9 .. Ibid. 
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the reasons which were advanced by the Internal Security Council to 
justify ttu? detentions. The .meeting of the Internal Security Council .
which dete;rmined on the detentions was held in Kuala Lumpur. (It - may be 
noted that the operation was carried out extremely efficiently with de­
tentions taking place in the Federation and Singapore concurrently. ) On 
his return to Singapore Lee Kuan Yew was interviewed .at the airport.!f'by 
both press and radio. He was reported in the Straits Times as saying 
that if Singapore had been left alone it would not have contemplated 
such sweeping action: 
I think it would be fair to say that for the Singapore 
Goveriment it would have been easier to leave this action until 
after August 31 this year, but as I have said on several occasions, 
on issues of national importance like merger and Malaysia, defence 
and the stability of Malaya and Malaysia, we will work with the
Federation. 
then in answe1r to a question : 
• • •  we would never have contemplated it . It would not be necessary 
because we could have carried on until August 31.18 
The former Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock seized on this statement as an
example of Lee Kuan Yew derogating his duty by failing to stand by the
Federation and suggesting that the arrests were not entirely necessary.
Lim Yew Hock asked for Radio Singapore to repl'ay the recording made at
the airport, but his request was refused although he was offered an
opportunity to hear the recording privately. Lee, meanwhile, claimed 
that he had been misunderstood during the interview and. indicated that 
the Singapore Government did, of course, stand by the Internal Security 
Council's decision.!f'11  - The inciden� had many implications. J.fith the 
thought of an election due no later ·_!f'than April 1964, Lee must have been!f'.
deeply concerned to·!f'avoid gain�ng an image for being more ready than the 
Britiah or the Lim Yew Hock Government to reqort·· to mass detentions.,, to . 
achieve his aims. It seems clear that be would have uiuch preferred the 
arrests to have taken place when only the Federation authorities could · 
be blamed for the detention process. His hasty and rather eml>arrassed 
retraction suggests swift and critical .response by the other members of
the Internal Security Council ; particularly the Malayan member, to his 
attempt to shift the blame away from the Singapore Gove111aaent onto the
other members. Lee 's concern was later shown to be correct when the 
Barisan sought to exploit the detentions in attacking the Government. 
The detentions operated against the leading Barisan trade unionists, 
10. Ibid. , 4 February 1963. 
11. Ibid., 5 February 1963. The writer heard Lee speaking in an inter­
view from the airport. There was a little difficulty hearing all 
that was said because of extraneous noise but my impression certainly 
accorded with the Straits 'l':lmes account. , Lee's subsequent l>roa:dcast 
in which he tried to gloss over the matter was obviously an uncom­
fortable· one in which he lacked his normal· fluency. 
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including Lim Chin Siong, S. Woodhull, Dominic!f'·Puthucheary and his 
llrother James. 12 Lee Kaan Yew on his retuu from Kuala Je,11.ur referred 
to the detentions as being necessary to prevent violent agitation!
which had lleen planned to coincide with events outside Singapore. 3 In
the doc,.ue-d: released by the Internal Security Council to justify the
detentions there was no attempt to diffenntiate between the members of 
the Barisan and C.s■nuolsts -- they are taken to be synonymous. The
Barisan, it was alleged, a:!me� to develop Singapore as a base from which 
the security of the whole Malaysian area could be undermined. To do 
this, the doauoeYLt further alleged, the Barisan wished to frustrate 
merger and leave Singapore as the Cuba of Malaysia. Lim Chin Siong was 
accused of having met the leader of the Bx:unei revolt, Azahari, four
days befon the revolt broke out, and the Barisan was said to have aimed 
at aobilizing support for further troa1>le in North &rueoa. Dealing with
the apparent incongruity of the!f'·!f'a1ms of the Brunei rebels and the Barisan 
Socialis the Security Council stated: 
In spite of their mutual distrust they are known to have 
discussed plans for the defeat of Ma.lf?sia by action in the five 
tet1itories of �be future- Federation. 
The.!f'alleged ct'nnection between!f'.!f'the Barisan and Azahari, the claim 
that the Barisan planned to participate in further violent ac:tion!f'•
against the future Malaysian!f'territories; and the past stated'!nts of the :Barisan, were the essential justification.a for the detentions. Since
detention uncJ•r the Preservation of hblic Security Ordinauee does not
recauire that charges be tested in court, the validity of these charges 
can only be speculated upon and possibly, therefore, the only verdict 
which can be made with all fairness is the distinctive verdict of the 
Scottish legal system -- "not proven''. Yet, while an obsexver must re­
main skeptical in the absence of do�ten.tary proof, it would be equally
unacceptable to ignore the strong indications in the Baris(lll's development
and in its party program which ·suggest that there is a �ection betwe8n
its aims and the likely aims of the Coe-1•1u,.ists in Singapore. There were
also indications that pursuit of the Bariaan's policy in Singapore could 
have led to severe unrest in Singapore. The Barisan leadership is 
politically sophisticated with!f'.an int1rnate connection with Singapore's 
political development. However much it is possible to defend the Bari­
san'a po1ition on merger in terms of past experience of..detention and 
distruet of residual British control in Singapore, it is· difficult to see 
how Lim Chin Siong, Woodhull or the Pathucheary brothers could really 
assess that.!f'merger could be gained on better terms than!f'. those obtained by 
Lee �-an Yew and his GoveJ"urne11t . The Barisan!f'9 s call for "true merger" 
can scarcely be seen as a call advanced with honesty, and the suggestion 
, ' 
12. Of the one hundred and eleven persona initially detained, twent.y-four 
were members of the Barisan, three were members of the Party Rstyat, 
three were members of the U.P.P. and one waS a member of the Workers 0 
Party. A further eleven had connections with Nanyang University. 
Strait• �:hoee, 6 February 1963. 
13;· Ibid.·, 4 Pebruary 1963. 
14. Ibid. Lee Kaan Yew later refe,red to plalllled demonstrations in Singa­
pore in discussing the!f', detentions in the Assembly on 9 April 1963 0 
I 
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put forward by the P.A.P. that the Barisan's real hop� was for merger to 
be frustrated, with the possibility · of subsequent unrest which would 
give opportunities to extremists, cannot be lightly dismissed. Any
assessment of the Barisan must take note, furthermore, of the appeals!f'. 
made to comnunal feeling and the apparent ambiguity in the attitudes
expressed by its members concerning the .internal-security question. In 
summary, the Barisan's basic policies were such that to have followed
them could have provoked a variety of situations in which disorder and 
disruption were the most likely result, and those most likely to benefit 
were the Cooa,unists. A-s a final, but by no means utiimportant factor, the
fact of Communist operations in both Singapore and Malaya cannot be
lightly dismissed in view of the area's recent history. As a personal
assessment, the detentions appear quite possibly justified by evidence
and Singapore's!f'- political situation in some cases, but equally possibly 
as reflecting the readiness of the British and Malayan· authorities to · · 
act in a time of general crisis to neutralize an increasingly �roublesome 
internal opposition. 
The detention of the Barisan leaders had an o"bvious effect on the!f'"' :· 
capacity of the party to operate e_ffec:tively and!f': . revealed. the: parliamell­
tary leader, Dr. Lee Siew Choh, as very much dependent on assistance in 
the formulation of policy and tactics. If the P.A.P. had been reluctant 
in the case of the February mass detentions to incur!f'.!f'odjum through acting 
against the Barisan, it showed!f'no!f'·!f'hesitation on these lines in its treat-. , . .
ment of the Barisan detainees or in its arrest of a number of Barisan 
party members on charges of inci�ement to riot when they protested against 
the conditions under which the detainees were kepto Dr. Lee had - earlier
denounced the conditions befo·re arrests took place. 15 Then . ,01.\ 22 April
the Bariaan carried its protest against the continued detention, solitary
confinement and the prison conditions fuTther by staging a march on the 
offices of the Prime Minister. _Five Barisan Socialis leaders, including 
Dr o Lee Siew Choh, were arrested and charged with abetment to overawe the
Gole:cnuient by force. 16 Later seven other Barisan members were arrested, ,:
bringing the total to twe 1ve .!f'17 Insufficient doe1smentat ion is again a : · 
handicap in assessing whether .the act.ual eve'nt was more than an orderly 
demonstration -- the evidence of the photographs published in the Straits
Times for 23 April 1963 is inconclusive. The case was not finally decided 
until .29 August when eight of those arrested were convic�ed on a charge ·· · 
of rioting -- Dr. Lee Siew Choh was acquitted. Those charged had not 
been detained throughout this entire period but they were remanded in 
custody initially, and this fact along with the various preliminary hear­
ings and the need to spend t:f.me preparing a defense 111'1St have pi:-oved 
harassing to the Barisan's political effort. In defending his clients 
15. Ibid., 1 April 1963. Fenner Brockway, one of the British Labour 
Party Members of Parliament who visited Singapore in May 1963 com­
plained about the conditions of detention. Straits Times, 29 May 19630 
16. Ibid.o, 23 April 1963. 
17. Ibid.,  8 August 1963 reports the opening day of the trial and details 
the charges. 
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the leading British barrister, Elwyn Jones, Q.C., said: 
••• This is a case which has wholly failed as a criminal proceed­
ing. ·nIt is a case which has much to do with politics bat very 
little to do with criminal law.n18 
Defense lawyers speak !!. parte but it is an est:froat:ion which cannot be 
ignored. 
Through 1963, as the date for Malaysia drew nearer interest in-· 
creasingly focussed away from Singapore towards the international .. 
implications of the project. The Prime Minister and senior party 
members of the P.A.P. embarked on a series of visits to every consti-­
tuency on the island -- clearly I it is now apparent, with an early
election in mind -- and there were increasing threats of industrial 
action by those unions controlled by the Barisan. Because of the 
Singapore Alliance's reluctance tQ vote with the Barisan Socialisn.nin 
the Assembly, the P.A.P. had no difficulty in gaining a vote of en­
doreement for its policy oy Malaysia and then adjourned the Assembly 
sine die on 1 August 1963. 9 _nArgouw,nts during the debate on the PoA.P. 's 
motion of endoreerne'l.t added nothing new to the policies already den­
scribed. The decision to hold a general election was gnnouneed on 4 
September 1963 and nominatiom closed on ·12 September. 2 · According to 
the Straits T:frnes reporting the announceme�t of a general election, it 
was expected that the elections would take place during October 1963. 
In view of the criticism which has been levelled against the P.A.P. for 
calling an election with the minimum of notice and so placing the other 
partie·s at a disadvantage, it should be noted that the P.A.P. ha� indi­1cated on 25 July 1963 that it would hold elections after Malaysia. 
To argue that the Barisan was placed at a disadvantage when it was 
announced that the elections would be held on 21 September may have 
some validity, but to carxy this argvaoent too far would be to ignore 
the anticipation which all partie� in Singapore must have had of the 
proximity of elections from the end of July 1963 onwards. Despite
confident stateme11ts made by Lee Kuan Yew shortly before the polls, 
there was evidently considerable feeling in Singapore at the t:fme that 
the P .A.P. could be eclipsed as a political force and expectation that 
the Singapore electorate would pia.intain its record of returning a 
government more sharply to the left at each succeeding election. Neither 
the local press, nor representatives of overseas newspapers writing from 
Singapore expressed unqualified confidence in the P.A.P.n's  capacity to 
att�act sufficient votes to retum it.to power. Not only was there the 
precedent that no govemment in Singapore had succeeded itself, but there 
was also the possibility that the Barisan would come to power with the 
pro-Malaysia vote split between the p·.A.P. and the Singapore Alliance. 
The uncertain mood was expressed in the Straits Tfme4 election day 
editorial when, referring to the possibility of a Barisan Socialis victory, 
18. Ibid., 30 August 1963. 
19. ffii., 2 August 1963. 
20. Ibid.o, 4 Septembe� 1963. 
21. Ibid. , 26 July 1963. 
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the newspaper noted .. It certainly could happen and it would be disaster­
ous."ZZ 
The P .A.P. was returned at the election with a clear majority, wi-n­
ning thirty-seven of the Assembly seats to. the thirteen won by the ·Baris�b 
and with the one remaining seat going to the original P.A.P. rebel, Ong 
Eng Guan. In a clear illustratic;>n of the polarization of politics about 
the P.A.P. and the Barisan already noted in �his paper, the Singapore 
Alliance, formed of the Singapore People's Alliance, the Malayan Chinese
Association and U.M.N.O., failed to win a seat !nd in many cases the
candidates for the Alliance lost their deposit. 3 The P.A.P. was opposed
by left-wing candidates in thirty-five of the thirty-seven seats which!f'· · 
it won. The exceptions were the Southern Islands electorate, a �avily 
Malay-inhabited area where the sitting U.M.N.O. representative was de­
feated, and Geylang Serai which had also previously been held by an
U.M.N.O. representative. Of the remaining thir!f'ty-five electorates, only 
in seven cases did the P.A.P. win on a split left-wing vote. The P.A.P. 's  
share of the votes was forty-seven percent and the Barisan's share was:
thirty-three percent. The Alliance polled eight pe7�lnt of the votes and
the United People's Party polled over seven percent. · . . 
An analysis of the P.A.P. victory in the September 1963 elections
must give due weight to the negative factors which assisted the party 
to its success. The leadership of its chief opponent had been- severely
restricted!f'·by the··February ·detentions and ·!f'harassed during the trial men­
tioned above. The P.A.P. had embarked on an intensive drive to recapture 
the public support which it feared it had lost, and used the facilities 
of radio and television ··to do this.!f'25 The Government had also undertaken 
. ..
visits to constituencies to present its case before the election campaign-
proper got under way, and no other party f ight_ing the elect ion engaged· in
visits of quite the same nature. By contrast with the other parties too, 
the P.A.P. was able to prepare!f'·!f'for the actual election campaign with a 
more exact knowledge of lust when it would take place. It is tempting in 
a situation where civil liberties do not operate fully to stress these
negative factors to the exclusion of positive aspects of the P.A.P.'s 
success, which in fact appear to have been considerable. In the dis­
patches of Western news correspondents Lee Kuan Yew has been customarily 
reported as an aloof individual of great ability, but tending towards 
arrogance, and this assessment has had currency among other observers.!f'26 
.
22. Ibid., 21 September 1963. See also Straits �irnes, 13 September 1963, 
Observe� (London), 15 September 1963 and· Daily Telegraph (London), 20 
September 1963. 
23. Full results taken from_ the Singapore Government Gazette Extraordi-­
nM:Y, Vol V, No. 104, 24 September 1963- are included in Appendix c. 
The fact of the Alliance candidates --· 31 of the 41 who s.tood -­
losing their deposits was noted in. Straits .. Budget, 20 October 1963. 
24. Straits.!f'Times, 23 September 1963. 
25. See footnote. 26: on page 27 of this paper. 
26. An interesting example of a highly skeptical account of the P.A.P.
Government and its leadership is contained in S��g�
i
o�� -·!f'9l7�Y State, 
Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 26, No. 10, Sept-. 19 b' published by · 
the Department of  Tutorial Classes, Universjty of Sydney. 
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Lee is undoubtedly able and, when faced with opposition, capable of 
bitter and· intense criticism as he showed in the Chua COUl4ission when 
dealing with Ong Eng Guan. But the image which present, him as aloof 
and unsympathetic needs re-adjustmento He can talk to his Singapo� 
audiences in four of the main languages used in Singapore -- Mandarin, 
Hokkien, Malay and English -- and has increasingly gone out among the 
people to �ke his points to them. In the period shortly bef9re · sthe 
September 1963 elections, he gave a striking example of his ability to 
sway what could well have been an e xtremely hostile audience. On 19 
J'uly 19�3 Lee addressed a large meeting -- certainly of �everal 
thousands on the basis both of newspaper report and photographs -- of 
the Singapore Harbour Workers Union which bad as an adviserss. T .  Bani, 
27· a leading �r of the Barisan and an assemblymanso Lee spoke to the 
meeting in Hokkien, Malay and English and stated bluntly that his 
Government could not accept a threatened strike by the union at a 
• I
particularly .sensitive time for both Singapore and Malayas. He claimed 
that the union was being exploited by Coo,ounists , and offered to ensure 
that their wages- demands were given proper consideration provided the 
strike threat was not carried into action. If it was , he warned,  the 
union ' s  leadership would be "dealt with". The response from the union­
ists was tos_give Lee an overimelming assurance that the strike would not 
be held and to chee.r him at the end of his address. He was similarly 
cheered three days later when he announced intfirim wage increases and 
the cancellation of the union ' s  registration.s2 Another instance of Lee 
gaining the support and sympathy of a large crowd under difficult con­
ditions oc�ged during his tour of the Toa Payoh constituency on 11 
August 1963. Additionally in this assessme11t of the P.A.P. ' s  election 
success, recognition must be given to the fact that Leeo·was able to 
present the issue of merger in terms which the electorate understood. 
Moreover, it was shown to be a practical proposition when merger was 
achieved just before the polls took place. 
The Barisan could not present a sufficiently attractive alternative 
to the P.A.P. ' s  program although, as the election results reveal, the 
Barisan' s. blend of criticism of Malaysi� appeals to Chinese chauvinism 
and appeal to anti-colonial sympathies was not without success. Of the 
thirteen seat.J which the Barisan Socialis won, eleven were in what is 
coamonly de$cribed as Singapore 's  "rural" area. This term is obviously 
far from exattt, but based on the preliminary releases of information 
following the 1957 Singapore Census, it drNs have significance for at 
least foar of the electorates wa:n by the BarisAn outside the city. These 
are the electorates of Bukit Panjang, Bakit Timah, Choa Chu Kang and 
Jurong. The first of these falls ap.proximat:ely within the administrative 
unit, used in recording census figures in 1957, of Bukit Panjang while 
the latter three fall approximately within_ the administrative unit, used 
in the census of Jurong. Both of these administrative units had, at the 
time of the census, a significantly lower population density than the 
rest of the island and, particularly in the case of the Jurong unit, a 
27. Straits Tirneq, 20 July 19630 
28. Ibid., 23 July 1963. 
29. Ibid.,  12 August 1963. 
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significantly higher proportion of persons employed in agricultural 
labor. Against an overall island population density of 6,441 persons 
to the square mile, the density in Bukit Panjang was 1,728 persons to 
the square mile and in Jurong the figure was 849 persons to the square 
mile. The percentage of persons employed in agriculture in both the 
Bukit Panjang and Jurong·nadnainistrative areas wasn- higher than for any 
., 
other of the five units outside the city. In Bukit Panjang 2�. 5  percent
of those employed were. engaged in agriculture while in Jurong the per­
centage was 59. 7. The highest figure anywher• else was. 13.5 percent.
In both of the administrat. ive units the percentage of Chinese is higher 
than t1- overall percentage -- 76 percent for Bukit Panjang and 82 per­
cent forn.Jurong.n30 It is not so satisfactory to attempt .to establish 
a relationship between the other "rural" electorates won by the Ba:tisan 
and the census material, since the administrative units and the seats 
won do not correspond to the �ame e�tent. The implicati�n of the P.A.P .n9 s 
c01ouients on the fact that the Barison won in the rural areas was that 
these areas were in some way more susceptible to the program put forward 
by the Barisan. Certainly in BukitnTirnah, Choa Chu Kang and Jurong where 
the Barisan � seats with canfortable majorities, the inference may ben.
made that the. Barisan was successfuln.in appealing to Chinese voters 
·living in rural ornsemi-rural conditions and that many of these voters 
would ben.engaged in agricultural operations. The same inference can be 
made, although with considerably less for·ce, about the Bukit Panjang 
electorate. If·nthese conclusions are. valid; and admitting the diffi­
cu1·ty of · generalizing for the other Barisan "rural" elect()rates, the 
hypothesis can perhaps be advanced with some validity that the Barisan 
has had most success in promoting its particular type of propaganda 
outside the more urban constituenciesno Certainly the figures indicate 
that the urban areas contain the bulk of the PoA.P.n's support, although
two interesting exceptions to this generalization aren· the electorates of·
Sembawang and the Southern Islands. Sembawang is the electorate nearest 
to the naval dockyard wheren- rnany of the dockworkers live, while the 
Southern Islands have a high percentage of Malay inhabitants. Possibly
little more can be said on the urban-rural vote split with certainty
other than that it exists and that the� are some suggestions that the 
·greater degree of sophistication which might be expected in the urban 
electorates could be influential in bringing the splito The P.A.P.  
policy appealing for the growth of a ''Ma:layan" · spirit and admitting the 
need for compromise is essentially a more sophisticated policy platform
than that on which the Barisan stood. In four of the eleven rural 
electorates won by the Barisan there are indications that those who 
resp�nded to the Barisan's campaign were rural Chinese agriculturalistson31 
30. In the absence of the 1957 Singapore Census the figures quoted here 
are taken from preliminary releases made by the Census authorities 
in 1959 and quoted in M. K.  Sen, The Geographical Distribution of 
Po lation in Sin a ore 1947-1957, University of Malaya in Singapore, 
B.A. con. Thesis, 1959. Wason Microfilm 289, no. 11� 
31. On the basis of the information available the writer hesitates to be 
too definite in developing the hypotheses which may be drawn from 
the "urban-rural" vote split. As the map of the Singapore electorates 
-- P• 37 -- the map of the 1957 Census administrative divisions --
(continued) 
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In brief, then, the P oA.P. led by Lee Kuan Yew won its success in the 
September 1963 elections, (thus combining control of power in Singapore · ·  
with the achievement of the type of merger which it advocated) through
successfully presenting the issues in terms acceptable to the .!f'electorate!f'· 
and at the same time immobilizing much of the Barisan leadership. The 
P.A.P. was aided too in its c;:ampa!f'ign by control of the radio and television ·
services!f'o The P.A.P.'s success represented a personal tri1.D'llph for Lee. :.
Kuan Yew, however questiona)>le!f'many!f'of his methods.· His defense of.!f'these 
methods -- that they are no worse than those which would be employed by 
his· opponents if they held power -- is difficult to answer. ''Western­
style" democracy is a funct�on of many factors patently absent in 
Singapore and ·departures from its standards should scarcely be greeted
with surprise. 
frontispiece -- the election results and populati�n density figures 
-- Appendix C -- show, the "rural" electorates won by the Barisan ara
in areas of lower population densityo A further hypothesis which it 
would be interesting to test if enough evidence could be assembled
is the possibility that there has been less development in most of 
the rural areas in terms of Government housing and social welfare!f',
facilities. The P.A.!f'P. Government's avowed intent�ons of improving 
services -- water, roads and electricity -- to these "rural" areas, 
which have been stressed in the period after the election, tend to 
support this thoughto 
� 
V • SINGAPOBE AND MALAYA - lo The Political Issues. 
The acceptance of Singapore as a partner in a wider Federation of 
Malayaia only opened the way for fa.ether negotiations between Singapore 
and Malaya, to establish the terms of that merger. As already stressed 
in this paper, the Tengku's decision to propose Malaysia in May 1961 
seems to have been closely linked with developments in Singapore and the 
fear that Lee Kuan Yewn's P.A.P. Government was losing control of the 
electorate. In positive terms, as also recounted earlier , the Singapore 
Gover,nnent , since assuming off ice in 19 59 , had taken strenuous mea·sures 
to make itself an acceptable partner for merger by emphasizing its aim 
of bringing a Malayan outlook to Singapore; by seeking to allay the 
Federat_ion GoVEsrument ' s  fears on the political complexion of ,i'ts leaders; 
and by working towards achienving soae form of economic association be­
tween Singapore and the Federation. The Tengku" s May 1961 announcement 
was not merely an attempt to restrain further left-wing developments in 
Singapore. It was also evidence that the P.A.P. arguments had had sane 
effect and, whatever reservations might be retained by conservative· 
Malay politicians in dealing with Singapore Chinese Socialists, that the 
P.A.P. leaders had become acceptable participants at the oargaining
table. The P.A.P. • s· chief contribution to this feeling had been its 
recognition, in political terms, of the point beyond which the Pede·ration 
would not go. l 
The determination of appropriate political responsibility 'between 
the Federation and Singapore was reached with a miP:um,m of delay and does 
.
not appear to have resulted in major difficulties. The determination of 
financial and economic responsibility between Malaya and Singapore,. cm 
the other band, proved to be an extremenly difficult issue__ wbich was not 
finally resolved until just before the inauguration of Malaysia in 
September 1963, and still leaves promises of difficulty ___ for the future. 
The issues involved are sufficientnly complex to be considered iri a 
separate section of this paper , even though the separation of the economic 
from the political issues in this case is essentially artificial. 
In its earliest public coo•oents on Malaysia, the P.A.P. had indi­
cated that it regarded the retention of control over education and labor 
as an absolute necessity for any agreement.n2 This position was accepted
by the Federation and formally confitmed following the first official 
Malaysia discussions between Lee and the Tengku in late August 1961. In 
the cood!Nlcti•ue which was issued following this meeting, the Federation. 
accorded control over Education and Labor to the Singapore Gove�nt 
and reserved control over Defense, Extemal Affairs and Security. At 
the �ame time a working party of officials was appointed to: 
1.  See page 20 of this paper for further discussion of th�e point. 
2. Straits Times, 10 June 1961. 
3. Ibid. , 25 August 1961. 
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••• go into the overall financial and other implications arising 
out of arrangements whereby local autonomy is retained by 
·Singapore on agreed matters, and to consider the financial con-..
tribution Singapore should be reCfU_ired to make to the national 
gover,mient. 4 · . 
Following a further meeting be�wee_n the Pr:urie. Minis_t;:e·rs . of Malaya and 
Singapore in September 1961, tQ.ey announced that Singapore would become 
the Federation's twelfth state by June 19635 -- - a date to be later twice 
revised. The working party of officials frc,m b<>�hnsioes met, and the 
terms for merger were published on 16. November 196·1•n. The Heads of 
Agreement, as the terms were called, repeated the priticipal·nfeatures of 
the earlier comtaunique in a little more detail as follows: 
Singapore will be a stat� within the Federation but on special
conditions and with a _ nlarger measure of local aut��orny than the 
other states within the Federation. Defence, Extemal Affairs and 
Security will be the responsibility of the Federation Gov,zrau.nt;
Education and Labour that of the Singapore Government ••••  
The Heads of Agreemellt prov�dea that und�r . the �w a�ang•ments the 
special position of the Malaya innSingaporenwouldn·be safe$Uarded in 
accordan:ce with the Federation Con$t:1.tution, .wit:h _r•li.gious provisions
for the state to be on then_ns� lines as those 4pply�ng iA �lacca and 
·Penang. 8 The Singaporen· Public Service was to· ·be re-tainecl as a state · 
public service with facilities available �or �econding members of the 
public service to duty within the Federation. This provision did not, 
however, apply to the Singapore police force which, under general 
responsibility as•umed by the Federation for security matters, was 
slated for Federal controt.n10 The two mos.:t immediately controversial 
aspects of the agreement for Singapore's it\ternal politics :were those 
relating to citizenship and the apportionment of representation for 
Singapore in the Federal House of Representatives. On citizenship, the 
Heads of Agreement provided that all Singapore citizens should retain 
their Singapore citizenship while ass1D11ing Federal nationality. Citi­
·zens of the Federation were to 'nbecome nationals of the new Federation 
also and: 
••• Nationals of the larger Federation whether Singapore citizens 
or the Federation citf.zens, will as nationals have equal rights, 
carry the same passport, enjoy the same protection and be subject 
to eciual responsibilities under the Constitution of the larger 
Federation.n11 
4. Ibid. 
s. Sunday Telegraph (London), 17 September· 1961. 
6. The Times (London), 17 November 1961. 
7. Singapore COIIDlland.nPaper 33 of 1961. References in this paper from 
a copy published as The Merger Plan, p .  3 .  .
8.  Ibid. , P•  4. 
9 .  Ibid. , P• S. 
10. Ibid. , P• 5. 
11. Ibid., P• 6.  
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The Heads of Agreeme�t provided for Singapore to be represented in the 
Federal Parliament by 15 members. Some of the factors taken into con­
sideration in determining this number included the autonomy granted to 
Singapore in education and labor, the fact that all citizens in 
Singapore should not lose the citizenship rights which they then en­
joyed ,  and the generally larger measure of reserve state powers to be 
held by Singapore when compared to the other states in the Federation.o12 
Singapore was also entitled to two members in the Senate of the Federal 
Parliament. The ntunber of members was one matter on which there had 
been compromlse, as Lee Kuan Yew later revealed in discussing Malaysia 
on 6 Decernher 1961 , in the Singapore Assembly. The Federation origin­
ally proposed that Singapore should accept twelve seats and Singapore 
sought to gain nineteen.o13 On financial matters , the Heads of Agree­
ment were fairly general,  an indication of theo· fai�u{% of· . the officials 
negotiating the agreements to reach· detailed ' :accord: 1 ·;.The .tact ,. of: th:ts:
lack of precision was used to advantage by Singapore in its· later 
negotiations. Singapore had earlier raised the question 
I· 
of a future 
coumon market which it regarded as an essential to merger,o15 but this 
matter was not taken up in the Heads of Agree-8nt. 
Compared with the difficulties which developed in 1963 in relations 
between Singapore and Malaya over finance and other issues, the year 
1962 witnessed a general air of genial cooperation. The .omost notable 
entry by a Federation politician into the field of Singapore politics 
has already been described,o16 with the account given of the Tengku's
threat to close the Causeway uttered several times during 1962. Even 
if this had possibilities of embarrassing the P .A.P. , it was not 
uttered in this spirito. Both the Malayan and the Singapore Goveruments 
were anxious to accelerate progress towards inaugurating Malaysia, and 
they cooperated towards this end in pressing Britain to arrange for the 
transfer of sovereignty over the Borneo territories. With his back­
ground of anti-British attit'.Udes an� statewe--its Lee Kuan Yew ,ras able 
to take a stronger line in this than would have been 
i
ossible for the 
Tengku, without the latter stepping out of character. 7 In supporting 
the Tengku at this time,  just as in his later ill-concealed dissatis­
faction with the Tengkuo1s acceptance ofo_oa delay in the inauguration of 
Malaysia in August 1963 , Lee was deeply conscious of the extent to 
which his own political future - - and his party 's  as well -- depended
on the successful conclusion of the Malaysian project. One cooaoent by
the Tengku during 1962 , which did relate specifically to_ Lee's own con­
duct and which in other times might have brought a considerably stronger
riposte,  concerned Lee Kuan Yew's  visit to Moscow following the London 
12. Ibid.o, P• 7. 
13. Leg. Ass. Debates, 6 December 1961, Cols. 1407-1412 . 
14. The Merger Plan, pp. 8-9 and Lee's couments in the Singapore Assembly
Leg. Ass. Debates , 10 June 1963 , Cols. 613 -620. 
15. This had been raised both before and after the Tengku's Malaysia an­
nouncement by Singapore representatives. See for example Times 
(London) , 26 July 1961 . 
16. See page 24 of this paper. 
17. See for instance Sunday T1mes (London) , 29 July 1962 . 
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. .
talks on Malaysia held in late July. The Tengku confessed to have been
"surprised" to learn of Lee • ·s visit to Moscow, a visit which the Tengku 
indicated Lee had not discussed with him.!f'18 Quite out of character,!f'Lee 
waited a week before replying publicly and assuring the Malayan Prime 
Minister that he had nqt been "contaminated''; by the vj.sit, and noting 
that Singapore wa• pr.epared to tra4,e _!f'with the S_oviet U:nion. Jfis . own 
·personal ·outlook in these matters; Lee aseerted,· was simi1ar· to· that of. · 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian Head of State. 19· Although concern 
to avoid a direct clash between the
.!f'
Tin,$ku an�!f'hi�se�f mark.ed Lee's 
actions during 1963 also, the tensions wll,ich developed.!f'over the finance 
and co111oon market issues and·· the. Malayan Chinese_ Ass�ciat:i.on 1 .s operations ·
in Singapore cou1d ·_not be hidden. ·· · 
In!f'.any list of difficulties between the ruling parties of Singapore 
and Malaya during 1�63, the most d�se·xvfug c,f mention were Lee 's  conunents 
on the February detentions where he indicated that lbs Government would 
not have found it necessary to detain his opponents · and his conciliatory ,
statements regarding Indonesia during February 1963, at a time when 
statements from U.M.N�!f'-0. headquarters were couuoencing a campaign to in­
form the Malayan public of Indonesi� uconf��tat�9n�• o. As already
indicated' Lee I s  embarrassed _retraction c:o,ncemi,ng . the" detainees: suggests
that Malayan pressure was appiied. to the Singapore Prime Minister. It
is unlikely that Lee '·s statement .that ·lie Ut}derstoc;,d Dr. Subandrio of 
· · · ·Indonesia was·: · 
•• • not opposed to a Federation of Malaysia as euch as a neighbour
which is either on friendly or neutral terms with Indonesia, but
opposed to a Malaysia whifh shares a co11i:11on land frontier and 
which is hostile to her. 
was viewed with favor in Kuaia Lumpur. Disagreements on these matters 
were minor when c01npc:1red to the long-term dispute which developed over 
economic questions and the P.A.P.!f'1 s·concurrent and interconnected dispute 
·with the Mal�yan Chinese Assoc_iation. 
The political implications of the financial dispute related to the 
extent that Singapore, by exercising control over its finances, could
determine its independent de.velopment in a variety of matters such as 
industrial development, housing, social·!f'welfare and education. The com­
mon market issue was chiefly linked with Singapore's future economic
development seen in the frame of a likely further diminution of its 
entrepot trade and the need to establish industries and a market within 
which it could sell its products. In presenting its case during the 
lengthy negotiations, the Singapore Gover1wient showed a shrewd apprecia­
tion
.!f'
of its own goals and of the lengths to which it could go in attain­
ing them •!f'. Althoµgl;l: the. Federation Gove:r:1un•nt indicated ;on a number of. . 
:. . 
18. Straits Times, 21 September 1962. 
19. Ibido, 29 September 1962. 
20. See P• 31 of this paper. 
21, Stl'aits 'rimes, 13 February 1963, 
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occasions that the issue had reached a point beyond which it could not 
be negotiated,!f'22 the Singapore Gov•rno,ent pressed for and!f'- obtained its 
basic!f'- goals in the July 1963 discussions. Singapore's expertise23 and
knowledge of its goals helped:, _!f'but its political asQ•SMl!f'•lt that Malaya 
could not risk the loss of face involved in a real breakdown in rela-. . . . .
tions -.,etween the two negotiating parties appears equally!f'
. 
.il,nportant.
While there was an eJemie11t of risk- involved for Singapore in such an 
estimation, it seems reasonable to suggest that the internat,ional pres­
sures operating on Malaya plus the knowledge of potential trouble for 
Malaya if Singapore •re isolated, wexe too great to be ignored. Lee 
Knan Yew's attitude is �,u,.ued up in his own_coo■ue•tt at a dif�icult!f'. stage
c;,f negotiations during April 1963, in response to a press iaf1Uiry as to 
progress in the fig.(lllcial negotiations -- ''Malaysia will survive.
Don't wox.cy Chum."24 More for1114lly and at a later stage_ he said: 
Reason and logic. tell me that there is so much at stake that 
neither the Federation nor Singapore,. nor indeed the British,
whose military cOD1Dlbnents in this area are of a very basic 
nature �- I mean neither o� of us -- can afford a collapse. 25 
.. 
The finaneial negotiations took place at. a t,1me 11hen the!f',Malayan
Chinese Aseociation was displaying incaased interest in extending its 
political power into Singapore -�d the Pecle�ation Fi�ce Minister 
occupied the_position of President of the Malayan Chinese Asso�iation. 
(Tan Siew Sin is, additionally, a cousin of the Singapore Finance!f'· 
Minister and personal antipathy between these two negotiators was a 
further complicating factor). In
.
the period before May 1961, political 
development in Singapore with its stress on left-wing politics, and the 
apparent impossibility for more conservative parties to gain po-wer had 
been such as to discourage the ope?'.ations of the Malayan Chinese Asso­
ciation there. The Malaysia propoa!al, howver� was apparently seen by
the M�C.A� as providing a new framework for Singapore politics in which 
business interests, in particular, would find it attractive to support
a party which was a member of the ruling Alliance Goverruoeut in Kuala 
:Unnpur, and so able to exert influence in such matters as the granting 
of -bus:fness licenseso The M.C.A� President, Tan Siew Sin, made an ex­
plicit statement on his party's interests!f'-in Singapore du�ing May 1963: 
• • •  The Malayan Chinese Association.has a duty to perform in 
Singapore. I� is Singapore's only hope for future stability 
and progress. 6
22. As exaocples of final stands see. the statement by the Federation 
Finance Minister, Mro Tan Siew Sin of 29 April 1963 reported in 
St·raits T:fmes, 30 April 1963 aad the statement by Tengku Abdul 
Rahman o� 19 June 1963 reported in Straits Times, 20 June 1963. 
23. The Singapore Finance Minister, Dr. Gob Keng Swee, holds a London 
UniveTsity Ph.D. in economics. 
24. Straits Times, 17 April 1963. 
25. Ibid., 22 JUDe 19630 
26. Ibid., 23 May 1963. 
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A practical illustration of the M.C.A.'s belief in such a role was the
visit to Singapore of two M.C.A. senators, T. H. Tan and Khaw Kai Loh, 
during May in an attempt to recruit business support.- These activities 
Lee denounced as the "root cause" of the finance problem and an indica­
tion that the M.C.A. wanted a collision between the Tengku and'!f'himself.!f'27 
Senator Tan's response was to threaten to mo�e a motion in the Federal 
Senate against the entry of Singapore into the talaysian Federation if 2it did not stop obstructing the finance talks. 
The clash between the P.A.P. Goverrmaent and the M .C.A. embarrassed
the Tengku, as both sides attempted to invoke his name in support of 
their positions. While Lee repol}3d that the Tengku had told him to ig­
nore the activities of the M.C.A. -- a remark which certainly had the 
appearance of a calculated indiscretion!f'�- the M.C.A. could point to- the 
Federation Prirne Minister's gtatement that the M.C.A. was a loyal member
of the Federation Alliance.!f'3· Tengku A§ful Rahman called for round 
table ,talks to try and end the dispute, but the issues involved are
deep ones and recurring clashes between the two parties continued after 
the outbreak of public hostility in May. The rivalry was an embarrassing!f'-· 
one for Tengku Abdul Rahman since he undoubtedly had reservation concern!f'­
ing the M.C.A. as a future vote-gaining member of the Federation Alliance,
yet he obviously wished to avoid giving encouragement- to a party whose!f',
policy on socialism is not in accord with the outlook of the Fede�ation · 
Gover,unent, however mild the socialism of the P .A .P. in fact may be. 
The principal intangible in the M.C.A.!f'-P.A.P. controversy was not
the intentions of the M.C.A., which were stated with clarity, but the!f'" 
role which Lee and the P.A.P. intended to play in the Federation of 
Malaysia. Before the accomplis�it of Malaysia Lee Kuan Yew's connnents 
on this question were restrained. In �is revalatory broadcasts during 
September and October 1961 Lee referred to the P.A.P . 's aim of working 
with Socialists in the Federation: 
My colleagues and I have friends amo�gst our counterparts , 
the non-Conauunist socialists in the Labour Party and Party 
Rakyat. The Coul(Qunists are!f'·ext�emely agitated that we the non­
Coumunist socialists in the Federation and ��ngapore would get-together and strengthen each other's hands.· 
It is doubtful if the P.A.P. believed it could advance this aim when it 
attended the Malaysian Socialist Conference in Kuala Lumpur in January 
1962. It was expelled from the Conference on a.!f'motion from the Party 
Rakyat of Malaya which was supported by the other parties attending -­
the Bari1an Socialis, the Malayan Socialiet Front, the Party Rakyat of ·
27. Ibid., 18 May 1963. 
28. Ibid., 20 May 1963. 
29. Ibid., 18 May 1963. 
30. lbid., 22 May 1963. 
31. Ibid., 21 May 1963. 
32. Events after Malaysia was inaugurated are discussed briefly _in 
. .
Section IX of this paper. 
33. Lee Kuan 'Yew, op. cit., p .  94. 
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Singapore, the Party Rakyat of Brunei , and the Singapore Workers' Party.o34 
The Secretary General of this Conference , Lim Kian Siew, later denounced 
Malaysia in its pr�osed form and warned Britain of difficulties if it 
was pushed through. 5 Opposition to Malaysia was decisive in separating
the P.A.P. from any of the participants in the Conferenceo. 
As progress towards Malaysia be�ame more assured after the July 1962 
talks in London, both Tengku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew coouoented on 
the future role to be played by the components of the new Federation. On 
9 August 1962 the Tengku indicated that when Malaysia came he would in.,.­
clude members from Borneo in his Cabinet but not representatives from 
Singapore. There 
�
ld be none of the lat,ter since they were already
of the "same rank" .o3 Speaking on the same point a week later, Lee said 
that since the P.A.P. was not a member of the Malayan Alliance it did 
not seek seats in the Federal Cabinet . He noted, however, that Singapore
members in the Federal Parl1ameut would have the right to seek seats .if 
they c3'ld do so on the basis of having the support of a majority of the 
houseo. There w�s no further delineation of attitudes until July 1963 
when the P.A.P. attempted , but failed, to pass a Bill through the 
Singapore Assembly which would have permitted elections for Singapore 's  
fifteen Federal seats to have taken place before Malaysia was in­
augurated. Speaking at this time Lee suggested. that the P.A.P. hoped
to join forces with people of a like mina in the Federation. He said 
that he believed that some of the P.A.P.o's  ideas would eventually be 
accepted in other parts of Malaysia. Nevertheless, he stressedo. that he 
did not foresee a P.A .P .  Prime Minister of Malaysia in the foreseeable 
future.38 
The attitude just noted was linked with praise for the Tengku as 
the leader of Malaysia and as a politician devoid of t;OlllDUnal feeling. 
When Lee addressed the Assembly on 30 July 1963, he said , speaking of 
the Tengku, "as long as he is there he will be the leader of Malaysia . "39 
In the time -between the announcement of the Malaysia concept and the 
end of July 1963, Lee Kuan Yew made an obvious effort to avoid personal
controversy with the Tengku, even though in the period from February to 
July 1963 there were times when relatoions between the two Governments 
were strained. Lee praised the Tengku and claimed that the final 
Singapore acceptance of the Malaylha terms in the July 1963 talks in 
London was for the Tengku 's  sake . In the final two and a half months 
before Malaysia came into being , developments took place which Lee 
evidently judged sufficiently dangerous to his position for him to risk 
placing his Government and himself in opposition not merely to the 
Federal Government in general, but in effect in opposition to the per-. 
sonal prestige of the Federation Prime Minister. Lee Kuan Yew did not 
34. Straits Tfmeq, 29 January 1962. 
35. Ibid . , 5 April 1962. 
36. Ibid . , 10 August 1962. 
37. Ibid. , 16 August 1962. 
38. Ibid. , 27 July 1963. 
39 . Leg. Aas. Debates, 30 July 1963, Col. 349o. 
40. Straits Times, 10 July 1963. 
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want Malaysia to be postponed since he undoubtedly saw such a development 
as likely to detract from whatever support he had in Singapore; and when 
the Tengku submitted to international pressure both for postponementn· 
and for a United Nations survey of opinion in Borneo , Lee spoke out 
against the proposals: 
This is the time for Malaysia to stand up and fight for 
its position. We cannot give in to an international blaclanailer 
(i.e. Sukarno).41 
To speak at this time of considerable pressure on the Tengku may have 
aided Leeo's  position in Singapore, but it obviously involved a • risk of . . 
.alienating the Federation Pri.me Minister. This risk was by no means 
alleviated by Leen's announcement of his intention to proclaim Singapore 
independence on 31 August and to hold the powers
4i
f defense an4 external 
affairs, in trust until merger was accomplished. 
Lee proclaimed Singapore 's  independence as he promised, and
4
success­
fuily persuaded the leaders in Sabah and Sarawakn. to do the same!f'. 3 Only
after this action did it become clear that Singapore was not merely con­
cerned to strike a brave pose. for internal consumption, but was also 
using the minor crisis involved in its proclamation to highlight some 
final demands which it wishedn, to settle with the British and Federation 
Governments. It is difficult to see whatn.action Lee could have taken if 
his demands had failed , but they did not. He demanded and obtained from 
the Federation settlement of certain arrangements for a common market 
which although contained in Annex J of the Malaysia Agreement signed in 
London had been neglected in the Malaysian Tariff Board Bill. He also 
received an assurance that the right to refuse entry of Singapore citizens 
into the Federation was to be a reciprocal one, and was granted. continuin� 
special powers for the Singapore authorities in the suppression of secret 
society gangsters.n44 The price Lee had to. pay in obtaining these conces­
sions was criticism from the Tengku, who had been particularly distressed 
at one reference Lee had made to the.nnecessity to fight for independence 
in contrast to some countries - - Malaya being understood heren_n-- which 
had been handed independence on a silver platter; criticism· from offi­
cial's of the Malayan Alliance; and criticism from Dr o Tan Siew Sin of 
Malayan Chinese Associationo When he spoke atn-Malacca on 7 September
1963 the Tengku crtticized Lee' s  statements on the way in whichn- Malaya 
won its independence and his actions in
4�
eclaring Singapore'sn!!!_ facto 
control of defense and foreign affairs. In Kuala Lumpur an Alliance 
·leader was reported as saying: 
We feel Mr. Lee o••  has staged a silent coup d 'etat by ·n46proclaiming the island to be self governed from Au�st 31 . • • •  
4lo Guardian (London) , 9 August 1963. 
42. Straits Times , 31 August 1963. 
430 Ibid.  , 22 and 23 August 1963. 
440 Ibid. , 7 and 12 September 1963. 
450 Times (London), 9 September 19630 
46. Ibid.n, 9 September 1963. 
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Tan took the opportunity to issue a statement critical of Lee, in which 
the M.C.A. leader: ; claimed that Lee Kuan Yew had in the past approached 
the Tengku on the possibility of the P.A.P. joining the Singapore 
Alliance with Lee as President. At this request , Tan said, the Tengku
had advised Lee Kuan Yew to enter into discussions with the members 0£
47the Alliance, but these had failed because of Lee's arrogant attitude. 
Because it provides a possible future source of friction between 
the Singapore and Malayan Govctuments, mention should be made of the 
status of radio and television in Singapore, and , in particular , what 
control the Federal GoveTtoo,ent would exercise over them. As noted else-
where in this paper, the Singapore Goveroxnent has left no doubt about 
its readiness to use these mass media for its political endsn. In 
February 1963 Singapore authorities announced that they would soon 
acquire some more powerful -- 50 kilowat -- transmitters which would 
enable Singapore programs to be heard throughout Malaysia .n48- Singapore 's 
television transmitters which began functioning in February 1963 can _be 
received across the Causeway in Johore. When Lee Kuan Yew spoke to the 
Singapore Assembly a��t Malaysia on 5 April 1963 the iaeue of control 
hAd not been settled. If there was controversy over this matter from 
�hen until the signature of the Malaysia agreement in London in July 
1963, it was subordinated to the disagreements over financial controls 
and the co1111-on. market. In an annex to the Malaysia agreement, Singapore
was granted day-to-day control over the programs to be transmittedni by
radio and television and the Federal Government was apportioned legislan­
tive power and "the right to issue • • •  any direction necessary.to in�ure 
the implementation of the overall policy of the Federal Government."  O 
This, too, was an area of controversy into which Tan Siew Sin, the M.C.A .  
President was pi.pared to step. In a speech made in Singapore on 4 
August 1963 he was reported as hinting that aftern
.
Malaysia the Federation 
Goverooient would take over television and broadcasting. Lee Kuan Yew 's  
response on this occasion was to indicate that Singapore would not be 
cowed.oSI 
Lee Kuan Yew and his Goverrune�t were successful, for the main part , 
in gaining acceptance for their position on matters negotated , during the 
discussions for Malaysia and successful in achieving their return to 
continued power in Singapore. But the final months of negotiation had 
eroded much of the mutual confidence built.nup during 1961 and 1962 between 
Singapore and Malaya. Even Lee's ,apparentn·nintention to avoid criticiz­
ing Tengku Abdul Rahman faltered in this final period , so that even if 
direct criticism was avoided,nc�iticism by implication did taken·nplace and 
counter criticism was provoked .  The disagreements on matters of policy 
and principle were compounded by the personal antipathies between 
47. Straits Times, 11 September 1963. 
48. Ibid.o, 14 February 1963. 
49. ·Leg. Asa. Debates, 5 April 1963, Cols. 24 and 25. 
50. United Kingdom Coo1oc111d Paper 20941 1963 - Malaysia: Agreement con­
cluded between the United Kin dom of Great Britain and. Ireland the 
Fe erationn·of Mala a N Borneo Sarawak andn
.
Sin·n. ore�. July
1963 Annex K.n, p. 234. 
51. Straits Time�, 5 August 19630 
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Singapore's chief negotiators and the Federation Finance Minister and
through the open conflict which developed between the Singapore-based 
P.A.P. and the Federation Malayan Chinese Association. Lee Kuan Yew 
showed an appreciation of both the past and the future when, following
his return to power in Singapore in September 1963, he referred to the 
first task of the new P.A.P. Government as the inmlediate re-establish­
ment of confidence with the Central Goverx™nt. 52 
52. Ibid., 26 September 1963. 
V. SINGA.PORE AND MAIAYA - 2. The Economic Issues 
The broad lines of Singapore's economic problems have already 
been indicated as resulting from a relative decline in the e.ntrepot
trade, a rapidly increasing_npopulation and an accompdnying problem of 
growing 1me�ployment, with nearly fifty percent more persons coming 
onto the labor market each year than was the case several years ago.n1 
These facts bring iDJDediate economic problems. In addition, Singapore 
has to plan for a future which will provide work opportunities by in­
suring industrial development, and _nby finding s�fficient markets for 
whatever products new industries might produce. After it took office 
in 1959 the P.A.P. Govermnent, largely on the initiative of Dr. Goh 
Keng Swee, established the Economic Development Board having as onen�£ 
its tasks the attraction of overseas capital to invest in Singapore.
To encourage this overseas investment, a large area of previously
neglected land at Jurong on the westem section of the island was set 
aside for future development by indusntry, and various incentives were 
offered fQ investors in the forui of tax relief -- particularly exemp­
tion from corporate tax during the initial period of operati�n. Dro 
Goh has also travelled widely to the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Australia, seeking loans and investments for Singapore. Despite
Singapore's record of industrial difficulties during. the fifties and 
an initial reaction by business against the new G0\76tnment in 1959 
which diverted capital to the Federation, the amount o� new outside 
capital investment in Singapore rose in 1960 and 1961. This resur­
gence in investment emphasized the basic problem which Singapore had 
to overcome in order to make its whole development rationale feasiblen. 
Increased industrialization and investment were of little use if an 
expanding market was not available to receive the goods produced in 
Singapore. A major means of solving the problem outlined here lay in 
the creation of a c0111DOn market which would p�rmit Singapore to sell 
its goods to the larger population in the Federation of Malaya. Such 
a solution was made more attractive by the existing use of a c01W1on 
currency and the links which already existed in the two areas in 
banking and coo,oercial operations.: 
For a variety of reasons this desired aim had not been achieved in 
the period before the Malaysia proposalo Malaya's economy, in contrast 
to Singapore 's entrepot economy, is solidll based on the export of pri­
mary products, principally rubber and tin. It levies export duties on 
1. Ruef£ Report, p. 5. 
2. The Economic Development Board replaced the Industrial Development 
Board at first set up by the P.A.P. Government which showed few 
results. 
3. Ruef£ Report, p. 26. 
4. Some of then.facts supplied by the Ruef£ Report stress Malaya 's  de­
pendence on rubber. Rubber accounts for 18% of the national product, 
over 20% of total employment and 35% of Malaya's exports. Ruef£ 
Report, p. 6.  
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these and also operates protective duties to guard its industries. The
Malayan economy,. through this reliance on primary products,!f'_!f'faces· t�e 
constant threa_t of world price fluctuations and the uncertainties .of 
possible future competition from synthetic rubber. Malaya has attempted 
to counter its reliance on a limited base for its economy by offering.
similar . "pioneer" benefits to those given by $ingapore. Malaya was, un­
derstandably, reluctant to open its tariff walls - to- compet:i. tion from 
Singapore where, despite a higher per capiea:·income, the cost of. labor -
is lower than in the Federation. In particular the Federation was!f'.
reluctant since Singapore, so long as it preserved· its entrepot!f'.trade,
could obtain material!f'- for use in its .manufa�tures at. a more -favorable
rate than was!f'_!f'available to Federation manu�acturers. Singapore merchants 
were equally unwilling to abandon their relian� _!f'on a free port system 
for particjpation in an initially uncertain Federation market. To
achieve a fair and reasonable solution a. connnon market offered many 
advantages. As the Ruef£ mission stressed in its general assessment of
the situat�on in the Malaysian territories, all!f'. the_future components of
Malaysia , were faced with the need to develop their economies.!f'_ The
larger internal. mar�t which. would be provided by . a cQUW1on marke,t arrange -
ment and the greater diversification pos$ible w_ithin such a ma:rket could 
aid future development. · Even when a connn<>n market was ac_cepted by both
Malaya and Singapore as a desirable aim, considerable differences re­
mained on the means for institu�ing it. At the most fundamental level, 
while- the Singapore Governmeqt insisted that a �onanon_mArket·!f'agreement
'had to!f'·precede the inauguration of!f'Malaysia,5 ·the Federation Government
adopted the viewpoint that ag�eement in princ_iple was · gufficien�. and that 
detailed agreement could follow later.-, after Malaysia. _ ..
For the Singapore Government, agreement on c01mnon market arrange -
· ·ments .was closely linked-· with agreement on the division of financial ' . . . . 
.powers, which had been determined in only a genera� way during the joint 
working party sessions of officials from Singapore and Malaya in 1961. 
Singapore since the Second World War has not only continued its develop­
ment · along different economic lines, bot has _stressed development to a 
greater extent than Malaya, and has concurre9t1y ·spent larger sums �n
social services than the Federal Government. with this in mind, tpe 
Singapore Gover0&nent was anxious to · .insure that it retained sufficient
contl;'Ql, over its internal revenues to carry on development along ,!f'the 
lines it had already adopted. This raised the basic questions, over
which so much discussion took place in the first half of · , as to .t963-
where control of the finance rai-sed within Singapore by incom� tax, ex­
cise and customs should rest, and of how much Singapore should!f'·!f'retairi
.
in
order.!f'to carry out its projected programs, after contributi�g its share 
5. This had been indicated by the Singapore Government from the start of 
its discussion of Malaysia. See, for example, Lee Kuan Yew reported
in Straits Times, 26 July 1961. 
Com-·!f'-merce and Industry, see Straits Times, 1 May 1963. · · 
7. Ruef£ Report, p. ·3. Singapo�e•s expenditure on social s�rvices in 
the period betwe�n 1958-1962!f'has run at 40% of public investment 
while in the Fed·eration for the same period the figure· has varied 
between 25% and 33%. 
6. For a statement to this effect by the Federation Minister for!f'
• •• • • • • • •  
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to the cost of Federal services. While, again, some artificiality is 
injected by separating the question of financial control from that of 
the coo,uon market, the issues involved become clearer in isolat_ion. 
At all times, however, it should be rememhered that for the Singapore 
Govemment the two issues were seen as interxelated. 
The Heads of Agreement ·between Singapore and Malaya regarding 
merger, which were concluded during 1961, noted that: 
In view of the larger measure of local a'1t011.omy and the 
consequent larger expenditure on Singapore services and 
·development, the financial relations between the Federal 
Gover,wae4t and the states set out in the Federation Constitu­
tion will not be applicable in their entirety to Singapore. 
The Federation will retain legislative authority over all 
taxes of a national character • • •  -subject to the maintenance 
of the free port status of Singapore which will not be changed 
without the concurrence of both the Federal and Singapore 
Governmeats. The present machinery for the collection -of 
taxes in Singapore will be retained • 
• • •  The proceeds of national taxes will be used to pay the 
cost of gOV6r1■me11t and public services in Singapore and the 
contribution to the Federal Government for Federal services. 
The details of the aRportiomnent will be worked out by the 
joint working party. 
Hard bargaining to resolve the questions regarding the amount of itso· 
revenues Singapore ·· should contribute to the Federal Gove:roment and the 
control it should exercise over determining the amount did not begin 
until 1963. This probably reflects the need through 1962 to defer such 
questions until the conclusion of the basic political agreements neces­
sary to Malaysia.9 Understanding of the · financial issues is aided , t_o
the extent that Lee ICuan Yew'· s statements are accepted, by a full ex-· ' 
position of the issues involved and the state of negotiations throughout 
the financial discussions. (This indeed seems to have been a technique 
of the P .A.P. Govet,nnent on all matters throughout the negotiations 
based prescooahly on the consideration that by revealing the facts ofo. a 
situation freely a Government gives the impression of frankness and 
reasonableness.) 
The important negotiations between Singapore and Malaya over fi­
nancial matters opened on 28 February 1963. Lee Kuan Yew offered on 
8 .  The Merger Plan, p. 8 .  
9 .  AgriAenient on such issues as when it would come into being and whethero,
in the Bomeo territories, public opinion was in favor of entry. 
The entry of the Borneo territories into Malaysia is outside the 
scope of this paper , but it may be remarked that a case exists for 
seeing the Cobbold Report as rather less conclusive than the British 
Govermnent suggests. 
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behalf of his Government a proposal that Singapore should keep all its 
·revenues, �ncluding tax .collection·s, after merger and pay a lump f}F to
the Federal Government to -meet its share of the · - Federal services. 
This pn,poeal brQUght a firm respon,e from the Federation Finance 
Minister in which 'fan Siew Sin stated that it was clearly n�cessary 
that the Federal Government should have "at least ultimate control over
what is eventually!f'_ regarded as Federation revenue."11 ·!f'In sttbsequerit 
exchanges the differences between the two Gover,nnents became further 
delineated� The Singapore Gover1:ament i�sisted that it should hold 
"more than three-�arters'' if its revenues for the discharge of it
·s
internal respon$ibilit:ies,!f'1 while the Federation Fi�nce Minister 
continued to affirm the right of the Federation Govemment t! determine
what Singapore's contribution to Federal services would .be.1 With no 
agreement reached on the financial issue in the meetings begun on 28_
February 1963 the matter was referred to further meetings on 2i and 22
March 1963. This session_ discussed a memor�ndum put forward by Malay�, 
outlining the factors to be taken into account in the determination of 
Singapore's share of Federal Gover�nt .services. The essentials .of
the Federation proposal were th:at the Federal Govemment· should retain
all monies in excess :, of those. required for singapore to run its state
services and pay its conti-il>ution to Federal services. . This latter the ·
Federation assessed at 2 ·1. 2 perceilt yf common pan-·Malaysian services such as Defence and Fox-eign Affairs. 4 - Six,gapore rejected the figure·-
of 21.2 percent for its: 
, 
c9nt1;ibution to pan -�alaysian services as too 
high, and proposed that the amount it contri�ted should be determined
by its representation in the.Fe'deral Parliament, (which was to· be smaller 
proportionally than its p9pulation recrui,;ed if a .. strict mathematical 
formula was applied) the s:ize of its popul,ation, and the extent of its 
economic growth.ts This last determinant was often referred to as the 
"_prosperity index" a term whi'ch emphasized Singapore's concern that in 
determining its contribution tow�rds the Federal services due account 
should be taken of its capacity to pay in the event of some future 
·economic hardship_. The Stngapore negotiators also objected_ to _ tyg in­tended Fe�eration appropriation of Singapore's surplus revenues. 
The di_sagree1Uents on technical matters were complicated by the in­
creasingly open antipathy between Singapore and Malayan �egotiators 
which is described. , in the preceding section ·of this paper. Although the 
chief critic of the Singapore po$ition was Tan Siew Sin, criticism also 
came from the Federation Deputy l?rime Minister Tun Abdul Razak.!f'17 · Dis ­
cussion continued through April 1963 without progress. In mid-April Lee 
Kuan Yew gave a _!f'clear indication that settlement of the common market 
10. Straits Times, 2 March 1963. 
11. Ibid.,!f'. 5 March 1963. 
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 6 Marcq 1963. 
14. Leg. Ass. Debates, 5 Ap·ril 1963, Cols. 33 and 34 and 10 June 1963, 
Cols.· 613 and 614. 
15. Ibid., 10 June 1963, Cols. 615 and 616. 
16. Ibid., 10 June 1963, Co.l. 616. 
·17. Straits Timee ,  3 April 1963. 
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issue would aid settlement of the financial issue(I, and this "carrot 
on a stick" techniquy8
was pursued through to the final negotiations in 
London in July 1963. It seems possible that the Federation failed 
to consider why Singapore was so anxious to conclude the two issues 
concurrently. Singapore saw the need to have the market agreement 
within which it would develop the industries it hoped to promote through 
continued control over much of its revenues. Alternatively Malaya may 
have believed that its bargaining position as the much larger power was 
sufficiently strong to force eventual Singapore acceptance of Federation 
proposals. One or both of these attitudes appear reflected in Tan Siew 
Sin 's  statement that financial controls and the connnon market were 
separate issues.o19 The Singapore assessment was apparently that the is­
sues could be made intero-dependent and that persistent negotiations could 
bring results whatever the tenor of public statements. These financial 
negotiations took place at a time when Indonesian opposition to Malaysia 
was becoming increasingly vocal. Singapore thus not only went to the 
discussions with an important background of expertise and a firm know­
ledge of what it wanted, but also"owith the awareness that publicized 
differences between the future components of Malaysia constituted a pos­
sible loss of face for Malaya. This knowledge was exploited up to the 
final signature of the Malaysia agreement and again in the.oevents which 
followed Lee 's  proclamation of "independence" on 31 August 1963. 
A significant step toward a financial accord was made when, on 29 
May 1963, following a meeting between Goh Keng Swee and Lee Kuan Yew for 
Singapore· and Tun Abdul Razak and Tan Siew Sin for the Federation, it 
was announced that agreement had been reached in principle for the intro­
duction of a C0illllion market once Malaysia was established .o20 The hopeful 
statements made by both sides following this decision did not prevent
further deadlock on financial issues. The matters which remained unset­
tled were: 1) the proportion of Singapore ' s  revenue which should go to 
the Federal Gover11ment, and 2) the disposal of Singapore 's  surplus reve ­
nues . Singapore was prepared . to offer the Federation 27.3 percent of its 
.total revenues or 39 percent of its.ototal national taxes as payment for .
its share of pan-Malaysian services, and at the ttame time sought the con­
clusion -of coo+oon market terms in the Malaysian Constitution. In relation 
to the second major unsettled matter , the Federation displayed an uncon­
cealed interest in Singapore 's  surplus reyenue as a result of its undero­
taking to find development funds for the Borneo territories. Singapore
sought to meet this interest by offering to make available a loan of 150 
million Malayan dollars to the Borneo territories. The Federation asked 
for 28 percent of Singaporeo' s  total revenue or 40 percent of its national 
taxes as a contribution to pan-Malaysian services , and wanted the details 
of the COJ11oon market arrangements to be determined after Malaysia. In­
stead of a loan for the Borneo territories, it wished Singapore to make a 
50 million Malayan dollars grant to the territories.o21 · The Federation 
insisted that it would not go further in its efforts to acconmodate 
Singapore, and Tengku Abdul Rahman spoke of forming Malaysia without 
180 Ibid.o, 19 April 1963. 
19 . Ibid.  , 1 May 1963 . 
200 Ibid. ,  30 May 1963. 
21. The issues were 9,mnna,:ized in a talk by Lee Kuan Yew reported in the 
Straits Times,  26 June 1963. 
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Singapore. 22 The Federation bad by this time yielded considerable ground
to the Singapore position, a fact which cannot have disconuraged Lee Kuan 
Yew and Goh Keng Swee as they faced the final negotiations. 
The resolution · financial issues was achieved in a series of .of the . 
,
meetings in London in which the Federation representatives gave credit 
' 
to Duncan Sandys; the Secretary for Co11o,,onwealth- Relations, for bringing 
agreement. Lee Kuan Yew asked that he be quoted as saying that hisncon- · .
cessions were made only through regard for the Tengku. If Duncan Sandys
had been the only pe:rson involved ,.nhe would '�have brought him to his 
knees. 023 The delegations announced- agreement on both the conmon market 
and financial matters .on 5 July 1963 and released. details of them on 6 
July 1963. On the . financ.ial side, Singapore agreed to pay 40 percent of 
its national income from taxes -- the equivalent, of 27 percent of its 
total revenue - - to then-Federal _Gc;>vern:ment as the Singapore share of pan� 
Malaysian expenses. This • amount is to be reviewed by an 11independent
body" one year after the establisbmel'lt of Malay,sia - and thence every two 
years. As a compromise, Singapore agreed to grant a fifteen yeaT loa.Jl of 
150 million Malayan dollars to the Borneo territories on liberal repay­
ment terms. The.loan would.carry no int,erest demandsn.on the first 100 
·million dollars for the fi.rst five years and 22e remaining fifty million 
dollars would carry normal rates of interest. In· a _rider over which 
there was some later confusion, Singapore was_ granted the right to sup-
ply 50 percent of the labor for the projects undertaken using loan funds.n25 
The terms finally obtained by Singapore through the financial dis­
cussions are attractive, since they permit Singapore a fair amount of 
freedom in .control of it_s fµture development. Provided the projected 
reviews of the proportion of Singaporen's revenue to be paid to the .
Federal Government do not make- any significant changes, Singapore has ·
the opportunity to maintain its individual approach to social services 
and to continue with such programs as its Govertnnient housing scheme. 
This freedom is one of the series of possible future irritants iri Singa­
pore-Malaya relations noted at the conclusion of this paper. In insist­· 
ing on its right to supply 50 percent of the labor in the projects
undertaken in the Borneo territories, Singapore has made a partial step .towards solving its unemployment problem, but probably thensignificance
of the agreement is greater as a future lever for the export of labor 
from Singapore, rather than for it._s :fmmediate effect on the ltmuense 
22. Ibid.o, 19 June 1963. 
23. Tun Abdul Razak' s coumi,ent was reported in Straits Times, 3 July 1963 
and Lee's in Straits Times, 10 July 1963. 
24. Ibid.by, 9 July 1963. 
25. In the details announced on 6 July 1963 it appeared that the terms· 
of the loan stipulated that Singapore craftsmen would be employed in 
Borneo only if it was not possible for the labor to be obtained in 
Borneo. When the full text was revealed of the agreement signed be­
tween Tengku Abdul Rahman and_nLee Kuann.Yew -- it was _nnegotiated at 
the last moment and typed and signed on the back of an envelope -­
it showed that the employment of 50 percent of Singapore labor was 
mandatory. See·Straitsn,.imes, 24 July 1963. 
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problem of un- and underemployment within the state. 
Singapore Cabinet ·oMinisters had been calling for a conto!ln market 
arrangemento·owith Malaya from the inception of the P.A.P. Government in 
1959 , ·but no progress had been made towards the goal before Tengku 
Abdul Rahman's announcement proposing the Malaysian Federation. The 
basic reasons for Federation reluctance have been outlined. ' Whereas a 
coo,uon market arrangement appeared vital· for Singapore if. it was to 
have an economic future, the issue did not have the same ur'gency for 
Malaya, although as has been noted a colllllon market does offer advan­
tages to all components of the Malaysian Federation. Just as the 
financial arrangements between Singapore and Malaya were not nego­
tiated until the more strictly political issues were out of the way,
so the coo11iui,. market negotiations took place principally in 1963. By
comparison with the financial negotiations, a further elerneut was 
added to the coc■,.on market discussions by the Federation• s decision 
to seek advice from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Develo�i on problems of closer economic relationships within 
Malaysia. The leader of the International Bank Mission, Jacques 
Rueff, made a preliminary visit to the Malaysian territories for ten .
days in October and November 1962, but the mission ' s  real work was 
carried oat by a team of international experts who were in the 
Malaysian territories from 7 February until 16 April 1963.!f'27 
26. The announcement of the appointment of the International Bank 
mission was made on 5 October 1962 -- Malaysia in Brief (Kuala 
l-1sm1pur, 1963) Chronology, p.  133. According to the Political 
Secretary to the Minister of Culture in Singapore reference to 
the need for a cOD1DOn market agreement was not included in the 
Heads of Agreerne�t negotiated in 1961 since the decision had been 
taken to consult the International Bank. Straits Timee, 2 July
1963. 
The lntemational Bank Mission had the following terms of 
reference: 
1.  To eXRJDi.ne and report on the feasibility of , and problems in­
herent in, closer economic co-ordination among the prospective 
Malaysian territories with special reference to: 
(a) the feasibility of coo,oon market ·arrangements among the 
territories of Malaysia, taking into account the importance
of preserving the entrepot trade of Singapore, Penang and 
I,abuan, and the public revenue implications of cash arrange­
ments. 
(b) the impact of present diffel:'.'ences in trade and tariffo··o. 
. policies amo11g the territories. 
(c) other economic areas of possible conflict or overlapping 
interests. 
2. To reco111ue<1d concrete steps which should be taken in the fields 
of economic policy to effect such economic co-ordination as to 
produce the maxiou,o advantage to all territories .  
3. ·To recoo,oend administrative ·oarrangements for co-�rdinating and 
integrating development planning including industrial develop.-
ment. - Ruef£ Report , ppo vi and vii. 
27 .  Ruef£ Report , p. vii. 
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Before the Ruef£ Mission arrived in the Malaysian area, Dr o Goh 
Keng Swee, Singap<:>re 's Finance Minist·er, had been meeting with Federa­
tion officials to .discuss a future common market. Speaking on 6 January 
1963, he proposed a ·common ma't'.ket on much the same terms which he had · 
advocated before the 1959 Singapore elections. He suggested that there 
should be a common marke.t ·which would permit· goods manufactured in 
Singapore to move into the Federation without duty, and which would 
similarly permit Federation goods intos- Singapore without duty. Under 
this proposal, goods·manufactured outside Singapore and Malaya would be 
subject to duties but raw materia,ls would continue to enter Singapore
free of duty .28 Since this plan would have given a cos·t advantage to 
Singapore manufact'-rers who would receive duty free raw materials from 
which to manufacture their goods, it did not bring a Malayan response. 
Throughout the common market negotiations the Federation Government 
displayed a lack of concern for the need to have a commons- market within 
any set timeso Singapore forced attention to this issue by making the 
settlement of the financial negotiations conditional upon the conclusion 
of a common market agreement. The fact· that the Ruef£ Mission had appar­
ently accepted the feasibility of a ca1Unon market while in the Malaysian 
area, resulted in its na,ne being invoked by the Singapore Government as 
·it pressed its position� · 
There are strong indications that the Ruef£ Mission 's views were 
not welcomed by the Feder•tion Government. While Singapqre representa- · 
tives referred to th� Mission and its· "report" in April 1963 and in June 
1963 presented a constitutiona_l. plan ·for a counnon market based on the 
''report", the Federation Government until late in the negotiations denied 
the possibility of formulating a conmon market agreement in the time 
availabls .29 The Ruef£ Report as transmit,ted to the Federation Government 
in July 1963 appears to be in the form of conclusions agreeable to the 
Governments of both Malaya and s·ingapore" rather than the Mi$Sion 's inde­
pendent findings. This is at least implied by the fact that it was not 
discussed by the executive directors of the Bank or the management of the 
International Bank and so "represented the view�0
o£ the Mission rather : 
than the positive recommendations of the Ban.les."  It is also implied by 
the fact that Lee Kuan Jiw referred to the Mission's report being in 
existence in April 1963 and. by Lee 's referring to Singapore being ready 
to accept the conclusions of the Ruef£ Mission, which was reported at 
least twice in the Straits Times of 22 June 1963 and in another statement 
in the Straits Times of 24 June 1963. The second time Lee noted that Dr. 
Goh had prepared a detailed plan for ' a common market based on the Ruef£ 
Mi'ssion 's views - which h� had presented to Tan Siew Sins. The published 
report on the Ruef£ Mission's visit to Malaysia did not accord completely 
with the agreements reached in London,· and a comparison of some . of the 
differences is made later in this paper. 
28. Straits Times, 7 January 1963.:29 Just what form the ''report" was in when Lee referred to it in Apri 1 e 
and June is not clear. That some "re_port" did exist before the 
printed copy was transmitted to the Federation Government does seem 
to be a fact since there was no Federation rebuttal of Lees's state-
ments. . .
30. Ruef£ Report, p. ix. 
31. Straits Times, 19 April 19630 
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Dr. Gob Keng Swee reported on the state of �gotiations when he 
addressed the Singapore Assembly on 7 June 1963.o3 There was no dif­
ficulty, he said, in gaining the agreement of the Federationo_oGover1nnent 
to an arrangement in which there was a couauon external tariff for both 
Singapore and Malaya. The difficulty about such an arrangement was that 
it would destroy Singapore ' s  entrepot trade which was not, of course, 
acceptable. Singapore had therefore proposed a modified coo••�n market 
arrangeme11.t. This provided that goods manufactured within the Malaysian 
territories should move freely within those territories;obut that pro­
tective duties should be instituted to preserve them from foreign 
�tition. Tariffs applied elsewhere in the Malaysian territories on 
goods not manufacturedo·oin the territories should not be applied on goods 
entering Singapore . The advantage of this proposal , as Goh Keng Swee 
pointed out, was that the bulk of Singapore ' s  entrepot trade which was 
in tropical produce would not be affected, and dislocation of the entrepot 
would be limited. This proposal was an advance on the earlier positions
adopted by the P.A.P. , since it admitted the possibilities of protective 
duties operating on goods entering Singapore if the same goods were .. manu­
factured within the future Federation, but it did not really take up · the 
question of the treatment of raw materials which might be imported into 
Singapore for processing and then subsequently exported into the Federa­
tion. 
Progress towards a solution of the differences between the two gov­
ezoo,ents. ; did not come until the final hard bargaining in London at the 
end of June and in the first few days of July 1963. Agreement on the 
conmon market was notified with agreement on the other financial issues 
on 5 July 1963. and the terms of the agreement were embodied in Ann�x J 
of the Malaysia Agreement. In broad outline the Annex, which incident­·o
ally only giveso_odetails for Singapore and . Malaya ' s  arrangements, provides
for a coouoon market to apply progressively throughout Malaysia for "all 
goods and �joducts produced or manufactured in significant quantities in 
Malaysia." The e:xemption from the COUlllon market arrangements of goods 
with their principal terminals outside Malaysia means that in the case 
of such items as tin and rubber the Federation will contin� to levy 
taxes before the goods cross to Singapore for sale abroad. Further-
more, Singapore ' s  position as a possible site for the manufacture of 
materials iml>orted at a cheaper rate by being free of duty is curtailed 
in Article 1(3)o· of Annex J which provides that the eonuuon market pro­
visions "shall not be construed to prevent the imposition • ., .  of any
special tax on producers in a low-tariff state which would offset the 
cost inequalities arising from the differential import duties. "35 · 
Only where existing protective duties are uniform will there be ·noo · 
trade restrictions on the passage t�ioughout Malaysia of goods im­
ported into one of the territories. The scope of the market is thus 
a limited one ,  designed to insure the continued collection of revenue 
32. Leg. Asso Debates ,  7 June 1963. 
33. United Ki
{f
dom Cc,011w,d Paper 2094 - 1963. Malaysia Agreement, _Annex J.l 1), P• 228. 
34. Ibid. .. 
35. Ibid.o, 1(3) (a) . 
360 lb_id. ,  1(2)o. 
taxes by the Federation of Malaya on its major export items; the con­
tinued use of protective duties within the Federation of Malaysia where!f'· 
cost advantages as the result of differential duties result in cost in 
equalities for manufactured goods; and by a progressive introduction of
the market -- over twelve years -- the least possible dislocation of
the Singapore entrepot. 
To advise the Malaysian Government on the establishment of the 
conmon market, the Annex provided for a Tariff Advisory Board which 
would make recouwiendations· on the establishment and maintenance of a 
conmon external tariff for the protection of goods for which there will 
be a comnon market.!f'37 Singapore's special position as an entrepot port 
is safeguarded in the Anrtex :i.n two principal ways� The Tariff Adv.isory
Board has as 
. 
its principal st·aff a chairman and thr.ee deputy chairmen.
Singapo� has to concur in the appointment of the c331rman, and one of.
the deputy chairmen must be nominated by Singapore. The other safe­
guard lies in the progressive introduction of the market over a period 
of twlve years which should permit Singapore to make .adjustments to
match the decline of the entrepot trade. Thus article 3(2) of Annex J
provides · that except where · urgent act ion is considere·d necessary, the
Federal Govemment. shall not impose protective tariffs in Singapore 
before receiving the advice of the . Tariff Board, while for the first .
five years of the twelve over which the introduction of the market is 
to be phased Singapore wtll have the right to delay the application of 
a protective duty for twelve months if it feels that such a duty will 
harm its entr�pot trade.!f'39 Provision was also made in the Annex to 
withhold the application of revenue duties!f':-- i oe. duties levied for 
the purposes!f'·of raising rev�nue only -- for five years, and for the!f'· 
seven succeeding years up to 1975 Singapore may refuse to implement a
revenue duty on the grounds that it might endanger the entrepot trad%oso long as it reimburses the Federal Government for loss of revenue. 
Singapore's insistence on the necessity for a cOtmllon market agree­
ment successfully brought its inclusion in the Malaysia Agreement. By
comparison with the reconmendations of the Ruef£ Mission -- ·even if,· as
suggested, they only consist of agreed conclusio�s acceptable to both . .
parties -- the conmon market arrangements outlined in Annex J are ex-
tremely brief.!f'41 The provisions of the Annex appear to represent a
political compromise. While Singapore has gained Malaya's agreement to 
a market, its own capacity to compete in that market will certainly not 
be as unrestrained as it had hoped for and argued for in its earlier 
proposals. The tasks of the Tariff Advisory Board as set out in the 
Annex are not so strictly defined as they are under the Ruef£ Report. 
While the Ruef£ Report suggested that the Tariff Board should have 
responsibility for making reccmnendations on protective duties only,!f'42 
37. Ibid., 2(1)o. 
38. Ibid.o, 2(2)o. 
39. Ibid.o, 3(3) , P• 229. 
40. Ibid.o, 4(4), P• 230: 
41. See Ruef£ Report, Chapter VI and particularly!f'·po 56 ff. 
42. Ibid. , P •  49. 
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the Annex gives the Board responsibility for both revenue and protective 
duties.s43 The Annex does not go into what criteria will be used in 
deciding uponJhe application of protective duties, as was done in the 
Rueff Report. Overall, the agreements included in Annex J follow the 
broad lines of the Rueff Report but in a less detailed form. The Annex 
does not discuss, as the Report does, the way in which Singapore may 
preserve its entrepot tra�e.45 The measures suggested include the wide­
spread introduction of free zones and bonded stores with special provi­
sions made for tourists who are particularly important for Singapores' s  
economy. 
The provisions of the Annex were incorporated in the Tariff 
Advisory Board Act which was passed by the Malayan Parljame�t before 
Malaysia Day. Singapores' s  extreme senssitivity on the coomon market 
question was shown again when the Act did not follow the Annex in one 
respect, by failing to make clear that harmonization of the revenue 
duties to be applied in Singapore following the Tariff Board ' s  report 
due before 1965, did not imply immediate implementation of the revenue 
duties. The Annex provided here that the Singapore Govermnent could 
offset application of the revenue duties up to the final establishment 
of the cno+oon market in 1975, if it paid the cost of the revenue which 
would otherwise be raised. This was one of the issues placed as a 
�ernand before the Federation and British Governments in the fortnight
immediately before Ma�laysia, · and as with the other matters raised 
Singapore was successful. 
Financial and economic arrangements brought .harder bargaining 
than any other issues discussed between Singapore and Malaya. This 
prunarily reflects the deep concern of the Singapore Government to 
preserve a reaso nably sound economic future for the state, and to see 
that arrangements for this were incorporated in a formal fashion, which 
would pre�ent any subsequent erosion of Singapores' s  position. This 
determination must have been strengthened by the stress placed on 
strong central control by the Federation Ministers throughout the ne­
gotiations. The arrangements which have been negotiated do not obviate 
the possibility of future difficulties. Tariff Boards are notoriously 
subject to criticism and in the case of the new Federation there will 
not merely be opportunity for the public or manufacturers to criticize 
the Board but also the possibility exists that inter-governmental diss­
agreement between Singapore and Mala)ll.scould greatly impede the Boards' s  
tasks. For instance, the determination of how to limit cost advantages 
in low-tariff states -- thus Singapore -- provided for in Annex J, 
could well provoke difficulties. Even though Lee Kuan Yew has referred 
to the need for Singapore to regain the confidence of the Federation 
Gave:<o•oent, this will have to be achiesved in a situation in which there 
are factors already present and capable of exercising a divisive in­
fluences. In a sense the negotiations between Malay� and Singapore over 
finance .have been a classic illustration of the dictum that centralized 
control is most easily exercised in a situation where the interests of 
the component parts of a Federation are roughly identical. In political 
43 . Cmnd. 209� 4(4), p. 230 assigns the Board ' s  duties for revenue dutiess. 
44. Rueff. Report, p. 57. 
45. lbid. ,  Chapter VIII, p. 74 and ff. 
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matters, the inunediate in�erests of the two Governments are fairly
similar. Neither wishes to see the further growth of extreme left-wing 
power in Singapore and both were prepared to make concessions to pre­
vent this. While it may be argued theoretically that the economic 
interests of the two Goveruments are in the long term v�ry closely 
linked, their inm�diate aims are not. Singapore fought hard ton·nobtatn 
both the conanan market and the preserva�ion of its entrepot trade, as 
well as a large measure of financial autonomy, and Malaya f�ught to 
prevent Singapore retaining too much independence in an.y of these · · 
matters. It will be most surprising if the seeds of dissent sown by
the disagreements between the two Goverr�ents over financial and ..
economic matters remain dormant now that the new Federation has been 
established. 
" 
'. •. 
VI. SINGAPORE AND BRITAIN 
The Singapore Government's chief concern in its relations with · 
Britain, 4uring tbe __negotiations for Malaysia, was to prevent any 
British delay in moving towards the inauguration of the new Federation. 
As a result, while Britain and Duncan Sandys as the British Minister 
chiefly concerned always remained possible targets, so long as British 
delay was not evident relations between Singapore and British were 
remarkably harmonious • 1 Lee and hi·s Goverrunen.t accepted the Internal 
Security Council as one of the necessary but interim examples of con­
tinuing British control, despite the potential this offered for 
criticism fran the left. Lee, also, made much of the impossibility of 
Britain using its. Singapore bases for S.E.A.T.O. purposes and of t�e 
necessity to formalize Britain's use of the bases by an agreement.
But he, like the Tengku, took advantage of the ambiguity of the 
British-Malayan Defence Agreement of November 1961 concerning the use 
of the bases for s.E.nA.T.O. purposes to "explain it away" and sug­
gested that the bases in Singapore should be withdrawn within fifteen 
to twenty yeara.3 Even the Barisan Socialis has baulked at advocating 
the Jo .. oediate withdrawal of the British from their bases in Singapore.
One estfrnate of the economic importance of these bases to Singapore 
shows why it is politically inexpedient for any party to call for their 
abolition. The British &tmeJ forces establishments in Singapore 
directly employ more than 30,000 persons and, if families working in 
ancilliary services_ are take11 into account, the numbers �ffe�ted by a 
complete closedown are probably �tween 100,000 and 150,000. The 
Barisan Socialis vice-chairman, s. Woodhull, in fact referred to the 
bases as a ''blood transfusion" for Singapore.n5 But while finding it 
1. It see,ns probable that Lee JC11au· Yew's anti-British postures and un� 
doubted distrust of muchn-of British policy and motives have been too 
readily accepted as evidence.nof pervading
.n
personal anglophobia. Too 
often reports of Lee's statements have neglected to note the ·aspe�t of 
Leen's personal relations with Britain and the British. Little publin­
.city is given to the fact that.nLee visits his former Cambridge College
when he is in England and it is- interesting to note that Lee has not 
hesitated on occasions to defeQd individual Englislnnen working as ex­
patriates in the Singapore public service if he is convinced of their 
loyalty.
2. Sunday T:!mes (London), 1 October 1961 and Time$ (London), 30 September 
1961. 
3. The operative and ambiguous phrase which permitted the Agreement to be 
explained away was that the Goverruoent of Malaysia would ''afford to the 
British Governoie1'\t the right to maintain bases at Singapore for the 
purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia and for the preserva­
tion of peace in South-East Asia." Times (London) , 23 November 1961. 
On a date for withdrawal see Lee reported in Straits Timee, 4 August
1962. 
4. Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. rnv, No. 4, 26 October 1961, article 
"British Bases in Singapore", P• 243. 
5. Ibid. 
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impolitic to call for abolition,. the "Barisan has used the bases as a 
focus for industrial.!f'disc;onteat, while attacking any nggestion of their 
use for S.E.A.T.O. purposes or for storage or transportation �f nucletr 
weapona.!f'6 
-Throaghout the negotiations for Malaysia, Singapore's  leaders 
reflected a self-intensted_ fear of delays as likely to affect their 
internal position. The- fact th.at Britain was·an almost traditional tar­
get for Singapore criticism probably alao acted as a safety valve inn. 
relations between Singapore and Malaya, since, when t\lere!f'·was delay in 
negotiations, the frustration whieh this produced could be channelled
away from Malaya._!f' At the same t1- the Federation Govez,.a,ient must have 
welc01i1ed the fact that Lee could play the role of critic to prevent
friction developing in Malaya's relations with Britain. Lee 's criticisms 
of Br�tain' s slowness in moving t.ewards public acceptance of the Malays fa 
· ·concept· related particularly to the Borneo �erritories. Thus during
July 1961 Lee was reported as saying that there was_ concern in Kuala
Lumpur ever British delay in connection with the Borneo territorieso!f'7 
Lee spoke more strongly when it seemed, following the -.visit of ·the ·
Cobbold COD1Dlssion to Borneo, that there was still some British reticence 
about drawing up a t:lmetable for the Borneo · territori•s' entry into ' ,
Malay,ia •!f' Asserting that he had '' aa much right t3 say. . as anyone British .or Malayan''  Lee called for Malaysia by J'une 1963. In·. London during 
July 1962 when ·the Tengku was discussing Malaysia, Lee. warned that 
British ·''dawdJing" could lead to the whole of Southeast Asia being lost
to cc,10111unism. , · This last rem-'E'k was not 
,
only an example of criticism
of the_British, but also of Lee's readiness to phrase his remarks to 
suit his audience -- in this caae a British oneo 
, . . . 
At tlre level of unofficial nlat ions between Britain .and Sing�pore, · 
there ·waa the visit· during' May 1963 of a three member!f'. investigating • < · 
team from the British Parl:tamentary Labour Partyo . .  The three - parliame1l­· .tariana wen Arthur BottGmley, . the 
« 
Lal>oar Shadow Colonial
. 
:Semtary,
Pennei Brockway
. 
and Beglnald Sorensen�· 
.. 
Both.. •f the latter·:two.. men!f'. had
a long xecori!f'of inteflilat ·in colonial affairs. 8 Their visit convinced.
them that there was ovirall ripport in the Malaysi�n territories for the 
new Federation, �lthough in B�unei tqey reported f�nding Yidespre�d sup-
port,,. of v4rying degree, for the De�'her 1962 rebellio�. Referring
specifically to Singapore, Bottomley a•: leader of the group said in a 
television forum on 29 May 1963: 
There can be no doubt that there is a -powerful exp!_ession in _
SingapGre against Malaysia. But I am bound to say • •  Lconsultatio'!l/ 
6. Straits T:lrnes, 1 May 19620 ·· · 
1. T:lmes (London), 26 July 1961� 
8. Straits T1rne�, 26 July 1962. 
9 .  Sunday T:lme�, 29 July 1962. 
10. Their arrival in the, area was reported in Straits ·-. Times, 18 May . ·. 
1963.
11. Ibid. , 28 May 1963._ 
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••• left us in no doubt that Malaysia is the right thingn· • • •  and 
we are convinced that
1i
he majority in Singapore wish for the 
creation of Malaysia. 
This visit and its conclusions were.important in bringing the bi-partisan 
support which the British Par11ameut accorded the Malaysia proposal. 
Both in the final negotiations for Malaysia held in London in 1963,
and in the laat•:lnute crieis which developed following t,e 's. declara­
tion of de facto independence on 31 August 1963, the Singapore Govern.neut 
tried to present the British Goveroo•nt as the obstructionist preventing 
progress. �an Sandye was singled out both time� for criticism by . 
Lee Jruan Yew. 13 Yet in both cases the issaes to be determined were in 
fact ones between Singapore and Malaya which Britain had the unenviable 
task of rec011ciling. In the London negotiations it was the financial 
and economic issues which weren-at st:ake, while in early September 1963 
there waa a residual finaneial matter, an issue of the mutual right to 
restrict innigratien and i� powara to be given to Singapore for the 
suppression of gangiters. Despite the nature of the probl91f! in 
September Lee waiwd Sandye that be had to "sort things out�•. Com-
pared with these aatter_s, the negotiations between Singapore and Britain 
regarding pay, ant for the use of land which the British had occupied in 
Singapon erul the return of land previoaaly used by Britain as the 
aclmiuistering power ware minor matters. Under an agreemeTlt:.nconcluded 
at the time of the final talk■ in London, Britain agreed to hand over 
1,330 Gctes which had been previously med by its civil and military
esta�lieh, ents in Singapore atJ.d to pay five million Malayan dollars for 
land occupied without title.n16 . The continued presence of British forces .
in Singapon a.rut the contiruei reliance on British bases to provide·nmuch 
of the eq•loy1aent on the island means that then will still be opportu­
nities for agitation against Britain and its policies. While there is 
continuing international opposition to Malaysia, howe.1er� the difficul­
·tiesnof explaining the continued British presence to the Singapore 
electorate will J,e very much lessened. 
12. Ibid. ,  30 May 1963. 
13. See for instance Straits Tfzes, 10 July 1963 and 3 Septeaaber 19630 
14. This ia discussed on PP• 47 and 48 of this paper. 
15. Straits Time�, 4 September 1963. 
16. Ibid., 10 July 1963. 
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VII. SINGAPOBE AND 'tHE BORNEO TERRITORIES 
Alleged collusion between the members of the Barisan Socialis and 
the Brunei rebels, and allegation$ of intended co-operation between the 
Barisan and dissiden�s -in North Borneo, formed one of the chief reasons
for the actions of the Intem41 Secur·ity Council in February 1963 .1 
This alleged association highlights the general lack of close political 
ties between Singapore and the Borneo territorie�. Although in early 
1961 Dr. Toh Chin Cbye spoke of the desirabil_ity of forming closer
links with Borneo, as well as- Malaya, there is no evidence of the P.A.P.
making successful inroads into the Borneo political scene before May
1961. The P.A.P. would, of course, have been limited in any such 
attempt by the territories' status as British Crown Colonies and.!f'by
their lack of political development. Moreover,!f'· the P .A.P. faced such ·
problems in Singapore that it· could scarceley weaken its efforts there 
by attempting to expand its activities into Bomeo. The importance of 
the Borneo territories for the Malaysia concept was, however, clearly
appreciated by the- P.A.P. leaders in!f'- Singapore, and Lee Kuan Yew 
pressed for. the - quickest possible- dee-ision on their - entry imne.diately 
after the .Tengku' s initial Malays· As noted in· the previousia proposal. -
section, this involved criticism of Britain whenever Lee judged that 
insufficient progress was being made. Rather in contrast, however, to 
the Tengku's early_ : ate�nts on Borneo, Lee wa, careful not - to offend .st -·
Borneo susceptibili�ies. At the Coounonwealth Parl:lamentary Association
meeting held in Singapore during July 1961, Lee was reported eX§ressing
concern for the feelings and interests of the Borneo delegates. During
this meeting Singapore also gave tangible evidence of its readiness to
aid the Borneo territories when the Minister for Education, Yong Nyuk
Lin, announced the offer of ten Malaysia schola�ships, which would be 
awarded to student• from North Borneo wishing to study at Singapore's 
University and Technical College. Singapore also offered to train 
Sarawak radio operators and to provide training for civil fervants from 
the Borneo territories within_ the Singapore civil service.!f'· It was at 
this meeting that Donald Stephens transferred his support to Malaysia, 
and it may be speculated whether Lee's solicitude for Borneo feelings 
was in part instrumental ·1n this decision. Stephens • cou,roent on the 
scholarship offer may be noted in this respect: 
. 'This is something which I will take back to my country with
pride and with happiness. My people will appreciate it very much. 5 
1. See PP• 30-32 of this pap;r.
2. As an example the Tengku was reported in the Straits Times, 24 July
1961 as saying that there was really no difference!f'·!f'-- in race and 
interests -- between the Malays and the Dyaks. 
3. Straits Times , 22 July 1961. 
4. Ibid. , 27 July 1961. 
5.  Ibid. 
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When the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Coun!ttee met in Kuching in .
December 1961, Lee Kuan Yew again appearedsin the role of the wise mar­
riage broker, ready to reconcile differences and complimenting the 
politicians of North Borneo and Sarawak on their political sophistica­
tion. Speaking in a meeting he said: 
• • •  So long as we accept the necessity and the inevitability of 
Malaysia, the differences of view which we have as to the form 
and content of Malaysia can be resolved.s6 
In a later meeting he asked how the idea could possibly have originated 
that the politicians of Sarawak and North Borneo were not sophisticated,  
and he sp ke
.s
in the same tone ins·sa radio broadcast throughout the ter­,
ritories .  
These statetue'lts need not be regarded as indicating Lee ' s  concern 
for the propriety of sudden political advance in the territories as it 
affected the people at larges. This was not his main preoccupation· 
whereas the acceptance of Malaysia by the politicians was. The opposi­
tion of the Sarawak United People ' s  Party to Malaysia Lee denounced as 
the result of the party 's  being penetrated by Coo,nuni..sts. 8 The P.A., P o  17 s 
position of support for early Borneo entry and an unreadiness to accept 
that the terl'itories might pursue some other path to independence were 
countered by the Barisan Socialiss. the Barisan was critical of the 
manner in which the Cobbold Connission carried out its survey and 
called for self-determination to permit the territories tos.sdecide on 
their own fature.9 The outbreak of the Brunei rebellion gave Lee the 
opportunity to contrast the progress  towards merger made by Singapore , 
a Chinese. statesj compared with that made in Brunei, a Ma.lay state under 
a sultan.s1 The later denunciation of the Barisan for its alleged links 
with the rebels has already been discussed in this paper but it is de­
s irable to stress again the divergence of outlook between the Barisan 
with its opposition to Malaysia and Azahari with his vision ofsa new 
hegemony over the Borneo territories.  
Lee 's insistence that, in return for Singapore 's  loan to the 
Borneo territories, Singapore craftsn.en should provide 58 percent of the 
required labor force, was given Malayan assent without consultation with 
the Borneo delegationsso This was made clear in Donald Stephenss' sur­
·prised reaction to Lee ' s  annom1cement" of the condition·, somestime after 
the. final meetings on Malaysia held in London in early July 1963. On 22 
July 1963, Stephens stated that he had no knowledge of the condition, 
and that no provision for the use of· Singapore labor, in conjunction 
with the Singapore loan to the Borneo territories, had been included in 
the Malaysia Agreeme�t: 
60 Sarawak By The Week, No. 51/61, Po 10. 
7. Ibid., P• 14 and PP• 17-20. 
So  Lee Kuan Yew, op. cit. , P• 9 5. 
9o Straits Times, 23 October 1962. 
10. Ibid., 1 January 1963. 
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The first mention of this fifty percent _Sing_apore labour 
force came from.- Mr. Lee Kuan Yew alone and it only ca.me after.
the agr.ement h11ds· been signed._ 11 
This complaints· br,eugh.t the revelation ·of the agreement signed by Lee 
Kuan Yew and t.b.-•::T�ng�usf on • the :ba_ek -:gf .a11 envelo.pe:, at · the last moment ·of the negotiatiorts _ in �ondon, and a placating statement -from ·Lee Kuan 
Yew. But while he·- expressed sympathy fo:r: Stephens, �nd· regret that he 
had not b�en informed earli�r, Lee Kuan Yew stressed that "a loan is a 
loan" and t11i� so.me ·f.9� of quid J)r� gpo. is a nopnal par� of a· loan 
arrangement •s . This iss·san arrange.nient which may lead to some diffi-. 
. / .culties between Singapore and the Borneo· territories in the future 
since restriction on the influx of inmi-grants was one of the concerns 
most frequentlys. exp.re.ssed to the Cubbold Connnlssion.s13 Lee has given
his fiJ:m undertaking that- any- .laborerss. · . sent from Singapore to the Borneo 
territories will return -as so.on as they finish the particular project on 
which they are working.-14 In any event, the terms of the loan arranges­
ment did not prevent- Lee· gaining the eupport of thes·sleadei:s of North 
Borneo and.: S�rawa.ks- fo:r: t.he p;r�JllattJ.tes: de�iarati9q. of in.4epende:i ce on 31·
AuguJt 19.6.3•. , ,�,... :v�j_it�•�- .tll, ' t�_r:rttorie.s and _q;tscus$�d �is inte,:i tions -.
with Stephen.-.N: : and· Stephens •. urge.d them to -lngk� , _D0,nald Ile alsQ . de-· ·s • • . . . f· 
clare their ind�p,endep.c;e. ·at the S$]18· t�me, and .w�s reported as saying
in Kuching .that : .the -ball "was �t the feets· of Sabah and ·sSarawak and it 
was up·to theJll: ':to_ · klc;k. _i,nto. :· tb4: ge>,al�";L5 . ._I�e·mad�r it. clear that· he 
expected the. Borneo ·leaders to ·kick �-he· ball in 11the right directions!' " 
When Ningkan and Stephens flew to Kuala Lumpur to tell the Federation 
Gover1a1iet1t of thei-r intention of pr.oclaiming independence · at the same 
time as Singapore,s_ Lee accompanied them, notings- that uThes- least Singapore 
can do at this time is to stand by them. 016 Lee ' s  capacity to gai'n the · 
Borneo leaderss' support during thi_s period probably resulted partly from 
his earlier concem for their position in discussions on Malaysia,sand 
partly from the local political pressures operating on the Borneo leaders 
to show that Malaysia would, in fact, become a political reality. If a 
degree of rapport was established between Lee Kuan Yew and the aorneo 
leaders, there does not seem to have been anys·smarked attempt by the 
Singapore leader to capitalize upon it in the post Malaysia Day period. 
This will be one of the matters discussed in the final section of this 
paper.s· 
11. Ibid . , 2� July. 1963. 
12. Ibid.,  24. July · i963•. 
13. Be ort of the C01J11ralssion of En · i -- North Borneo and Sarawak 
: Lontlqn, . .1.96.'- . , p •· 5�.. .. . · ' -- .
14. Ibici'. ,,·�t•f• :<°i2. , . . . .. . . . -
1 5. Sarawak Tribune, 23 August 1963. See also . Straits Times, 22 August 
1963. 
16. Straits Tirnes, 23 August 1963. 
VIIIo. SINGAPORE AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION 
Following the grant of semi-independent status to Singapore in 
1959 , the island 's  Government made considerable effort to establish an 
international image although Britain retained control over its external 
relations. This has sometimes involved actions which diverged from 
Malayan foreign policy. Possibly the most notable instances of this 
divergence have been in the economic field, again reflecting Singaporeo0 s 
absorption with the need to trade· to survive. While Tengku Abdul Rahman 
was a key figure in the efforts to expel South Africa from the Common­
wealth and to im�ose an economic boycott on South African trade , the 
Singapore Government has adopted the position thatohowever distasteful·o
it finds South Africao' s  racial policies it has no choice but to trade 
with it so long as South Africa does not try to interfere in Singapore 
politics. In contrast to the Federation too, Singapore gave implicit 
recognition to the Government of the People 's  Republic of China by pero­
mitting the Banlt of China to operate in Singapore - - although the line 
of demarkation here between Britain 's  responsibility and Singaporeo9 s 
control over economic matters is a difficult one to draw. Malaya
recognizes neither the Peking nor the Formosa regime and therefore does 
not permit the Bank of China to operate. At a less striking level 
Singapore competed independently of Malaya i� international sporting
contests. Lee Kuan Yew has spoken of his desire to copy the inter­
national policies of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia,o1 a statement 
which can probably be paraphrased as an indication of Leeo9 s desire to 
avoid involvement in the international power struggle between the East 
and West � This is in contrast with the position of the Federation of 
Malaya. Nominally Malaya pursued an independen� foreign policy which 
involved alignment neither with the East nor the West • . In fact , the 
Malayan position in international affairs has ,  generally, been one which 
supports the objectives and actions of the West , at least in broad 
principles. In contrast with other unaligned countries, the Malaya 
Government gave firm support to the Indian position in the Sinoo-Indian 
border dispute and to the Diem regime in South Vietnam. While not a 
member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Malaya, before 
Malaysia was achieved, could be used as a staging area for Counnonwealth 
troops for s.E.A.T.o. The Defence Agreemen.t, signed between Malaya and 
the United Kingdom in November 1961 ,  has left the question of SoEoA.ToOo 
use of Singapore bases vaguely defined, but it is clear that the United 
Kingdom regards them as still available for that purpose. 
Before Malaysia was proposed Lee had visited Indonesia in an ato­
tempt to encourage further trade between Indonesia and Singapore and 
probably with a concern for the long-stated Indonesian policy of 
endeavoring to reduce its dependence on the Singapore entrepotoo It is 
doubtful whether much was achieved at the time of the visit but rela­
tions were reasonably cordial. Lee said of the visito: 
• • •  I would like to repeat that we received the utmost 
1. Straits Time�, 29 September 1962. 
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courtesy and hospitality_ during our stay in Indonesia and look 
forward to the stre�tbening of trade and cultural relations 
in the months ahead. 
Singapcr e 1 s concern to avoid alienting Indonesia's trade, may:. explain
Lee Kuann'Yew 's restrained approach to Indonesian criticism of Malaysia 
at the end of 1962 and in early 1963. While politicians iri the Federa­
tion grew more publicly angry about the Indonesian .position, �e Kuan 
Yewn·as late as 12 February 1963 stated that he did not believe the .
Indonesian Foreign Ni�ister, Dr. Subandrio, to be .opposed to Malaysia 
as such.3 Once Lee had assessed that Indonesian opposition was a 
threat to the establishment of Malaysia, however, the tone of his 
statements changed. When the concept of some fot'l1lal association of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines was mooted in June 1963,
following the Manila accord, Lee expressed bis reservations. Singa­
pore, Lee indicated, ·nwould favor a confederation of the three 
countries, if what was envisaged was an association based on economic 
and social ties and social cooperation. But if the agreement meant 
more than this and included Singapore 's  political al?sorption, then his ·
gov�rnment was oppo•ed to it.n· When the .concept of Maphilindo became 
a little more precise, Lee continued in his attitude of reserve, 
particularly .so far as political implications of the idea were con­
cerned.ns 
The Singapore position hardened even further when Indonesian and 
Philippine opposition was successfuln· · in bringing the United Nations 
survey of opinion in the Borneo territories. Lee stressed that 31 
August would continue to be the date for the inauguration of Malaysia 
in Singapore and was reported as protesting against giving in to 
President Sukarno whom Lee now described as an "international black­
mailer". 6 During the Singapore election campaign Devan Nair, one of 
the leading P.A.P .  trade unionists,. attacked Indonesian "neo-colonialism" 
as threatening the territorial integrity of Malaysia and, in a rare re­
ported instance of communal appeal by the P .A.P. , poi�ted 
to the dif­
ficult position occupied by the Chinese in Indonesia. Judged by the 
amount of space devoted to the rebuttal of Manila 's  objections to the 
new Federation, the Philippinesn' case for claiming North Borneo was 
scarcely seen as worthy of notice. When the British Embassy was at­
tacked in Djakarta as part of lndones fan opposition t� Malaysia, Lee
' .··, 
2. Leg. Ass. Debates, 10_ February 1960,. Col. 134. 
·3. Straits Times, 13 February 1963.
4. Ibid., 14 June 1963. 
5. J. M. van der K.roef, "Mapbilindo: Illusion or Reality'' in Fa,J;:
Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XLI, No. 10, 5 September 1963, P• 642. 
6. Guardian (London), 9
1
August 1963. Lee Kuan Yew subsequently denied 
using this phrase which, apparently, was first repor:ted by an 
Australian Broadcasting C01mnission correspondent after talking with 
Lee at a reception. While noting this denial, the phrase does not 
seem out of character. · see Straits Times, 10 August 1963. 
7. Straits TitQes, 18 September 1963. 
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Kuan Yew rejected the possibility of war developing over Malaysia and 
termed the destruction of the Embassy "a twentieth century ritual of 
showing disapproval."8 Although Lee and the P.A.P. had preserved a 
correct relationship with the Indonesian Gover,unent into 1963, the 
alleged links betwe�n the Barisan and the Indonesian Conmunisty Party 
provided ao,m .. s:t.tion for P .A.P. criticism which has already been 
described i? this paper. 
The P.A.P.. 's concern for projecting an international image of 
Singapore was subordinated throughout the development of Malaysia to 
the more pressing problems of internal opposition, and the resolution 
of disagre_ernents which existed between Singapore and Malaya. It is 
not clear whether Lee's visits to a series of uncoumitted countries, 
which he undert;ook �n May 1962, were made on his own initiative or at 
the request of the Federation Gowxnment. Whatever was the case, there 
is no doubt that Lee Kuan Yew is concerned and interested in matters 
beyond Malaysian's internal politics, and this interest was carried 
forward in the period following the achievement of Malay�ia. 
8. Ibid. , 19 September 1963. 
IX. POST MALAYSIA 
The events leading to the inauguration of Malaysia, on 16!f'· 
September 1963, form part of a t:f:me continuum in which the need to 
establish periodization may have involved a certain amount of artifi!f'­
ciality. Indeed, later events stress the inadequacy of regarding
Malaysia Day as the terminal point for a study of Singapore and!f'· 
Malaysia. While the events frOQl 1961 to 1964 have left continuing 
problems and antagonism�!f'within and outside the new Federation, few
internal developments have been so iunnediate.ly significant as the 
decision by the People's Action Party to contest the Malayan elections 
of 25 April 1964, and so to try to extend P.A.P. power beyond Singapore
island. This decision appears as the attempted culmination· of the con­
solidation of power, achieved by the P.A.P. in the September· 1963 . 
elections in Singapore, and as a .<llear turning point for future develop­
ments in Malaysia. In the concluding section!f',of this study, therefore, 
the broad pattern of events in and concerning!f'·!f'Singapore, up to the 
announcement of the P.A.P. is entry!f'.into the Malayan elections � will be 
described, wh.ile s0112general conclusions will_ also be drawn. 
. .
Following September 1963, the!f'.P.A.P. Government held power in 
Singapore with a large parliamentary. majority, and an impressive pro­
portion of the popular vote. This position of strength had not, 
however, eliminated all difficulties, from its path. The votes polled 
by the Barisan Socialis had been substantial, and it was clear that the 
P.A.P. would continue to be faced by considerable intemal opposition 
in the state, even if its parliamentary position was unassailable. In
its relations with the Malayan leaders, the P.A.P • .  had, through its .
actions in the final months before Malaysia was achieved, forfeited much 
of the goodwill which it had worked so hard to develop over the pre­
ceding three years. Its attempts to heal relations with the Federal 
leadership were further complicated by the existing hostility . between
the P.A.P. and the M.C.A., the Chinese party in the Federal Alliance, 
and in some ways Lee Kuan Yew's decision that his party should contest 
the Malayan elections was the outcome of this hostility. A third broad 
theme in the post-Malaysia Day peria:1 was Lee's continued interest in 
international affairs, which was marked by his leadership of a Malaysian!f'_
mission to Africa to enlist support for the Malaysian point of view in
the dispute with Indonesia. 
After his Government was retumed to power , Lee announced his new 
Cabinet. He retained most of the former ministers, with the exception 
of the two ministers who had been ·defeated in the elections.!f'1 One
interesting change in portfolios was the appointment of Ong Pang Boon, 
1. The member·s of the new Cabinet were: Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister ; 
Toh Chin Chye, Deputy Prime. Minister; Goh Keng Swee,··, Finance Minister ; 
Si Rajaratnam, Minister for Culture; Ong Pang Boon, Minister for 
Education ; Yong Nyuk Lin, Minister·,-for Health; Lim Kim San, Minister 
for National Devel�pjnent; Inche Othman Wok, Minister for Home Affairs 
and Social Welfare; Jek Yen Thong, Minister for Labour. Straits 
�fmes, 18 October 1963. · 
71 
72 
. . 
the former Minister for Home Aff�irs, as the new Minister for Educationo 
Ong, who pl�d-an aggres.s:lve · role in the first P.A. P.  ·Govermnent, 
particularly in Legislative Assembly discuesions, is the product of both 
English -and Chinese education, and so -we1·1 suited te hai,.dle Singapore O s· 
educational problemss. The detentions-of a large part of the Barisan 
Socialis wakened that party, but did not, by any means, eclipse it. One 
of the first chall•nges to- gove:rhmeutal authority in the post-Malaysia 
period caroe from the Barisan-dominated · Singapores· Association of Trade 
Unions (S.A.t.U.-) • which called a strike at the Naval : -Dockyard to begi11. 
on 7 October, ·and a General Strike to begin on 8 Octobe� ,· as a protest 
against the Singapore Gc>verument' s  interference in union affairs . 2 
Neither ·strike appears ·to have been parti�lar.ly succe$11:fulo Action 
was take" against the SoA.T.U. sti-ike leade·rs, this time by the Federal 
Govex,ament, which, under the Malaysia Agreement, asPUJDed authority for 
intemal secti�ity in Singapore. Included amongst those who were ar­·s
rested were three· Barisan Assei-.bly m•11:ahers � s. T. Bani, !Ale Tee Tang 
and Miss Lows· Miaw Gongo Two other Barisan members unp1icated in the 
strike went into hidingo These arrests had been preceded by the pre­
ventive attests of Nanyang University student-a, again by the Federal 
authoritiess. Early cm the morning ofs· 26 S.eptember 1963• twenty arrests 
were made at Nanyang University, of students and of three Nanyang
graduates who had stood as candidates for the Barisan in the September
1963 elections. The Singapore Gov·er:ument felt it necessary to cooaoent 
on these a:c-z:ests, indicating its support for. them, since they were 
directed at Coo11•01lst!, but stressing that it did not support an attack 
on Chine• .aacatio�. 
The Singapore GoveJ"auoeut, additionally, took independent action 
against what it described as Cooaouniats arut Coo,ounist activitiess. It 
acted, shortly after the elections, to withdraw the citizenship of Tan 
Lark Sye, a Singapore rub�r magnate, me111Per of the Nanyang _University 
Council, and according to the Singapore authorities an important pro­
Cou■ouniat. The P.A.Po Goveromeut also showed itself particularly con­
cerned to eradicate Coo,ounist influence in the rural areas, already
discussed in this paper. This concern was manifested in a number of 
ways. From the negative point of view, the P.A.P. Gove:roaae11t withdrew 
the regiatTations-of two Chinese rural associations which it stated to 
be Co,1 1N1niat controlled, and which operated amo1lgst the Chinese living 
outside the urban areass. At the same t1me, it withdrew the registra­
·tion of a rrtaH•be.r of hawkerss' associations which it claimed were con­
trolled by Coo+uunlsts o 4 The Gover1uoent later stated that the Condllunists � 
having lost the cover provided by the rural association,. were attempting 
2 . Straits Times, 8 and 9 October 1963. 
3. Ibid., 27 September 1963. The Malaysian Minister for Internal 
Security in a st�tement reported .in Straits T1rnes, 12 October 1963 
made it equally clear that his Goverowent would not be deterred from 
arresting students who were suspected of CODIDUllist affiliations ; 
"Let there be no misunderstanding in this matter. The Govt:sr1w.ent 
will not tolerate young students either at Nanyang University or in 
the Chineae Ildddle schools participating in, and actively furthering, 
the plans' of the Cou,nunists in Singapore as occurred in 1954-560"  
4. Ibid.,  4 October 1963. 
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to further their position by setting up ''kinderg!rtens
u where rural 
children could receive Conanunist indoctrination. From the positive
point of view, the Gover,went embarked Qn a program of development for
the "rural" areas, stressing such matters as improved roads, better 
public lighting, and improved water supply. tn a further attempt to
improve his Government's image throughout the island, Lee Kuan Yew
announced a plan1.t.o establish "citizens• con�ltative conanittees" 
throughout the state. Further.!f'efforts .to strengthen its internal 
position include!f': the decision by the P.A.P. to hold ·courses in politics 
for the Malay members and supporters of the party, and special attention
paid to the interests of the!f'-squatters who were being resettled by the 
Govertmient. 6 · · 
The Barisan has insufficient members in the Singapore Assembly to
constitute a parliamentary problem for the Govt-:r1nnent. This is pos­
sibly reflected by Lee Kuan Yew's invitation to the backbench rmbersof this own party to feel free to criticize aspects of policy. While
Lee will wish to keep ctitlsiSJll under control, such a freedom may act 
to prevent dissatisfaction within the party. Furthermore, the P.A.P.'s 
position has been aided by the unexpected release of leading members 
of the Barisan Social is, who had·  been d�tained in the February· 1963 
mass detention operation. The release of such figures!f'.as James and 
Dominic Puthucheary, s. Woodhu11 and Lim Shee Ping was accompanied by
rather surprising political recantations. In his statement, James 
Puthucheary.. �enied being a Communist or being sympathetic to c01w1unism 
and indicated his firm support for the Malaysia concept : 
I desire the most free and genuinely democratic society it 
is possible to have. I suppgrt Malaysia and would like to see 
it develop along such lines� 
s. Woodhull was less reticierit in acknowledging his p�vious associa­
tions. He said in his statement that he had been indifferent to. whether 
or not he was associating with Cormaunists; 
•• • I recognize that this has been helpful to the Conmunist 
cause which I have no desire to aid. 
•• • I welcome the opportunity to abandon all political and
trade union activity.9 
5. Ibid., 23 November 1963.
6. Ibid., 25 October 1963 which reports a statement by the Minister for 
Home Affairs and Social Welfare announcing plans to improve condi-
tions in the "rural" areas� The P.A.P.'s general policy was contained 
in the Address by the Singapo� Head of State in the Legislative 
A ·ssembly on 29 November 1963 -- Leg. Ass. Debates for that day. See 
also �e Kuan Yew in the Del>ate on the Address in Reply, Leg. Ass. 
Debates', 9 December 1963, Cols. 145 to 146,. and Straits 1';imes, ·.1
January 1964 for the planned political activity amongst Singapore 
Malays. .
7. Leg. Ass. Debates, 9 December 1963, Col. 190. 
a. Straits Times, 29 November 19630 
9. Ibid. 
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The Bariaan reaction was to charge the Federal Govet,mte4t with "brain­
washing" the detainees.!f'10 This ·!f'charge, together with the charge that
the detainees were badly housed durtyf their detention, was rejected by 
two of those who had . been released. 
The fact that a solid core of P.A.P. opponents remains detained, 
either in Singapore or in Malaya, emphasizes one of the problems which 
remain for the Singapore authorities. The detention of the Barisan 
leaders umat: be accounted one of the·!f'reasons success in· for the P.A.P. 
the September 1963 elections. Singapore's population, in general, has 
shown little reaction to the detentions, but there is the obvious danger
that, should the Central Gove:r:ument embark on any further detention 
program, this could be used in lat6r attacks against the P.A.P. on the 
basis that the Malay-dominated Central Govezument was attacking the 
Chinese of Singapore. CA11nunal loyalties remai..n strong in Singapore,
and as the Singapore electorate grows more politically sophisticated it 
may becon.e increasingly concerned over the extent to which its �epre­
sentation in the Federal Parl�ament represents discrimination against
a Chinese state. This is the sort of consideration which is likely to
have influenced the P.A.P.'s decision to attempt extending its power 
beyond Singapore. Singapore's internal ea>nomic situation will play a 
large part in determining the future popularity of the P.A.P. Gover,unent, 
and it will obviously strive to carry on its social and housing programs 
at an increased rate. If industry is not developed and expanded, the 
already critical labor situation will be exacerbated as the youthful
population floods on to the labor market. .
, 
Internal economic!f'-developments will be of great importance to the 
Singapore Gover1nueTtt as the Malaysian Federation develops. Its most 
!m:oediate concern, however, is with the problems arising out of 
Indonesian "Confrontation". The results of the Indonesian trade boycott
have been regularly noted by Singapore leaders. When Lee discussed the 
matter in October 1963, he estimated that the Goverunie�t might have to 
find alternative employment for ,15 ,000 persons affected dire�tly by the _decline in trade which would accompany a continuing boycott.!f'12 The 
most detailed estimate of the effects of "Confrontation" .on S:lngapore 's 
economy was given by Dr. Goh Keng Swee in his budget speech delivered 
on 28 November 1963. Then, he spoke of - the possible loss of income, 
resulting from "Confronti§ion", as likely to total as!f'-much as 8.2 per-
cent of national income. It is this figure which has been giveri as 
..
10. The Barisan issued a statement to this effect on 10 February 1964 
in which it claimed, inter alia, that the Central Gov&rrvaent had 
used the services of a British ex-CODiUUnlst Mr. D. Hyde to "brain­
wash" the detainees. Straits Times, 11 February!f'. 1964. 
11. See Leong Keng Sweeo's  statement on release in Singapore in Straits 
Times, 5 February 1964, and!f's. Woodhull's letter to the Straits 
Times, 26 February 1964. . 
12. Lee Kuan Yew in an address to the Foreign Correspondents' Associa­
tion. in Singapo�, reported in Straits T:lmes, 11 February 1964. 
13. Leg. Ass. Debates, 28 November - 1963, Col. 76. Cou,,,erot on the 
actual effects of "Confrontation"!f'� Singapore's economy must await 
(continued) 
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a reference point in later statements, although, at least i-nitially, it 
appears to be too high. Nevertbe�ess, Singa-pore has taken steps to·
counter the effects of "Confrontation'' with the passage .of · the Economic 
Defence Bill and the Economic Defence (Direction of Employment) Bill.!f'14 
These are designed to insure that workers who lose their jobs through 
'"Confrontation " should receive assistance both from the Goverxnuent and. . .
from employers, and that where possible, alternative employment should 
be found for them. The economics of "Confrontation" gave Lee an oppor--­
tunity to comment on Malaysian intemational policy which he did not 
ignore. Antagonism should not lead to the absolute exclusion of trade, 
he argued, any more than it has be
.
tween India and Pakistan. And in the 
international field Malaysia could not allow the belief to develop that 
its attitude was unreasonable: 
We must be firm on this /matter./. But at the same time we - . -
can be friendly and fair. We must never by word or deed allow 
ourselves to be presented by the propaganda of our neighbours as
obstinate and obdurate people. 
It may pay U$, with Afro-A�ia not to retur.n in. kind the com-
pliments over �dio Kalimantan� lS 
In Lee's analysis, Indonesta's hostile re�ction to Malaysia would not
have ocQUrred i�. Mal�ysia. ha_d be�n f9rmed ea,t'lier, when Indonesian 
attention was wholly concentrated on the West Irian dispute. But since 
this was not the case, Lee argued, Indonesia's actions towards Malaysia 
were designed to show that it was a major power. The opposition which 
Lee Kuan Yew consistently expressed towards the Maphilindo concept was
continued in his new year's message. "Confrontation," Lee noted, was
not pleasant but in a sense it was to be preferred io Maphilindo which 
could have eroded Malaysia's distinctive identity.!f'1 In a statement 
the provision of detailed statistics and the elapse of time. It is
of interest, however, to note the preliminary CCh•iioents of Pierre R. 
Crosson, Chief Economist in the Centre for Development and Planning 
of the National Planning Association. Speaking at a Seminar of the 
United States National Student Association held at Stanford Univer­
sity from 3 to 5 April 1964 he said, in part, . .. .  "The actual decline 
in Singapore's employment and income, however, will probably be 
substantial,ly less than these figures indicate /the figures re.ferred 
to are ones which suggested that nconfrontationlT could reduce employ­
ment directly by 5 percent and indirectly by up to 8 or 9 percent? . . -
because of the specific policies adopted by. the Singapore ·Govermnent
and because of expanding employment opportunities in sectors of the 
economy which are independent of the Indonesian trade .. " 
14. Leg. Ass. Debates, . 2.8 November 1963, . C()l. 64. 
15. Straits Times, 1 January 1964.
16. Ibid. In his -new year's message, Lee gave his analysis of the moti­
vations behind Indonesian ''Confrontation". Dr. Subandrio was, 
according to Lee, the principal Indonesian advocate of Maphilindo. 
The P.K.I., in Lee.'s assessment, wanted "Confrontation". Lee argued
that in Subandrio's absence at!f'.!f'the United Nations in the latter part 
of 1963, the P.K.I. was able to press successfully its policy of 
''Confrontation". 
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issued on the 9ame day , the Singapore Minister for Culture again 
raised the allegation that Indonesia ' s  policy was based on anti­
Chinese feeling.o17 
The most important illustration of Lee Kuan Yew's  interest in 
playing a role in Malaysia ' s  international relations was provided by 
his leadership of the Malaysia mission to Africa. The mission ' s  aim 
was to explain their country ' s  case to a number of African nations , 
some of which had shown themselves to be less than enthusiastic about 
the new federationo 18 Lee led the mission at his own request , as was 
revealed when Tengku Abdul Rahman was questioned on the matter by a 
member of U.M.No Oo in the Federal Parliame�too 19 Malaysia has an ex­
tremely small diplomatic service and it is not well represented in 
Africa, so that a mission of the type which Lee led could performo·a 
useful service. Explaining Malaysia ' s  position and countering the 
Indonesian point of view, the mission visited seventeen African 
countries during January and February of 1964. In a speech made 
shortly before his departure , Lee co.ootented on the danger of Malaysia 
being isolated from the Afro-Asian countries of the world. The tone 
of his co,aoents suggest a personal assessment of the situation, rather 
than the viewpoint of the Malaysian leadershipo Lee noted that "Con­
frontation" could continue for a long period. Since this was so , 
Malaysia needed to work to rally support :  
For if our only friends in Afro-Asia are South Korea and 
South Vietnam, then even Australia and New Zeal!Bd may find it 
difficult to be actively conmitted to our sideo 
The mission was composed of politicians from the various member states 
of Malaysia and was accompanied by officials from the Malaysian Departo­
ment of External Affairso Its visit to Africa appears to have been 
reasonably successfuloo Leaders of the various African countries visited 
by the mission accepted invitations to visit Malaysia at some future , 
and unspecified, date and Lee Kuan Yew seems to have insured that the 
17. Ibid. 
180 Algeria joined with the Soviet Union in the Credentials C0111Uittee 
of the United Nations in expressing reservations about Malaysiao0 s 
status , while there had been newspaper support for Indonesiao0 s 
position in the United Arab Republico See Straits Time$,  14 
December 1963 and Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XLIII, Noo 7 ,
13 February 1964, P o 3850 
19 0 In a reply to a question on the matter from Syed Ja 'afar Albar , the 
Secretary General of UoM.N oO o , Tengku Abdul Rahman stated that Lee 
had asked to lead a Malaysian mission to Africa to put the Malaysian 
point of viewo In Syed Ja 0 afar Albaro1 s view, Lee "Instead of making 
Malaysia known to the Africans o o •  will .make himself ·known to the 
Africans."  Straits T:froe� , 4 January 1964 reporting the proceedings
of the Malaysian House of Representatoives on 3 January. 
200 Straits T1mes,  20 January 1964 reporting a statement by Lee Kuan 
Yew on 19 January o 
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attitude of such important countries as Algeria and the United !Iab Republic would be neutral in Mal.aysia' s. dispute with Indonesia. It 
will, of course, require a test situation such as a United Nations 
debate before the effectiveness of Lee's mission can be truly assessed. 
Cotncidental with the apparently successful nature of the Malaysian
mission to Africa, was the widespread personal publicity which Lee re­
ceived as its leader. 
The P.A.P.'s interest in intemational affairs was sh�n in other 
ways in the months following the achievement of Malaysia� The Singapore ·
Minister for Culture, S. Rajaratnam, was a member of the Malaysian
Delegation to the General Assembly o� the United Nations and Dr. Goh 
Keng Swee, the Minister for Finance � was a member of the Malaysian
Delegation to the ministerial talks on Malaysia held in Bangkok in 
February 1964. Although its participation in the debates of the Federal 
Parliament was, generally, limited, the P.A.P. through its Chairman, 
Dr. Toh Chin Chye the Singapore Deputy Prime Minister, ·ndid speak on 
the estimates for the Department of External Affairs in the parliamen­
tary discussion of the budget. He criticized the appointment of "dis­
credited polittcians" to fill ambassadorial positions in overseas 
.. . . . . .
diplomatic posts, and he sugg,sted that this form of appointmentn. had 
in part been responsibre for the inadequate reports received by the 
Malayan Government on developments in Djakarta, before Malaysia was 
formed. 22 T.he remark may also have been directed at the appointment, 
announced shortly afterwards, of Lim Yew Hock to be Malaysian High 
Counnissioner in Canberra. 
But while the internal events in Singapore were of importance, and 
while the efforts of Lee and his lieutenants in the international field 
served to promote their image in Malaysia, the most striking and impor­
tant development involving Singapore in the post-Malaysia Day period 
was the decision to contest the Malayan elections. Following its return 
to power in Singapore, the P.A.P.'s bid to reestablish confidence with 
the Federal leadership was not withou: difficulties. Tengku Abdul 
:aahman indicated that he was "sbockedn by the defeat of the U.M.N.O. 
candidates in the Singapore elections, ·and it was unlikely that he '11Duld 
forget the pressures applied by Lee Kuan Yew to gain concessions for 
Singapore, particularly in the final stages of the Malaysia negotiations. 
Shortly after the Singapore elections had been held, the Tengku visited 
Singapore and criticized what he claimed to see as Leen's inclination to 
usurp the Federal Goveruxnent's position. Lee in a conciliatory reply 
spoke of how his party recognized that a Malay must be Prime Minister 
of Malaysia for at least the next two decades. At the same time, he 
noted that the P.A.P. had ·a role to play in helping the Federal Govetcmaent 
21. See reports on .the progress of the Malaysia mission in Straits Times, 
28 ·January,·4 February, 5 February and 27 February 1964. This is 
not an exhaustive list of references. 
22. Straits Times, 4 January 1964 reporting Toh Chin Chye in the 
Malaysian House of Representatives on 3 January. 
78 
to understand the urban Chinese. 23 Some weight must be·. given to the 
fact that in criticizing Lee, the Tengku wasn·naddressing a branch of his 
own party which had suffered a severe defeat. The promi•se which he 
made to campaign in future Singaporen= etections, on U.M.N.O.'s behalf, 
is politically interesting.n24 During the same visit to·nSingapore, the 
Federation Prime Minister spoke of his concern at finding the Bank of 
Indonesia and the Bank of China still operating in Singapore., and also 
that in contrast - to Malaya, there was a S�th African Consul in Singa­
pore.25 lAae Kuan Yew chose to give a soft answer to these expressions
of Federal concern. The role of the P.A.P. representatives in the 
Federal Parliame1lt, Lee describ,ed a$ t:bat of a loyal opp.os·ition, unlike 
the disloyal oppo_ Thesition of the Barisan and the Socialist Front. 
P.A.P. representatives, Lee said, would sig as "cross-- benchers" and act 
as "friend, loyal opposition and critic." A clear step in Lee 's  
program to re-establish confidence lay in his request to the Tengku to 
select one of the two Singapore senators for the Federal Senate. The 
Federal Prime Minister selected Inche Ahmad bin Haji, a member of 
U.M.N.O.n' s  Singapore branch and a leader of the Singapore Alliance 
which was so unsuccessful in the 1963 Singapore elections. The other 
senator nominated by Lee 's Gover1unent was Ko Teci7
Kin, the President 
of the Chinese Chamber of Conmerce in Singapore. This latter nominan-
tion cannot have been unconnected with the continuing P.A.P. suspicion
of the Malayan Chinese Association's interest in Singapore. ·nBy
appointing Ko Teck Kin, the P.A.P. could point to its concern for the 
business cooaouor.ty, the group towards which the M.C.A. directs much of 
its ·attention. Reports of the M.C.A. sending a "team" to Singapore to 
revitalize its position and of M.C.A. threats to bring.discriminatory
action against foreign firms which supported the P.A.P., stressed the 
continuing nature of the P.A.-P. -M.C.A. rivalry. In an exchange empha­
sizing this rivalry, Tan Siew Sin and Rajaratnam clashed in February 
1964 overnt� relative interest in the needs of workers, as - reflected 
in the soc1!! insurance plans of the P.A.P. and of the Malaysian 
Gove:r, went . 
The P.A.P. decision to enter the Malayan elections was not pre­
dictable on the basis of statements made by its leadership concerning 
the party's political intentions in the wider Malaysian com:mmity. 
There was no attempt by Lee Kuan Yew or his associates to hide their 
23. The ex.cbange is S1u11oi:1�ized in the Times (London) , 30 September 1963 
while •tateme�ts by Lee and the Tengku are reported in Straits
Times for 28 and 30 September 1963. 
24. Straits Times, 28 September 1963. 
25. Ibid� 
26. Ibid. , 31 October 1963. 
27. Ibid., 18 October 1963. Singapore memhers for the Federal House of 
Representatives were selected rrom within the Singapore Assembly on 
the basis of proportional representation of the parties in that 
Assembly. Twelve P.A.P. members and three Barisan members were se­
lected on this basis. See Leg. Ass. Debates, 22 October 1963, Cols. 
57. and 58. 
28. Straits Budget, 5 February 1964 and Straits Times, 8 February 1964. 
• • • • •• • • • •  
79 
dislike of the M.C.A. or to pretend that th! P.A.P .  had no interest in 9extending its presence _n across ·the Cau�way. But onn·the basis of a 
detailed statement made in the Singapore Assembly on 9· December 1963 
during the debate on the Address iri Rep_ly � it did seem that the P.A. P. 's 
entry into the pan-Malaysiann.field would not come until after the .
Malayan elections. Lee said in the
.
debat·e: 
••• Much will depend on what happens in the elections in Malaya 
next year. Everybody concedes that the U.M.N.0. side of the 
Alliance can and will win a clear majority.n· But everybody is 
waiting to see what happens in the urban areas and in all the 
main towns in Malaya, for arising out of that vote, some vital 
decisions will. have to be made both by the U.M.N.o. leaders and 
by us in Singapore. 
• • •  if the towns decisively reject all M.C.A. candidates, then 
there must be a reappraisal by U.M.N.0. leaders. They will have 
to decide whether they can couuoand the loyalty of the sophisti­
cated urban population . -- Chinese, . . Indians, Eurasians and others . .. ' .. . 
town,. J0 · · 
.-- or govern without. the · : partnership of the. leadership of the · 
The implication here was clea_r ;  if the M�C.A. failed in the urban areas,
the P .A.-P. would aim to fill ·nthat gap. · ' But - the implication also was 
that such a decision would come after the elections. In the new year, 
a statement by the Singapore Minister for Culture reinfoTced the views 
put forward by Lee by ar'!ing that the P.A.P. had to start operatingas a pan-Malaysian party. ,Again, however, this statement appeared more 
as an indication of future policy than as a notice that the P.A.P. would 
in fact seek seats in the elections during 1964. 
The P.A.P.'s decision
.n
to enter the Malayan elections was announced 
by the Singapore Deputy PT:ime Minister, Toh Chin Chye, on 1 March 1964_,
when at the opening of a new newspaper :·n·in Singapore he departed from his 
prepared text and said that it had been decided that the party, which 
had played an important role in the establishment of Malaysia should now 
show itself to be a national party. But in doing so, Toh said, it had 
no intention of challenging the position of U.M.N.0. 
It is our purpose to co-operate with U.M.N.0. and the 
Central Goverinnent • • • •  We will therefore play - a token part. 32 
Speaking the following day, Toh made_ a .statement which has significance 
29. Times (London), 30 September 1963. 
30. Leg. Ass. Debates, 9 December: 1963, Co_ls. 141. and 142. 
31. Straits Times, 18 Januaryn· 1964 reporting a statement by Rajaratnam 
on 17 January. In his statement, the Singapore Minister for 
Culture stated that the P �A.P. should, by the way it conducted it­
self, convlnce . the people of Malaysia that the Socialist philosophy 
of the People's Action Party could help to solve Malaysia's prob­
lems---: in a practical and peaceful way.
32. Straits Times, 2 March 1964. 
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in any assessment of the reasons behind the P.-A • .P •.'s decision to enter 
the elections. The P.A.P., he stated, bo�ed to - become' "a force to be 
reckoned with" in Malaysia in five years. 3 This is the period, it 
may be noted,nafter which a new- election for the Malaysian House of 
Representatives would have to be held. Viewed.nin the perspective of 
the previous three or four years' events, the P.A.P. decision to con­
test the elections appears almost more important than the results 
themselves. The P.A.P., wheq the elections were held, achieved a 
disappointf.ng reS\llt for its supporters, as only one of the nine can­
didates for- federal seats wes e!?cted, and nQne ·nof the c�didates for 
seats in the. state legislatures. This result will have unportance 
for the futqre politics of Malaysia, and the P.A�P.- :• �  failu:re should 
not be minimized. But the fact that its leadership should have felt 
that the hour had arrived for the P.A.P.'s entry on to the Federal 
stage reflects interesting motivations, and possibly,n. t·oo, the deci­·n
sion is ·_ impoi;:t.,nt as a reflection o·f ·-likely centrifugal- forcesn· acting
within Mal'aysia. Two broad questions require explanation: what 
changed the apparent P.A.P. decision at the end of 1963 not to enter 
the Malayan political field until after the 1964 ele·ctions, and what 
role did the· P.A.P. see itself as likely to play in this new sphere?
While the P.A.P. leaders spoke frequently on the second of these 
question� in their campaign, no clearn_npublic $tatement emerged on the 
first point. It s��e useful, then, to approach the first question 
through a review of.nthe second. 
In the manifesto issued by the P.A.P. on its election policy two 
aims we�- ,tre•sed. First, the P.A.P. argued that it had- entered the 
elections.nto "assist in the building of a united democratic and 
socialist Malaysian) based on the principles of social justice and non­
COUillunalism.n" Second, it had acted·ton''.i.neure that the·nSocialist Front 
33. Ibid. , 3 March 1964. 
34. The P.A.P. entered eleven candidates· for the Malayan elections, at 
the Federal level, and fifteen candidates for state seats. Since 
it did not wish to contest seats in which there was an U.M.N.O. 
candidate, itn- withdrew its candidates from two seats for the House 
of Repre'8ntatives who would have stood against U.M.N.O. candidates 
in Johore. Thu$ while there were eleven P.A.P. candidates appear­
ing on the ballot sheets, there were only nine effective candidates .
for the House of Representatives. 
The e.lection results appear in full in Straits 'J'imes, 27 April 
1964. The ruling Alliance captured eighty-nine of the one hundred 
and £our seats contested. In brief the election results were� 
Federal Parliament Alliance 89 seats, Pan Malayan Islamic Party 
9 seats� Socialist Front 2 seats, -People • s Progressive ·Party 2 
seats, People's Action Party 1 seat, United Democratic Party 1 
seat. 
State Assemblies Alliance 241 seats, Pan Malayan Islamic Party 
25 seats, Socialist Front 7 seats, People 's  Progressive Party 5 
seats, United Democratic Party 4 seats. 
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did not benefit from ��bstantial protest votes against the Malayan 
Chinese Association." This was the tone maintained by the P.A.P. 
throughout the election campaign. The Malay leade·rship of U.M.N.O. was 
not attacked, but the M.q.A. , despite quite frequent av§lals to t�e con-
trary, was the clear target of the P.A.P. 's  intentions. As Lee and · 
his lieutenants had indicated during 1963, the M.C.A. in their view no 
longer offered effective leadership to the urban dwellers of Malaya andn.·
the party's weakness therefore constituted a threat to Malaysia's 
security. The reasoning behind this allegation was that the urban 
population, through its disenchanbpent with the M.C.A., w�ld give their 
votes to the Socialist Front, the "disloyal opposition." It was to stop
this eventuality, the P.A.P. claimed, that it was offering candidates in
37the urban centers of Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Malacca, Seremban and Kluang.
But while much of the emphasis of the P.A.P. campaign was directed against
the "effete and decadent M.C.A.", criticism of aspects of U.M.N.O. policy
and an obvious distrust of the P.A�P.'s motives by many senior U.M.N.O. 
members placed the Singapore party in a clear "opposition" position in 
the election campaign. All of Lee Kuan Yew's earlier talk of cooperation 
was of little importance when the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Tun 
Abdul Razak, could say that it was .not certain that .the P .A.P. could be 
trusted, and the Secretary General of U.M.N.O. could accuse the P.A.P .  c£ 
furthering conmunal tensions within Malaya.n38 Regardless of whether, be­
fore the election campaign, the U.M.N.O. leadership had been concerned 
about the vote-gathering capacity of the M.C.A. , this issue, became unin­
portant when the U.M.N.O. continued to stand by its Alliance partner in 
the election. With that support, the M.C.A. was able to stress the unity 
of the Alliance parties, and continually remind audiences.nat election 
rallies that an attack on it was an attack on the whole Alliance .n39 A 
significant indication of U.M.N.O. concern over the P.A.P.'s actions wasn. 
the decision by Tengku Abdul
.
Rahman thatn: Lee Kuan Yew should not go to 
the United States and the United Nations to campaign on Malaysia's behalf, 
35. Straits Times, 20 March 1964. 
36. The P.A.P. comments on the M.C.A. during the.nelection campaign verged 
on being contradictory. Thus
.n
Rajaratnam, in a statement reported in 
Straits Times on 1·6 March 1964 stated:·that it was never the P.A .P. 's · 
intention to supplant the M.C.A�, while two days later, in the same 
paper, he was reported as saying , that the P.A.P.  wished to show it 
could help the Central Government without "the M.C.A. millstone 
·around our neck.n" · 
37. Straits T:frnee, 23 March 1964 notes the·nareas which the P.A.P. was 
contesting. 
38. Tun Razak said in part : "There is a new party. We don''t know the 
sincerity of the party and its leaders. We doubt that sincerity, 
especially towards the Malays, their interests and their welfare.n" 
Straits Times, 24 March 1964. .
Syed·nJa'afar Albar, Secretary General of U.M.N.O. was reported in· 
Straits Budget, 1 April 1964 as saying that the P.A.P. was encoura�­
ing comurbnal feelings and in a statement reported in Straits Budget, 
8 April 1964 he said that Lee Kuan Yew was anything but a friend to 
the Tengku. .
39. This line of argument was apparent from the first in_M.C.A. comment 
on the P.A.P. See, for instance, statements in Straits Times for 2 
and 3 March 1964. 
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40as he had done in Africa. · Perhaps even more noteworthy, as an indi-
cation of concem, was the decision by the Malayan Elections Colllllission, 
subsequently overruled , that Singapore citizens could not campaign in 
Malaya. This announcement was made on 18 March by Dato Haj i Mustapha 
Albakri, the Chairman of the Coumission, and it apparently followed a 
similar statement by the Malaysian Minister for Health, Inche Khir 
Johari.n41 The decision was revoked the next day by the Attorney 
General, Inche Abdul Kadir bin Yusef. The fact that the decision was 
taken by the Chairman, following a statement by a Federal minister along
the same lines, does suggest a feeling within the Alliance, and appar� 
ently with�n the U.M.N.O.,  that the P.A •P. needed to be contained by all.
available means. The sudden reversal of the ruling was t�zmed the result 
of a decision that Singapof! citizens, being also citizens of Malaysia , 
had the right to campaign. The "twon-edged" nature of the original 
ruling is obvious. If the P.A.P. politicians who were Singapore citizens 
could not campaign in Malaya, an awkward precedent would be established 
for the mainland based parties whose leaders wished to �aq,aign in 
Singapore in any future elections. 
The P.A.P.n's campaign in the Malayan elections warrants a much more 
complete study than can be given in this essay. But some aspects of its 
efforts should be noted. Throughout the speeches of the P.A&Po leaders 
there was criticism of Indonesia. While no doubt essential in this 
particular campaign, the theme that Indonesia could not be trusted , 
especially not in any form of Mapbilindo association was given consider­
able stress. Lee argued that "Confrontation" ineyitably emerged from the 
1945. 43course followed by Indonesian leaders since On the domestic level , 
the M.C.A. was pictured as the repre_sentative of the ''haves" and the PoA .P o  
as the champion of the ''have-nots". These phrases recurred. constantly
in the speeches. But while the M.C.A. was criticized for its economic 
outlook, Leen· ltuan Yew and his supporters also spoke of the neglect of 
the urban people of Malaya, in such a manner as to mak$ clear their 
feeling that this neglect was a result of the U.M.nN.O.'s inability to 
deal with urban problems. This clearly emerged in a speech Lee made on 
40. The Tengku issued the following statement: 
"In view of the fact that the P . •  A.P. is contesting the el ections 
against the Alliance it would be inconsistent politically for the 
P.A.P. to represent the govei:1went abroad. 
"I have asked Mr. Lee to postpone his trip until after the election .. 
''Meanwhile we have our agency in the United Nations whose effort to 
build our case in the U.N. is meeting with great successo Any inter-
ference at this time may harm our cause." : . 
Lee replied that "On matters of national .policy, like foreign affairs, 
I t:ake the Tengku's instructions and follow bis decision.n" Both 
statements are in Straits �1mes, 14 March 1964. 
41. Straits::::-r:rme�,: .' 19 Marcn·:·1964• .n• WIien· flaeltioned about· the�·:decision, the 
Bleccton·n:Coi11iMefon�:Cnairman'n:ceuld,,uot indicate why:· stngapore citizens 
could not campaign.
42. Ibid., 20 March 1964. The P.A.P. was preparing to challenge the 
decision of the Coomission in the courts when the ruling was reversedo 
43. Straits Budget, 1 April 1964n. 
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24 March 1964 in Penang: 
A P .A.P. victory in Penang together with Kuala Lumpur,
Seremban, Malacca and Johore means that the U.M.N.O •!f'. leaders 
·must take stock of the new pQsit
.
ion and a change of policy in
the urba�areas is in,evit�ble� The wi.nds of change will start 
to blow. 
It does not seem without interest that the P.A.P. chose its Minister for 
Culture,.s. Rajaratnam, t.o direct the party'$ election campaign in Malaya. 
The P.A.P. cannot have ignored the past. indications that the Indian 
donmunity in Malaya has not taken a particularly active role in politics,
as distinct from trade union activities. The fact that the one P.A.P. 
candidate to be elected, Devan Nair, was of Indian origin, also holds 
45interest for the future!f'o 
The P.A.P.'s reasons for entering the elections are only partly
revealed in their speeches during the campaign. That the P .A .P. wished 
to move towards rep. .lacing the M.C.A. in the urban centers cannot be 
doubted nor can its hope of . . ga�ning support· fr� voters formerly attached 
to the Socialist Front or the People's Progressive Party. The Federal 
Government's decision to hold state elections at the �ame time as the 
Federal electio�s denied the P ,A.P. any oppo�tunity of testing opinion 
in Mataya between 1964 and 1965, and this .too could have impelled a 
·decision. But it is.!f'probably necessary to probe deeper. The P.A.P. 's 
decision seems. .  linked with the complicated question of the future role 
to be played within Malaysia by the energetic, and certainly in 
Singapore term�, successful P.4.P. leadership. Lee Kuan Yew has indi­
cated his interest in foreign �£fairs and it has been appparent ·that his 
views on some matters have been at variance with those pursued by the
Federal leadership . The P.A.P.'s interest in the future of Malaysia is 
also linked with the hopes for continued opportunities for Singapore's 
economic development. The perspective gained through time may define 
the problem more clearly, but there does seem reason to consider that 
the P.�.P.'s decision was prompted by the desire to reinforce the in­
flw nee which.Singapore coqld exert at the center of the Federation, in
such fields as international affairs and matters of economic concern.
As a gamble, the P.A.P.'s decision was scarcely successful. But the 
stakes were such as to tempt a gambler for, as Lee himself pointed out � 
if the P.A.P. had won all nine of the seats which it contested it could 
have had more seats in lke Federal Parliame�t than any other party, 
apart from the U·.M.N:.o. · While it was not opportµne for the P.A.P. to
state it as an aim, one may well ask whether �he Singapore leadership did 
not hope in such a situation to achieve some form of.!f'coalition with the 
44. Ibid. 
45. Devan Nair was elected for ·the constituency of Bungsar, in suburban 
Kuala Lumpur. A further example of the P.A oP  .. 's  aim ex being a multi!f'­
racial party is shown in the fact that Nair is now able to address 
audiences in Mandarin. See Straits Times, 23 March 1964. 
46. Straits Times , 23 March· 1964. L.ee 's calculation was based on gaining 
nine seats in Malaya and combining them with the twelve his party
already held from Singapore. · 
84 
U.M.N.O., thus giving it a greater role in the determination of overall 
Malaysian policy. 
By choosing to contest the April 1964 elections , Lee Kuan Yew must 
have recognized one major factor acting against the chances of his partyse s 
candidates .  This was the Indonesian "Confr0,ntation" policy to which so 
much reference was made by all parties .  Since the Alliance leaders 
emphasized that the retum of the Government was necessary to strengthen 
Malaysia's  position in its dispute with Indonesia, discussion of economic 
policies became of secondary import�ce. Yet the P.A.P .  appears to have 
hoped for at least partial success, 7 and in his reaction to the results 
Lee made no secret of his disappointment.s48 wg�1e he sent a sportssman­
like telegram of congratulation to the Tengku, he also indicat�d that 
the P.A.P.s' s  interest in the Malayan electorate was not diminished by the 
election results. At a press conference held after the results were 
announced Lee described them as the "best solution for this country at 
this stage.s" But he noted the problem faced by his party during the 
elect:ion campaign, when after the P.A.P. had recorded its support for 
the U.M.N.O. that party ' s  leaders called for a vote indicating unity 
about the Alliance. He went on to say: 
Every analysis I have made of the basic political situation 
in Malaysia remains undemolished. 
The people have decided to back the Tengku and fight for 
Malaysia's  survival. 
All the other problems of economics and social change will 
come back to the fore later when Indones ian confrontation has 
been resolved or contained. 
Between now and then we shall build up our organization and 
recruit able men in Malaya to help carry on the battle for a more 
just society.sSO 
In this task, Lee said, the P .A.P.  would stay out of ,.· Sabah and Sarawak 
for the time being. 51 This c0111oent emphasizes the limited extent to 
which the Singapore Government has associated itsel·f wit;h the Borneo 
territories since the attainment of Malaysia. While there has been 
some discussion between Singapore representatives and interested groups
from the: 'Bomeo territories aimed at increasing reciprocal trade ,  there 
has been no indication that the P.A.P. will attempt to match its 
Malayan activities by similar activities in Borneo. Quite apart from 
conssiderations of - national security, which the P.A.P. has suggested 
must be taken into account in its present decission not to operate in 
Borneo, it is clear that Malaya offers a much better potential audience 
for future P.A.P.  campaigns . Before Malaysia was formed Lee Kuan Yew 
was abl� to gain the cooperation of the Sabah and Sarawak leaders in 
furthering Singapore ' s  policies. Without a significant increase in the 
P.A.P.s's  parliame�tary representation, it is a matter for speculation 
47. See New York Times, 19 April 1964, Seth S. King reporting on the 
elections. 
48. Straits Times, 27 April 1964. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid. 
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if Lee will again be able to gain Bomeo support for pressures he wishes 
to exert at the Federal level • 
..
The P.A.P.'s presence in Malaya and its intentions of continuing 
political activity on the mainland in the· future cannot have aided in 
the re-establishment of mutual confidence between the Singapore and 
Malaysian leaders which Lee had spoken of as his party's chief aim when
he was returned to power in September 1963. The Malayan elections have 
left the P.A.P. in a position of weakness at the Federal level, at 
least initially, from which it will require both skill and energy to 
emerge. If criticism of the Federal Allian�e Government is to be pur ­
sued along economic policy lines by the P.A.P. , there is obviously some 
risk of further endangering its rather tenuous relationship with the 
Alliance leadership. , And this is not the only area of possible differ­
ences between the two groups. The implementation of the COllillon Market 
Agreement, a �t�er which has tended to be overshadowed by questions of 
international policy, could be a source of future disagreement'-. Singa:.
pore, perhaps amongst all the states of the Federation, most clearly 
combines political awareness ,with ��onomic vulnerability. Any suggestion, 
moreover, that the economic consequences of "Confrontation''!f'_ operating on
a long-term basis are the concern of Singapore alone could throw antago• 
nism between Singapore and Malaysian lead·ership into clear relief. 
But these are matters for the future, and the P.A.!f'P.'s lack of ·!f'suc­
cess in the Malayan _elections should not obscure th� ver;y great success· 
which that party ach· The years from 1961 to 1964 ·ieved il:l Singapore.
were ones in which there _ was a change fr®.t dis_cussion of merger as an 
uncertain hope to its pursuit as an attainable goat. This change 
occurred when the �im of merger became associated with 'that of Malaysia, 
a fact which stresses how clearly that concept, with its measures to.
provide a counterbalance to Singapore, was linked with the resolution 
of the merger impasse. . The influe,ice of Singapore's political leaders 
in resolving that impasse was considerable and has been admitted in!f'.
fairly explicit terms by Tengku Abdul Rahman. Whether Singapore played 
a part in suggesting the inclusion of the Borneo territories as a
counterbalance must
.!f'
be begged in this survey through lack of evidenceo 
By any assessmeat the successful merger of Singapore with Malaya was a 
personal triumph for Lee Kuan Yew, who presented his case to the 
Federation Prime Mtnister and then fought a battle of attrition with 
his opponents at home, never publicly admitting.!f'the possibility of de­
feat!f'. In its negotiations with the Federal Government the Singapore 
leadership showed a firm grasp of the essential aims which it pursued ; 
an ability to present its case convincingly; and a readiness to stand 
by its position even if this bmught deadlock for a time. This was 
most pronounced over ·financial and economic matters where it knew its 
goals, and since it b.elieved they were negotiable pursued them in the 
face of mounting Malayan criticism. 
The Singapore Govermnent's firmness in its negotiating was the 
more remarkable considering its internal position o Western press com­
mentary on the Lee �uan Yew Govermnent has mello-wed since it took 
office, so that tl'ere has been less publicity given to its methods of 
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gov1::100,ent and less criticism of them. Over the period which has been 
described iri this paper, the P.A .P. did not hesitate to make full use 
of the powers at its disposal to meet what it claime� were the attacks 
on its policies, motivated by Conmw1ist conspiracy. While we may point 
to the lack of trials which could test the guilt of those who were de­
tained, and criticize the "undemocratic" way in which the P. A.P. used 
radio and television , cognizance must be given to the P.A.P.'s claim 
of conne_ction between the policies of the Barisan Socialis and the ends 
desired by the Coou,n�nists. In presenting its policies to the electorate 
the P .A.P. had many advantages. At the same time it could claim and 
show that its policy on merger with Malaya was a consistent one and,
equally important in politics, a practical one too. 
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APPENDIX A 
Educational Background of the P.A.P. Leadership 
The following information on the educational.background of the 
1959-1963 P.A.P. Cabinet Ministers is extracted from Who's Who in 
Malaysia edited by J. Victor Morais. (Kua.la Lumpur, 1963), and The 
Asia Who's  Who, Third Edition published by Pan-Asia Newspaper 
Alliance (Bong- lCong, 1960). 
Lee Kuan Yew - Secondary education in English. Attended Raffles College 
(later became University of Malaya in Singapore) and the University 
of Cambridge. Profession - Lawyer. Cabinet Post - Pr1me Minister. 
Toh Chin Chye - No details of secondary education. Attended Raffles 
I
College and took a Ph.D. from the University of London. Profession 
- University Lecturer. Cabinet Post - Deputy Pr1me Minister. 
Goh Keng Swee - Secondary education in English. Attended Raffles 
College and took a Ph.D. from the University of London. ·nProfession 
- Civil Servant. Cabinet Post •- Minister of Pioaoee. 
s. Rajaratnam - No details of secondary education. Profession -
Journalist. Cabine.t Post - Minister of Culture. 
Ong Pang Boon - Secondary education in both English and Chinese. 
Attended University of Malaya in Singapore. Profession - Politician. 
Cabinet Post - Minister for Home Affairs. 
·Yong Nyuk- Lin - Secondary education in both English and Chinese. 
Attended Raffles College.· Profession - Business; manager of an 
insurance fim. Cabinet Post - Minister. for Education. 
Tan �ia Gan - Education in both English and Chinese schools. Profession 
. - aJrcraft engineer andn· trade unionist. 
IC. M. Byrne - S�condary education in English. Attended Raffles College 
and Oxford ·university. Profession - Lawyer. Cabinet Post -
Mini■ter for Law and Laboure 
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APPENDIX B 
1955 Election 
Party Strengths in th� Singapore Legialat,ive -�As�embiy 1955.:1963 
Labour Front 10 seats 
Progressives 4 seats 
1>ep,ecrats 2 seats-· 
P.A.P.. 3 seats*
Alliance 3 •eats -
-Independents 2 seats 
*the P.A.P. contested four �eats and won three. 
1959 Election 
P.A.P. 43 seats
· Singapore People's Alliance* 4 seats 
U.M.N.O. 3 seats
Independent 1 seat 
* formed largely from previous Labour Front. 
1960 Defections from P.A.P • 
.·,
Ong Eng Guan defected from the P.A.P. and took ·!f'two!f'· other
f�rmer!f',l?.A:P. membet"s with him· to form the United People ' s  
Party, thus·reducing the Gove:r,uoent �ajority to ·twenty-nine. · c40 seats in a 51 seat Assembly). 
1961 Defections from .· the P .A.P. and the Anson By-Election 
D�vid Marshall won the An•on By-election in July 1961 reducing
the Government majority by one and the defection of thirteen 
· p.A.P. 111$D.'b.ers to the Barisan Socialis reduced the Government 
majority to·!f'tWQ. (26 seats in a 51 seat Assembly)!f'. 
1962 Defection - by Mrs. Hee 
Mrs. Boe Puay Choo resigned from the P.A.P. in July 1962 and 
subse4Uently join�d the Barisan Socialis. Thus!f'.from July 1962 . . l
the P.A�P., while the strongest party in the Legislative 
Assembly, did not have a clear majority over all parties. (25 
seats in a 51 seat Assembly). 
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94 . .'
1963 Election 
P.A.P. 37 seats
Bariaan Socialis 13 seats 
U.P.P. 1 seat 
APPENDIX C 
.•,
Singapore Election Resu·lts of 21 September 1963 
Based on material published in Sunday Times (Singapore) 22 
September 1963 and State of Singapore Government Gazette 
Extraordinary, Vol. V, No. 104, 24 September 1963. -
ones which contain some of Chinese 
In addition to listing the election results in this Appendix, an
attempt has been made to classify the electorates as either "urban'' or
"rural•�. This has been done because of the importance which has been 
attributed ·to such a division in Singapore assessments of the September 
1963 election results. In seeking to makill! Such a cla·ssification, I
have relied on the references made in comments by Singapore politicians· 
and also on information kindly supplied by Mr. Edwin Lee, a fellow 
Graduate Student and Singapore Citizen •. As a very loose generalization 
the "rural" electorates are . . areas
market gardening. As indicated in the text of the paper and based on . the
information contained in Preliminary Releases from the 1957 Singapore
Census, the term ''rural" electorate moat aptly applies- to those elector­
ates falling within the former administrative unit of Jurong. A map of 
the Administrative areas used during the 1957 Singapore Census is at the 
front of this paper and a map indicating the Singapore Election Consti­
tuencies in 1963, and shaded to show the results of the September 1963
elections, appears on page 37. Some relevant material from the Prelimi­
nary Releaies of the_ 1957 Singapore Census appears at the end of this
Appendix.· 
Aljunied (16,152) 
Suppiah Visva Lingain (P.A.P.) 
Thio Khang Lock (Barisan) 
Lim Koon Teck (Alliance)!f'_ 
Woo Kong Seng (U.P.P.) -
7, 745 
4,624
1,681
1,165 
Result 1959 
v. Lingam
(P.A.P.)
Maj. 697 
Total votes cast 15,215 
Rejected yotes 132 
Percentage voting 95.0  
Majority 3,121 "rural" 
95 
96 
92.5 
335 
Anson (9 , 192) 
Per■11oal Govindasamy (P.A.P.
Chan Chong Ken (alias Tan Chong Kim) 
A. IC. Isaac (Alliance)
D.!f'S. Marshall (Ind.) 
V. Lingam (U.P.P.) 
Chiang Seok Kiong .!f'(W.P.) 
Total votes cast 
Rejected votes 
3,957
(Bariaan) 3,123 
543
416
306
91 
8,436 
70 
Result 1961 
Anson By­
Election 
D. Marshall 
(W.P.)
Maj. 546 
Percentage voting 
Majority 834 "urban" 
Bras Basah ·(10,678) 
- .
Ho See Beng (P.A.P.) 4,926 Result 1959 
3,831 Mme Hoe PuayLeon Kwan Pai (Barisan)
Pang Cheng Lvan (U.P  .P.) .
Wong Chiu Sen (alias Wong Chiu Tim) (Alliance) 
-Choo (then
P�A.P. now
Chua Chin Kiat (W.P.) 
Total V()tes cast 
Rejected votes 
Percent�ge voting 
Majority 
304
114 
9,510 
91 
89.8 
1_,09S 
Barisan)
Maj. 4,021 
''urban" 
Bukit Merah (12,225) 
Lim Huan Boon (Barisan) 
s. :Ramaswamy (P.A.P.) 
Tung Tao Chang (All.) 
Poon Weng Ying (U.P.P.) 
Ngoh Eng ltok (Ind • .) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
4,963
4,520
740
1,129
732 
11,584 
110 
95.7 
443 
Result 1959 
S. Ramaswamy
(P.A.P.)
Maj . 2,896, 
"mral
11 
97 
999 
739 
92 
Bu.kit Panjang (12,997) 
. ..
Lee Khoon Choy (P.A.P.) 4 ,940 Result 1959
Ong Liang Teng (Barisan) 5,679 Lee Khoon Choy 
Loo Bah Chit (All.) 
Thuan Paik Phok (U.P.P.) 607 
(P.A.P.)
Maj. 3,658 
Total votes 12,225 
Rejected votes 132 
Percentage voting 95.0 
Majority "rural" 
Bukit Tirnah (12,502) 
. ..
Lee Tee Tong _(Barisan)
Chor Yeok Eng. (P.A.P.)-Ong Tiong Kuan. (U.P.P.) 
Total votes 
Rejected �otes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
6,173
4,982
628 
11,783 
152 
95.4 
1,191 
Result 1959 
Yaaco'b bin Mohd.
(P.A.P.)
Maj. 3,714 
0rural" 
Caimhill (12, 340) 
..
Lim Kim San ·!f'(P.A.P.)
Lim Ang Ch\1411 (Bariaan)
Lee
.Ah Siong (All.) 
Total votes 
7 ,749 
2,443
1,467 
11,659 
Result 1959 
Lim Yen Hock
(S.P.A.) 
Maj. 2,355 
'Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 95. 2 
Majority 5,306 ''urban
tt 
98 
935 
95 
..
Changi (11,866) 
Sim Boon Woo (P.A.P. ) 4,808 Result 1959 
Siek Shing Min (Barisan) 3 ,425 Te'o Hock Gu•n 
Syed Esa Almenoar (Alliance) 1,975 (P.•A.P . )  
Maj . 662 
. 
Abd�llah bin Masood (U .P .P.) 
M. N. Yahya (Ind . )  
Total votes 11,238 
Rejected votes 105 
Percentagen·nvoting 95 .5 
Majority 1 ,383 "rural" 
Chua Chu Kang (8 ,198) 
t1lio Cheng Thun (Barisan)
Lim Kim Rian (P .A.P .)  
Sim Chit Giak (U .P .P . )  
Neo Guan Choo (Alliance) 
Goh.Tong ·.Liang (Ind .) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
3,753 
2 ,429 
. 800 
396 
345 
. . 7 ,723 
76 
95 . 1  
1 ,324 
Result 1959 
Ong Chang Sam 
,. '(then P .A:. P .  ,
··npw· Barisan) · 
.. . 
· Maj .  1, 973 
"rural" 
Crawford (10 ,949) 
. ,  
s .  T.  Bani 
-
(Barisan)
K. �- Byrnen,..(P .A .P .-) 
Robert.nBsieh_n{A�liance) 
Lan Tok Keong (U.P.P . )  
Wong Hong Toy (W. P • ) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
4 ,400 
4,207 
571 
1 ,032 
81 
10 ,291 
110 
95 .0 
193 
Result 1959 
K.  M. Byrne (P.A.P.) 
;Maj. 4., 633 
"urban" 
359 
99 
74 
Delta (14,037) 
Mme. Chan Choy Siong (P.A.P.) 5,417 Result 1959 
Wee Toon Lip (Barisan) 5,354 Mme. Chan Choy 
Cheng Chia Kuang (U.P.P.) 2 ,233 Siong (P.A.P.)  
Wong Kiu Yu (Ind.) Maja. 6,993 
Total· votes 13,363 
Rejected votes 112 
Percentage voting 95.9 
Maj�rity 63 ''urban" 
Farrer Park (10,189) 
s. R. Dhamarajoo (P.A.P.) 
Lee Chin Siang (Bar��an) 
A. P. Rajah (Alliance)a· 
Mme. Wee Kia Eng (U.P.P.) 
Total votes 
5,365 
2,619 
1 , 232 
414 
9 , 630 
Result 1959 
A. P. Rajah
(Ind.) 
Maj . 245 
Rejected votes : 
Percentage voting 95.2 
Majority 2 ,746 "urban" 
Geylang East (16,014) 
Ho· Cheng Choon (P.A.P.) 
Phua Soon Lian (Barisau) 
Ng Cheng Chwee (Alliance) 
Tan Peng Sea (U.P.P.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
7 ,165 
5 ,389 
1 ,467 
1,134 
15,155 
147 
95.5 
1 , 776 
Result 1959a. 
Mohd. Ismail bin 
Abdul 
.Rahman (P.A.P.)a
Maja. 1 ,378 
''urban" (near 
Changia.base) 
100 
Geylang Serai (15,302) 
Rahmat bin Kenap (P.A.P.) 
Ahmad bin Haji Taff (Alliance) 
Mohametl Taha Suhaimi (P .M. I .  P.) 
Darus Shariff (Ind.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
6,722 
5,019 
1 ,201 
1,059 
14,001 
423 
94.2  
1 ,703 
Result 1959 
Abdul Hamid bin 
Haji
Jumat (U.M.N.O.) 
Maj. 4 , 108 
''urban'' 
Geylang West (15,386) 
- . 
Yong Nyuk Lin (P.A.P.) 
Un Hon Kun (Barisan)
Mohamed bin.Haji Ya �acob (Alliance) 
Kum Teng Hock (lJ.P.P.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
6,288 
5,670
914 
1,541 
14,413 
162 
94. 7 
618 
Result 1959 ., . 
. . . . . .  : . . . · . . ·,l -· . •  ._, .  ., • • • • • 
Yong Nyuk Lin 
(P.A.P. ) 
Maj. 4 ,647 
"urban" 
Havelock (15,159) 
Miss Low Mian Gong (Barisan) 
Wong Chmn Choi (P. A.P .)  
Ng Chee Sen (U.P.P. )  
Lim Ser Puan (Alliance) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
6, 304 
·4,  157 
3,209
641 
14, 311 
176 
95. 5 
2 ,147 
Result 1959 
Peter Lau (P.A oP .  
then , now 
Barisan)
Maj . 5,685 
"urban" 
Hong ·ti� (12,003) 
Ong Eng Guan (U.P.P.) 
Seah Mui Kok (P.A.P.) 
Lim Chien Sen (Barisan)
Sim Tai Guan (Alliance) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
5,066
3,789
2,344 
191 
11,390 
73 
95.5 
1,277 
101 
Result 1959 
Ong Eng Guan (P.A.P.) 
Maj . 7, 642 
By-Election April 
1961 
Ong Eng Guan (Ind.) 
Maj. 4, 927 
"urban" 
Jalan Besar (13,764) 
, ., 
Chan Chee Seng (P.A.P.)
Ng Ngeong Yew (Barisan) 
Yong Wong Kit (U.P.P.)n. 
Totaln·nvotes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
6,686
5,172
1,033 
12,891 
201 
95. 1 
1,514 
Result 1959 
Chan Chee Sengn· 
(P.A. P . )
Maj. 5,027 
"urban" 
Jalan ICayu (9, 164) 
Tan Cheng Tong (Barisan) 
Teo Hup Teck (P.A.P.) 
M.P.D. Nair (Alliance)
Lui Boon Phor (U.P.P.) 
Ong Yu Thoh (Ind.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
3,312
2,676
1,057
1, 146 
516 
8,707 
61 
95.6 
636 
Result 1959 
Tan Cheng Tong 
(then P.AoPo  -
now Barisan) 
Maj . 1,908 
"urban" 
102 
5 , 563 
Joo Chiat (14, 966) 
Dr o Pong ;Kim.Heng (P.A.P.)  
Leong Keng Seng (Barisan) 
Mrs· � Seow Peck Leng (Alliance) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
9, 300 
3, 737 
1,078 
14, 115 
99 
94. 9  
Besult 1959 
C .nH. Koh (S .P.A.) 
Majo 835 
Majority "urban'' 
.Jurong (7, 611) 
Ong Shee Chua (alias Chia Thye Poh)
Ong S·ou: Chuan (P.A. P. ) 
Soh U Loh (U.P.P .)  
Wong Tuck· Leong (Alliance) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
(Barisan)3, 973 
. 2 ,268 
501 
371 
7 , 113 
96 
94 . 7  
1 ,705 
Result 1959 
Chor Yeok Eng 
(P.AoPo) 
Maj o 3 , 177 
''rural" 
.
ICallang (16 , 974) 
Buang Omar .Junid (P.A.P .)  
Philemon OojithaJD (Barisan) 
Mohd. Shariff bin Dollah (U.P.P .)  
Tan Hock Lim (Alliance) 
Tan Hai Tong (Ind.)  
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
8 ,479 
5 ,215 
1, 166 
969 
411 
16, 240 
151 
96. 5  
3 ,264 
Result 1959 
Buang Omar Junid 
. (P .A.P .)  
Maj . 723 � 
"urban" 
103 
93.9 
94.4 
Kampong Glam (10, 186) 
s. Rajaratnam (P.A.P.)  
Tan Jing Quec (Barisan)
Harbans Singh (U.P.P.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
ICpPopg Kapor (1�,.612) 
Mahmood bin Awang (P.A.P.) 
Lim .Hock Thiam (Barisan)
Chia Ban Wei (Alliance) 
Nalliah Karuppiah (U.P.P.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
4,313 
4,093 
1,224 
9 , 630 
108 
95.6 
220 
4, 554 
4,155 
1,006 
1,143 
10,858 
·106 
Result 1959 
Rajaratnam (P•.A.P.)
Maj � 4, 577 
·a"urban" 
Resulta· l959 
G. Kandasamy
(P.A.P.) 
Maja. 2 ,427 
Percentage voting 
Majority 399 "urban" 
K!!1J>ong Kembangan (15 , 787) 
' -
Mohd. Areff bin Suradi (P.A.P.) 
Saleha bt. Mohamed Shah.a(P. Ra 'ayat) 
Mohamed Ali bin Alwi (Alliance)
Ibrahim bin Ja afar (U.P.P.) 
Dr·. Mohamed Dali (P.M.I.P.)a. 
Total votes.
Rejected votes 
7 ,127 
2,674 
3, 692 
. 914 
344 
14,-,751 
163 
Result 1959 
Mohd� Ali bin Alwi 
(U.M.N.Oa., )
Maj . 244 
Percentage voting 
Majority 3,435 ''rural" 
104 
Kreta Ayer (13,n103) 
Dr. Goh �· · 1eng Swee (P.A.P.) 
Peter Lau Por Tuck (Barisan)
Loke Wan (U.P.P.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
Moulmein (10,670) 
Madame Avada Dhanam Mrs·. Devan 
Nair (P.A.P.) 
Tam Wee Tiong (Barisan) 
Neo Hay Chan (U.P.P.) 
Koh Chiat Lim (Alliance) 
Soo Tho Siu Hee 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
8 ,059 
3 , 646 
604 
12,309 
166 
95. 2  
4,413 
5, 856 
3 ,051 
575 
542 
73 
10,097 
79 
95.3 
2, 805 
Result 1959 
Dr. Goh (P.A.P.) 
Maj . 5,929 
''urban" 
Result 1959 
Lin You Eng (then 
P.A.P.n, now 
Barisan)
Maj. 369 
"urban" 
Mountbatten (16,843) 
Ng Yaon Chong (P.A.P.) 
Miss Fung Ying Chin (Barisan)
Lee Kim Clman (Alliance) 
Mrs. Felice Leon-Sob (Ind.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
7 , 751 
5, 158 
1 , 865 
1,053 
15, 827 
142 
94. 8 
2 , 593 
' 
Result
, 
1959 
Mrs.·nseon Peck 
Leng (S.P.Ao ) 
Maj . 888 
"urban" 
105 
97 
54 
95.3 
Nee Soon (10,864) 
Chan Sun Wing (Barisan) 4,914 Result 1959
How Kang Yong (P.A.P.) 3,329 Dr. Sheng Nam Chin
Yeo Teo Bok (Alliance) 364 (then P .A.P. , 
Ngo Suk Hwa (Goh So Ming) (U.P.P.) 864 now Barisan) 
Lim Siak Guan (Ind.) 103 Maj. 4,146 
Total votes 9,574 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 96.0 
Majority 1, 585 "rural" 
Pasir Panjang (6,721) 
Othman Wok (P.A.P.) 
Tay Cheng Kang (Barisan) 
.A.bmad bin Rahmat (Alliance) 
Yong Ah Kau (U.P.P.) 
Total votes 
2,879
1,887
1,351
238 
6,355 
Result 1959 
Tee Kim Leng 
(then P .A.P. , 
now Barisan) 
Maj. 239 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 992 "urban" 
Paya Lebar (13, 544) 
Kow Kee Seng (Barisan) 
Tan Kia Gan (P.A.P.) -
Goh Yeow Dek _ (Alliance) 
Yeo Keng Wee (U.P.P.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
6,152
5,402 
·!f'415
858 
12,827 
119 
"/95.0 
750 
Result 1959 
Tan Kia Gan
(P.A.P.) 
Maj. 2,322 
''rural" 
106 
8 , 165 
5 ,589 
798 
909 
94.7 
Ponggol (10, 294) 
Ng Kah Ting (P.A.P.) 
Ko Chit Kiang (Barisan)
Tan Jin Hong (Alliance)
Joseph Lee Jiak Seek (U.P.P. ) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
River Valley (10,n532) 
Lim Cheng Lock (P.A.P.) 
Goh I,am San (Barisan)
Yap Pheng Geck (Alliance)
Chung Kit Wong (U.P.P. ) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
4 ,721 
2,860 
1, 320 
984 
9 ,885 
59 
96. 5 
1, 861 
5, 597 
2, 668 
1 , 156 
455 
9, 876 
104 
Result 1959 
Ng Teng Kiang 
(P.A.P.) 
Maj. 417 
"rural" 
Queenstown (16, 123) 
Jek Yuen Thong (P.A.P.) Result 1959 
Dr. Lee SiewLee Ek Chong (Barisan) 
Lee Kee Loons (Alliance)
Ng Ho (U.P.P.) 
Cbob (then P.A.P. 
now Barisan)
Maj. 1 ,569 
Total :votes 15,461 
Rejected votes 127 
Percentage voting 96.6 
Majority 2, 576 ''urban" 
Result 1959 
Lim Cheng Lock 
(P.A.P. ) 
Maj. 5 
Percentage voting 
Majority 2, 929 "urban" 
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Rocbore (11,698) 
Dr. Toh Chin Chye (P.A.P.) 
Dr. Lee Siew Choh (Barisan)
Pan Tiek Tai (U.P.P.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
Sembawang (9 ,329) 
. . 
Tiong Eng Siong (P.A.P.)
Mme. Chen Poh Chang (Barisan) 
Pakri Apavoo (Alliance) 
Low Seng Wan (U.P.P.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
3 ,745 
3,.591a. 
1 , 197 
348 
8 , 881 
49 
95. 7 
154 
Result 1959 
Ahmad bin Ibrahim 
(PoA.P.) 
Maj .a· 2, 750 
"'rural" (Naval
dockyard workers) 
Sepoy Lines (10,046) 
. . 
Wee Toon Boon (P.A.P.) 
Ong Chang Sam (Barisan) 
Goh Su Chiang (Alliance) 
Tan Choon Sing . (U.P.P.)a. 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
5,015 
4,926 
1,061 
11 ,008 
109 
95.0 
89 
4,907 
3, 147 
793 
545 
9 , 392 
81 
94.2 
1 , 760 
Result 1959 
Dr. Toh Chin Chye 
(P.A.P.) 
Maja. 5 ,283 
''urban" 
Result 1959 
Wee Toon Boon 
(P.A.P.) 
Maj . 1 , 532 
''urban" 
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SerangOQn Ga�n• (8, 765) 
-
Raphael Alfred Gonzales (P.A.P.)  
Ng Hui Siln (Bar:l.san)
Ng Teo Joo (U.P.P.) 
Choy Koh Wah . (Alliance) 
Total votes . . 
Rejected votesn· 
Percen.tage voting 
Majority 
4,456
2,698
736 
45S 
8,345 
71 
96.0 
1,758 
Renlt 19St·n: 
Leong Keng Seng 
(t}len P .,A.P.,  
nown·Barisan) 
Maj . 1,079 
"rural" 
Siglap· (15,915.) 
Rahim Ishak (P.A.P.) 
Tay Chek Yaw._n_(�llrtY . Ra' ayat)
Soo Ban.Boe (Alliance) 
Ong Jin.Teqk .(u•.P.P.)
Koh Te� Kln (I�d.) 
Total vo��s-
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
9,342 
2,618
1,488
1,365
225 
15,038 
90 
95.0 
6,724 
Result 1959 
Che Sahorah bint 
Ahmad (P. A.P .)  
Maj. 999. 
"rural'' 
Soutbem Islands (5,236) 
Ya'acob bin Mohame� (P.A.P.)
Ahmad Jabri bin Mobao,nad Akib (All.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
2, 764 
2,224 
4,988 
60 
96.4 
540 
Result 1959 
�brnad Jabri bin Md 
Akib (U.M.N.O. ) 
Maj. 1,373 
"rural" 
109 
94.5 
Stamford (11,628) 
Andrew Fong Sip Chee (P.A.P.) 
Teo Hock Guan (Barisan)
Lim Chung Min (U.P.P.)
Lal Behari Singh (Alliance) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
5, 781 
3, 719 
771 
582 
10,853 
99 
94.1 
2,062 
Result 1959 
Mme. Fung Yin 
Ching (then P.A.P., 
now Barisan) 
Maj. 1,562 
· 11urban" 
Tampines (13,137) 
Poh Ber Liak (Barisan) 
Goh Chew Chua (P.A.P.) 
Liam Tian Seng .. (U.P.P.) 
Lim Jew Kan (Alliance)!f'. 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
5,976
3,601 
2,130
656 
12,363 
123 
95.0 
2,375 
Result 1959
Goh Chen Chua 
(P.A.P.) 
Maj. 5,420 
"rural" 
Tanglin (9,239) 
Edmund William Barker (P.A.P.)
Tan Cheow Hock (Barisan) 
Thio Chan Bee (Alliance) 
Mme. Eng Chau Sam (U.P.P.) 
Ariffin bin Mohd Said (Ind.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
4,424
1,997
1, 738 
336
166 
8,661 
70 
2,427 
Result 1959 
Thio Chan Bee 
(S.P.A.) 
Maj . 395 
"urban" 
1-10 
4,949 
Tanjong Pagar (11,395) 
Lee Kuan Yew (P.A.Po)· 
Ong Hock Siang (Barisan).
Chng Boon Eng (Alliance) 
Lim Peng Kang (U.P.P. )  
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
6 ,317 
3 , 537 
393 
473 
10, 720 
121 
95.1  
2,780 
Result · 19 59 
Lee Kuan Yew
(P.A.P.) 
. Maj • . 4 , 512 
''urban" 
Telok Ayer ( 13,219) 
. . ..
Ong Pang Boon (P.A.P.) 
Lam Chit Lee (Barisan)
Goh Hong Keng (U.P.P.) 
Wang Chung Kwang (Ind.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
5,390 
4, 987 
1 ,484 
385 
12, 246 
152 
93. 7 
403 
Result 1959 
Ong Pang Boon
(P.A.P .) 
Maj. 6 ,266 
"urban" (dockworkers) 
Telok Blangah (13,263) 
Bernard Rodrigue·s (P.A. P.)
Jukri bin Parjo (Barisan). 
Result 1959 
Abdul Rahman (Alliance) 
Tan Swee Huat.!f'(U.P.P.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
4,327 
2 , 627 
525 
12 ,428 
123 
94.6 
622 
•A.P.)John Mammen (P
.
Maj. 1 , 662 
"urban" (dock-
workers) ·
, 
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Thompson (11,336) 
Koo Young (Barisan)
Leo Keng Fong (P.A.P.)
Loo Kha Thiam (U.P.P.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
Tiong Bahru (12,534) 
Lee Teck Him (P.A.P.) 
Soon Dit Woo (Barisan) 
Ng Teng Kian (U.P.P.) 
William Tan Ah Lek (Ind.) 
Tan Kok Siong (Alliance) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
5, 731 
3, 798 
1, 088 
777
508 
11, 902 
· 84 
95.6 
1, 933 
Result 1959
Lee Teck Him
(P.A.P .) 
Maj. 2, 993 
"ruraln 
Toa Payoh (13,!f'394) 
-" 
Wong Soon Fong (Barisan) 
Yip Sai Weng (P.A.P.) 
Goh Nee Kim (U.P.P.)_
Tan Chor Yong (U.D.P.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
·5, 292 
4,248
1,223 
10, 763 
119 
95.9 
1, 044 
6, 083 
4, 276 
1,501
· 760 
12,!f'620 
152 
95. 3 
1, 807 
Result 1959
S.T. Bani (then 
P.A.P., now 
Barisan)
Maj. 2, 397 
"rural" 
Result 1959
Wong Soon F-ong
(then P.A.P., 
now Barisan) 
Maj. 6, 193 
"rural" 
95.3 
11.2 
Ulu Pandan (11,866) 
Chow Cbiok Hock (P.A.P. ) 
Johari bin Sonto (Party Ra'ayat)
.A.oang bin H.A. Ma�an (Alliance)
Ler Chin Tee (U.P.P.) . . 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
5,000
2,967
1,729
1,450 
11, 146 
126 
94.9 
2,033 
Result 1959 
Incbe Mohd. bin 
Suradi (P.A.P.) 
Maj . 1,320 
"rural" 
Upper Serangoon (12,433) 
Sia Kah Hui (P.A.P.) 
Chia Yang Loong (Barisan) 
Phua Gek Boon (U.P.P.) 
Wu Mob Cbye (Alliance)
Lim Cboon Mong (Ind.) 
Total votes 
Rejected votes 
Percentage voting 
Majority 
6,650 
3,547
595 
393 
573 
11,758 
9 5  
3, 103 
Result 1959 
Chan ·Sun Wing
( then P.A. P. , 
now Bar�san)
Maj. 125 
''urban" 
PopUlation Distribution Per Square Mile 
by Administrative Areas - 1957 
The figures a�e based on P_x-eliminary Releases by the Singapore 
Census authorities contained in M. K. Sen, The Geographical
Distribution of Population in Singapore - 1947 to 1957. 
Density of Persons 
Area % per Sfiuare Mile 
- --- -- - - -- -·-- - - - - ----- ·- - - - - · ·  - - - -- - -- -- --- - - - - ·- - · -- ----- - -
SINGAPORE 100 6,441 
CITY 63.1 24,264 
JURONG 3.5 849 
KATANG 13. 7 4,918 
BtJKIT PA.JANG 4.3 1, 728 
SERANGOON 14.4 4,398 
SOUTHERN ISLANDS 1.0 4,885 
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-- -- -
CITY 
7.5 
Percentage Racial Distrilution of Population 
by Administrative Areas - 1957 
Thtf pe�tage,; are based on Preliminary Releases by the Singapore 
Census authorities contained in M. K. Sen, The Geographical . 
Distribution of Population in Singapore - 1947 to 1957. 
Administrative 
Area Chinese Malaysians 
* 
Indians Other 
-
77.9 11.0 9. 1 2.0 
JURONG 82.7 14.2 2.8 0.3 
KATONG 62.1 27.5 2.9 
SERANGOON 79.3 8.1 10.9 1.7 
BUKIT PANJ'ANG 76.0 12.9 10. 1 1.0 
SOUTHERN ISLANDS · 25.4 69.2. 4.0 1.4 
..* 
The term is used here because of the difficulty, for census purposes,
of distinguishing between Malays from Singapore and Malaya and those 
of Malay race who have come to Singapore from one of the nearby 
Indonesian islands. 
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Pementage Population Distribution by Administrative·nArea . . .. 
and Occupation - 1957 
Occupational Singa- Bukit Se ran- Southera 
Group pore City Jurong Panjang goon Katong Islands 
··· - - .. 
·AGRICULTURE 7.9 2. 1 59.7n 20.s 12. 2  13.5 13. 2 
CLERICAL 10.4 10.7 1.3 s.s 10.3 14.1 4.5 
COMMERCIAL 18. 3 20.3 7. 7 12.0 15.3  17. 1 4. 7 
PRODUCTION 31.3 33.2 15.2 40.0 31.4 22.3 
29.8SERVICES 23.9 24.9 12.3 16.4 24.0 
11.3TRANSPORr 8.3 a.a 3.8 5.6 
The percentages are based on Preliminary Release$ by the Singapore
Census authorities contained in M. K. Sen, :T�. ae·ographical Dis­
tribution· of Popula�ion in Singapore - 1947 to ·1957. 
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